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This dissertation examines the public opinion-public policy nexus with regard to the 
making of U.S.-China policy during the Clinton administration (1992-2000). The 
researcher investigates how the mass media discourse on U.S.-China relations relates to 
the policy tradeoff between economic interdependence and confrontation on human 
rights. Particularly, the quantitative study of the media discourse is placed within a 
Communitarian perspective to determine: (1) whether the policy tradeoff can claim to 
have the support of public opinion; (2) whether the media discourse originated from the 
active civic participation; and (3) how the policy tradeoff broke its promise. As a result, 
the researcher concludes that the eclipse of co-operative inquiry of the U.S. public, the 
ascendancy of issue management of special stakeholders, and the entanglement 
between newsmaking and policy-making may have jeopardized the republican virtue of 
U.S. diplomacy.  
First, the researcher contextualizes U.S.-China relations and relates it to the 
dynamics of U.S. foreign policy choices among four national interests: power, 
prosperity, principle, and peace. Then, the researcher sets the Communitarian theory of 
the press as a normative theory of media democracy and incorporates other positive 
theories of political communication to make sense of the dilemma of the current media 
democracy. Following that, a content analysis of the New York Times and Cable News 
Network examined: (1) who said what; (2) which perspective prevails; (3) the 
correlation between newsmaking and policy-making; and (4) the congruence/dissension 
between policy beltway and other social groups.  
The finding suggests a significant correlation between/among the policy proposal, 
the author of that proposal, and the issue/frame espoused; on the other hand, the 
conspicuous differences among policy-makers, ordinary citizens (issue public), and 
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professional communicators in regard to the policy trade-off indicates a low public 
accountability of the policy tradeoff. To explain the discrepancy, the investigator 
examined corporate America’s issue management of U.S.-China trade and put the 
policy tradeoff into the perspective of capitalistic globalization theory. Finally, the lack 
of republican virtue is explained as a result of corporate-driven diplomacy and the 
media discourse short of civic participation. Henceforward, a Communitarian press 
becomes recommendable for the rejuvenation of media democracy. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This dissertation research examines the opinion-policy nexus with regard to the making 
of U.S.-China policy during the Clinton administration (1993-2000). Through content 
analysis of major media discourse in the U.S., the investigator tries to determine (1) 
how the news coverage of China and the policy debate on U.S.-China relations in the 
mainstream media relate to the fundamental tradeoff of U.S.-China relations between 
trade and human rights in the last decade; (2) how the prevalence of a given foreign 
policy framework, such as realism vis-à-vis idealism, economic globalization vis-à-vis 
democratic peace, and dollar diplomacy vis-à-vis human rights diplomacy, relates to 
the mass-mediated consensus-building; (3) among plural social groups, whose 
perspective won the mediated competition of ideas and whose policy proposal is more 
congruent with the actual framework of the Clinton administration’s China policy. By 
doing so, this quantitative study of “who said what” may constitute a firm foundation 
for policy critique with regard to the republican virtue of U.S.-China policy. 
The reason that “who said what” matters in the opinion-policy nexus lies in that 
“people are policy”1 and “ideas have consequences.”2 In examining the connection 
between opinion manufacturing, or consensus building, and policy-making, “who said 
what” in the public forum could be a cleft whereby one can break into the opinion-
policy nexus. In reviewing the policy zigzag along pragmatism and principle and the 
policy tradeoff between trade and human rights in U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold 
War years, it is advisable to analyze the mass-mediated policy debate on China policy 
and news coverage of Chinese affairs during a given period of time to understand how 
the climate of opinion has been produced and how the mass-mediated consensus- 
building interacts with policy formation. 
                                                 
1 Edwin Feulner, head of the Heritage Foundation, says so. See: www.heritage.org/Press/nr030403a.cfm
2 This is title of Richard Weaver’s book: “Ideas Have Consequences” (1948), University of Chicago 
Press. 
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The investigator chooses the Clinton administration to examine the opinion-policy 
nexus because the Clinton years may have seen the most tumultuous change of policy 
framework of U.S.–China relations. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. 
Congress and other political factors and social groups regained more assertiveness in 
policy formulation, and thus could have engaged in more robust policy debate in the 
public forum. On the other hand, conducting diplomacy with the Chinese Communist 
government – in the wake of communism bankruptcy in Soviet and East Europe and in 
the face of the Chinese government remaining unrepentant toward the Tiananmen 
crackdown on democratic demonstration – provide sufficient ammunition for public 
debate on controversies. The U.S.–China strategic engagement in 1990s in spite of, or 
because of, conspicuous confrontation on democratic principle may render a 
compelling case for studying the republican virtue of the U.S. foreign policy. 
The republican virtue of U.S. foreign policy includes democratic debate on foreign 
policy and democratic value orientation in foreign affairs, i.e., the public accountability 
and democratic morality of foreign relations. As to the public accountability of foreign 
policy, the founders of this nation cautioned that foreign affairs, such as entangling 
alliance and warfare in foreign lands, tend to cause domestic tyranny, impoverishment, 
“and the destruction of the necessary physical foundations of republican virtue” 
(Alterman, 1998, p. 43). Therefore, foreign policy ought to be subjected to the scrutiny 
of democratic polity; without it a new republic like the United States could be “tempted 
to the gun smoke of an old empire” (Kennan, 1951). As to the democratic value 
orientation of foreign affairs, the theory of democratic peace argues that U.S. foreign 
affairs should support the spread of democratic principle and the enlargement of 
democratic community around the world in the hope that democratic polity will reduce 
the risk of war. To fellow democracies around the world, the best strategy to insure 
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security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.    
Ironically, the two dimensions of the republican virtue are sometimes at odds. 
President Franklin Roosevelt expressed his desperate need to “escape foreign policy 
handcuffs,” i.e., democratic polity at home, to confront Nazi threat to democracy 
abroad (Alterman, 1998, p. 72). So, public accountability of foreign policy and 
democratic value orientation of foreign policy are not always quite square with each 
other. Nevertheless, over time, democratic participation in the making of foreign 
policy, though minimal, tend to guard democratic morality of the United States’ foreign 
affairs (Alterman, 1998). 
In supporting policy critique of the republican virtue of the U.S.-China policy, the 
content analysis of the media discourse places an emphasis on (1) whether the U.S. 
public, represented by ordinary citizens and other social groups, has participated in the 
democratic conversation with regard to the China issue to the extent that it may hold 
the elite policymakers accountable in framing the U.S.–China policy; (2) whether 
public opinion, represented by media discourse, has a clear insistence on the democratic 
morality of the U.S.–China relations. 
This dissertation research also is conducted in the context of policy rethinking 
undertaken both in the United States and the People’s Republic of China. In China, 
there is a lamentation that globalization-oriented U.S.–China relations converted the 
Chinese economy into an inessential assemble line of the world factory rather than a 
world factory in itself, and that the Washington Consensus conceived by the neoliberal 
economists directed Chinese economy toward “a race to the bottom” – winning global 
economic competition through cheap labor, low environmental standards, and 
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authoritarian polity.3 Multinational corporations have discouraged independent R&D of 
Chinese enterprises, and thus rendered the Chinese industry a rudimentary supplier in 
the world economy system. In political aspect, the pragmatic diplomacy with the 
United States made China an auxiliary of the U.S. rather than an independent voice in 
the “multipolar politics,” which the Chinese government has advocated to balance the 
U.S.-led “unipolar politics.” 
In the United States, the policy rethinking is that the tradeoff of U.S.-China relations 
between economic cooperation and human rights is a dramatic turnabout of policy 
framework in the post-Cold War years. Its long-term effect remains to be observed. The 
short-term effect is that, enmeshed into economic interdependence between China and 
the U.S., the human rights diplomacy becomes increasingly toothless. Economic and 
trade issues between the U.S. and China overwhelms other issues by which a 
democracy sets itself apart from a non-democratic government. The most worrisome 
result is that the international community is losing leverage to hold the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) accountable to human rights values4. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to look into the opinion-policy nexus to see how such a policy tradeoff took 
place in conceptual world and who is the major shaper behind the policy turnabout. 
The research could claim some originality in that (1) rare empirical research has 
been conducted to examine the republican virtue of the U.S.-China policy in the post-
Cold War years; (2) the project tries to relate a critique of U.S.-China policy to the 
critique of the China policy-making process.  
In summary, this research looks into how policy-makers, opinion leaders, elite 
groups, stakeholders, and active social groups, participated in the mediated-debate on 
                                                 
3. Yu, Yan: Big country bewildered in globalization age: Is China really benefiting from globalization? 
Utopia Thinking. Available at: http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class17/200605/6758.html     
4. Agence France-Presse (AFP) “Washington’s China policy a ‘total failure’: top US lawmaker.” 
Thursday, May 19th 2005 at 7:13 pm ET.  Text available at http://www.political-news.org/breaking/ 
10814/washingtons -china-policy-a-total-failure-top-us-lawmaker.html. 
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U.S.-China policy during 1993-2000. Particularly, the investigator tries to find out: (1) 
How does the media discourse relate to the paradigmatic shift of U.S. foreign policy – 
from consensus of outrage and indignation to a consensus of engagement – in the post-
Tiananmen years, and thus, enlist public support for, or opposition to, a pragmatic, 
globalization-oriented China policy? (2) To what extent are the mainstream media’s 
coverage of China and the mediated debate on U.S. – China policy relevant to the 
actual policy framework during the Clinton years? (3) Whose opinion on the 
mainstream media is more congruous with the actual China policy framework? 
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Chapter 2. Background 
This chapter examines the pedigree of the U.S. foreign policy and the geopolitical-
ideopolitical context of the U.S.-China relations in the past decades. As to the U.S. 
foreign policy tradition, the investigator puts it into McDougall’s perspective. 
McDougall (1997) observes that the United States encounters the world with an 
“American exceptionalism” by which the United States is destined to spread 
republicanism, freedom, and democracy around the world and “to be a light to lighten 
the world” (p.20). As to the geopolitical-ideopolitical context of the U.S.-China 
relations, the investigator adopts Jentleson’s 4Ps policy tradeoffs framework. Jentleson  
(2000) theorizes that U.S. foreign policy is basically a “dynamics of choice” among 
four national interests – power (realism), peace (liberal internationalism), prosperity 
(international political economy), and principle (democratic idealism) (p.10-24). 
Applying Jentleson’s 4Ps theories to the dynamics of U.S.-China policy choice in the 
past decade, the researcher assumes that, among many policy tradeoffs, such as 
balance-of-power versus global meliorism, realpolitik of superpowers vs. idealism, 
international law vs. raison d’etat, and so forth, the fundamental policy tradeoff of 
U.S.-China relations is between prosperity and principle, i.e., between U.S.-China trade 
relations and China’s human rights record.  
In the post-Cold War years, democracy is increasingly recognized as the sole origin 
of political legitimacy. Political democracy and economic development are increasingly 
becoming siblings in both wealthy Asian countries, where authoritarian regimes 
crumpled one by one, and democratic East European countries, where economies 
recovered after the earlier chaos and malaise. However, as A. M. Rosenthal, the most 
prolific columnist of The New York Times during 1990s in regard to commenting on 
U.S.-China diplomacy, pointed out, the CCP excused itself from political reform. The 
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CCP government argued that the Western powers have brutalized China and thwarted 
China’s economic development and social progress in the 19th century; now that 
economic development has tremendous importance to China, it must be free of Western 
interference or pressure, namely, the teaching of human rights and the pressure for 
democratic polity. Based on that dubious argument, which manifested fear of a 
democratic future rather than grievance against past injustices, the CCP government 
flat-out “determined not to allow the Chinese people to take part in the historic 
movement spreading worldwide: the simultaneous development of prosperity and 
political freedoms” (Rosenthal, 1995, p.27). 
On the other hand, the CCP government learned a lesson from the quick meltdown 
of the Soviet Union and East European communist regimes that economic success can 
fence off arguments for political liberalization and westernization. In the meantime, 
U.S. society, after nearly a half century of Cold War with the Soviet Union, needs to 
recover from battle fatigue, restructure its military industry, and reaffirm its economic 
ascendancy. The Chinese market of 1.2 billion people just cannot be ignored for too 
long. Consequently, both the U.S. and China were enmeshed in the need to develop 
trade relations in spite of, or perhaps because of, conspicuous difference in political 
beliefs, values, and traditions. 
1. Republican Virtue of the U.S. Foreign Policy 
Before examining the republican virtue of the U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to 
look into civic republicanism as one pillar of the American institutional civilization. 
According to Honohan (2002), civic republicanism, rather than traditional liberalism 
which emphasizes individual rights and excludes substantive questions of values and 
the good life from politics, has been a more or less continuous and coherent republican 
tradition in the Western politics. Civic republicanism maintains that freedom, political 
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and personal, can be better realized “through membership of a political community in 
which those who are mutually vulnerable and share a common fate may jointly be able 
to exercise some collective direction over their lives” (Honohan, 2002, p.1). 
Furthermore, civic republicanism maintains that “freedom depends crucially on the 
virtue of the political classes, and their pursuing the interests of the whole” (p. 33). The 
thinkers of civic republicanism, such as Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, 
Harrington, Jefferson, and Madison, connected political freedom with political 
participation and active citizenship, and stressed that civic virtues – active concerning 
for the common good and participation in deliberation on self-rule – are as important as 
law in sustaining a civilized society. To civic republican thinkers, individual virtue is, 
although crucial, a fragile basis for a republic (Honohan, 2002, p. 79). 
In Pericles-era, civic virtue is valued more highly than freedom, just the way that 
political life is valued more highly than private life. Machiavelli, in commenting on the 
decay and corruption of the Roman republic, argued that people who put their own 
particular or sectional interests before the common good cannot remain self-governing 
and independent of domination by an autocratic ruler or external force. Montesquieu 
argued, in “The Spirit of the Law,” that while a tyranny and a monarchy necessitate 
cultivation of composition for fear and composition for honor respectively among the 
governed, the republic necessitates the cultivation of the public virtue among the 
governed.5  
Later on, civic republican thinkers worried that the rise of commerce was 
incompatible with republics and warned that “while commerce leads to increasing 
material interdependence, it distracts people from political concerns,” reduces feelings 
of solidarity, and weakens their commitment to the common good (Honohan, 2002, p. 
                                                 
5 Daniel N. Robinson: American Ideals: Founding a “Republic of Virtue.” An audio book published by 
The Teaching Company. Available at: www.teach12.com/ttc/assets/coursedescriptions/4855.asp 
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78-81). Actually, in commerce society, the eclipse of the civic virtue results in a 
redefinition of political liberty: It “is no longer understood as active participation in 
government but as security from arbitrary attack or punishment” (Honohan, 2002, p. 
82); It is ensured “not because people act virtuously for the common good, but because 
institutions and laws channel and limit self-interested actions” (p. 82). As Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World illustrated, in a highly commercialized society, deep-level 
divisions of labors, socialized machine production, and international trade tend to 
necessitate a highly regimented lifestyle and a totalitarian polity. 
Overall, civic republicanism emphasizes responsibility for common good and 
demands interdependent citizens to recognize their membership in a political 
community, to share a common fate for jointly determining some collective direction 
over their lives, and “to deliberate on, and realize, the common good of an historically 
evolving political community” (Honohan, 2002, p. 1). 
Civic republicanism has deep roots in American political tradition. In the very early 
years of the thirteen colonies, John Winthrop beseeched civic participation in 
government with a communitarian pitch: “We must delight in each other, make others’ 
conditions our own, rejoice together, always having before our eyes our community as 
member of the same body.”6 In the early nineteenth century, Tocqueville observed that 
democracy in America was founded on “the equality of conditions,” which, in turn, 
cultivated the propensity among citizens to form civic associations and to read 
newspapers. Various civic associations facilitated political association for exercising 
power. To Tocqueville, a citizen standing along, while independent, lacks political 
power, including the power to protect his or her independence; civic/political 
associations, which stem from equality, serve to protect the gains in equality by setting 
                                                 
6 Cited by Robert Putnam in Making Democracy Work (Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 87 
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against one another groups with special interests, and keeping any one of them from 
becoming dominant. As a result, voluntary civic/political associations of citizens not 
only arise from but also sustain democracy and protect community from “tyranny and 
license” (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 9). 
The architects of the American republic were tremendously influenced by the works 
of Harrington and Montesquieu. Viewing particular interests or factions as one of the 
main threats to the peace and freedom of citizens, the founders of this nation wanted to 
preserve both individual freedom and public virtue in the new republic through a strong 
federation against external enemies, and through the Bill of Rights which guarantees a 
participatory citizenry. Henceforward, civic republicanism has two strings of thinking: 
One is popular democracy, the other is representative democracy.  
On one hand, Thomas Jefferson demanded that power of a frugal and virtuous 
republic of yeoman and independent artisan should be decentralized below the parish to 
the ward level to facilitate grassroots democracy. He suggested that “the ward 
government be in charge of everything from running schools to caring for the poor to 
operating police and military forces to maintaining public roads” (Putnam, 2000, p. 
336). He believed that “making every citizen an acting member of the government, and 
in the offices nearest and most interesting to him, will attach him by his strongest 
feelings to the independence of his country, and its republican constitution.”7  
On the other hand, appalled at the Terror of the French Revolution which 
significantly discredited the participatory strand of republicanism, Madison’s 
republicanism theory maintained that the civic participation and common good be 
sustained by election of virtuous representatives. According to George F. Will, a 
conservative commentator who sympathizes with communitarian politics, Madison 
                                                 
7 Cited by Robert D. Putnam (2000) in Bowling Alone, p. 336  
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envisaged that the deliberative body – Congress – “would filter the public’s unformed 
sentiments and give them shape and the weight of reasonableness” (Will, 1994, p. 286). 
Also, Madison believed that the numerous special interests or factions within a large 
republic would cancel one another out to the minimum ill effect on the common good. 
Accordingly, the exercise of civic virtue relies more on political elite than on the 
general citizenry or “popular leader” – demagogue, although Madison himself did not 
abandon citizen virtue overall. Nevertheless, Madison maintained that the 
representative government is designed mainly to refine and enlarge the citizenry’ 
viewpoints about public affairs, which may best discern the true interest of their 
country, rather than to reflect assorted interest of a commerce society. Enjoying at least 
equal status with the presidency, the deliberative body was expected to preempt 
presidential appeal to, and manipulation of, public opinion (Will, 1994, p. 286).  
Over all, in the formative years of the American republic, it was a truism that 
democratic self-government requires an actively engaged citizenry, a lack of which 
may result in the decadence of the republic. Benjamin Franklin cringed at the 
vicissitudes of history of humankind teeming with despotism based on blood relations 
or bureaucratic rules and sorely lacking in republicanism founded on civic ties. He 
admonished the new republic at the end of the Constitutional Convention: “We have a 
government, a republic, if you can keep it.”8   
Based on the review of the civic republicanism of the U.S. democracy, the 
investigator assumes that the U.S. foreign policy tradition is inevitably tinged with the 
civic republicanism tradition. Henceforward, the investigator looks into the republican 
virtue of the U.S. foreign policy.  
To be specific, the republican virtue includes two dimensions: (1) America’s 
                                                 
8 Cited by James Carey (1991) in “‘A republic, if you can keep it’: Liberty and public life in the age of 
Glasnost.” In James Carey: A Critical Reader, edited by Eve Stryker Munson and Catherine A. Warren. p. 
207. 
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external relations have been required to be consistent with the sacred principles of the 
Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution (Kennan, 1951, 15-16); 
America’s foreign affairs should be an agent for good or for American values, not just 
for its effect on the balance of power and influence. Foreign policy will lack 
legitimacy if disconnected from the ideals and aspirations of the American people 
(Niebuhr 1932). (2) The formulation and implementation of American foreign policy 
should undergo the scrutiny of public opinion lest it undermine popular sovereignty and 
self-governance in the name of executive privilege to conduct diplomacy. 
Since its founding, the United States has perceived itself as an exceptional national 
entity in that its foreign policy is driven more by domestic virtue than by the vagaries of 
international politics; the objectives of foreign policy were but a means to the end of 
promoting the goals of domestic society, i.e., democracy, liberty, equality, prosperity, 
and peace. Therefore, when the United States government annexed the Philippines from 
the Spaniards at the end of the 19th century, many American publics worried that 
imperial policy might be contrary to their domestic democratic institutions and moral 
ethos.9 “Kings can have subjects; it is a question whether a republic can” (Kennan, 
1951).  
In the country’s earlier years, America’s founding fathers saw their nation as “a 
distillation of virtues latent in the civilization they left behind, but susceptible of 
realization only in America” (McDougall, 1997, p. 17). They imagined that the new 
republic had a global mission to spread republicanism and was “destined to prosper and 
grow into what Jefferson called an ‘Empire for Liberty’” (McDougall, 1997, p. 18-19). 
The providential character of the American experiment requires the American people to 
cultivate virtue and exercise self-discipline lest liberty perish. Therefore, the new nation 
                                                 
9 Gookin, F. W. (1899). A literary catechysm. Cited by Kennan, G. F., in  American Diplomacy, p. 18.
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on the new continent pledged to make no alliance, fight no wars, and spurn all intrigue. 
The melioristic and messianic diplomacy of the new nation would “reject power 
politics, balance of power, and intrigue in favor of pacifism, idealism, and reliance on 
moral persuasion” (McDougall, 1997, p. 20). “American people were not to do 
anything special in foreign affairs, but to be a light to lighten the world” (McDougall, 
1997, p. 20). “America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”10 Based 
on this democratic idealism, the United States tried to avoid any sort of paternalistic 
responsibility to any other country (Kennan, 1951, p. 19).  
Later on, the republican virtue of American diplomacy took the form of democratic 
peace theory, i.e., the United States should support the spread of democracy, not just 
because it is the right thing to do, but also because history demonstrates that 
democracies do not fight wars against fellow democracies. Thus, it is in the United 
State’s interest to support democratization to reduce the risk of war. President 
Woodrow Wilson made it a solemn or even tragic destiny of the U.S. to fight not “for 
revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the 
vindication of the right, of human rights, of which [we] are only a single champion… to 
fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts – for democracy, for the 
rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert 
of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at 
last free.”11 Thus, America’s international commitment and conduct should reflect the 
nation’s democratic value orientation. 
The second aspect of the republican virtue of U.S. diplomacy, public accountability 
of the foreign policy-making process, requires that American diplomacy be straight 
                                                 
10 John Quincy Adams, July Fourth Address of 1821. Cited by McDougall, W. (1997). Promised Land, 
Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776. Boston and New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, p. 36 
11 Cited by McDougall, W. (1997). Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the 
World Since 1776. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 23-24 
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with American citizens. As John Adams put it, “where European diplomacy was secret, 
bellicose, and riddled with intrigue, American policy would be open, peaceful, and 
honest”12 The dignity of America does not consist in diplomatic ceremonials or 
etiquette; “it consists solely in reason, justice, truth, [and] the rights of mankind.”13 
American foreign policy must reflect democratic ideals in both style and substance. It 
must be formulated through democratic means (Alterman, 1998).  
However, the republican virtue of U.S. foreign policy is an ideal to follow 
instead of a rule to be enforced. Although foreign policy will lack legitimacy if 
disconnected from the ideals and aspirations of the American people, it is inherently 
a fault to formulate foreign policy solely on the basis of legalistic-moralistic 
principles in spite of “contingent necessity” (Kennan, 1951, p. 95, p. 16). The 
doctrine of turning the other cheek runs against the national interest or raison d’etat 
because, as Niebuhr notes, national interest is itself a moral proposition (Sherrill, 
1999; Rosenthal, 1995). The republican virtue of American diplomacy needs to 
have a shield and a sword. Kennan (1951) elaborates that pursuit of national 
interest, “unsullied by arrogance or hostility toward other people or delusions of 
superiority,” is itself a decent undertaking and “can never fail to be conducive to a 
better world” (p. 103).  
Therefore, besides republican virtue, American diplomacy has another 
characteristic which is above ethical scrutiny. That is the basis for which Niebuhr 
commended President Kennedy during the Cuba missile crisis: “Moral men had to 
play hardball.” America will not take up the cause of freedom everywhere. Following 
this realism as its foreign policy framework, America will not choose its friends solely 
on the basis of republican principles (McDougall, 1997, p. 37). Even the founding 
                                                 
12 Cited by McDougall, W. (1997). Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the 
World Since 1776. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 23-24
13 ibid.  p. 24  
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fathers did not expect that the United States would behave so saintly by virtue of being 
a republic as to put their new nation into jeopardy by inviting foreign powers to impose 
humiliation or even war on America (McDougall, 1997, p. 27).  
Based on this hardball theory, the goal of U.S. foreign policy is to maintain balance 
of power. Some realists argued that democratic peace theorists confuse correlation with 
causality, mistakenly emphasizing the nature of the domestic political system as the 
cause of peaceful relations. Realists lamented that the tendency to achieve foreign 
policy objectives by inducing other governments to practice the same high moral and 
legal principle is “of the questionable applicability” (Kennan, 1951). To realists, the 
balance-of-powers and power politics are still the rules of the world; “international 
relations is a struggle for power,” and statesman should “think and act in terms of 
interest defined as power” (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 5); alliance against a mutual enemy is 
a key component of realistic diplomacy; coercive and covert statecraft is justifiable “to 
defend the American national interest in the gray areas where military operations are 
not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate.”14 The U.S. should abandon the pompous, 
self-righteous, holier-than-thou moralizing and reject the crusader mentality, and 
recognize that the national interest, reasonably conceived, is legitimate motivation for a 
large portion of the nation’s behavior, and thus be prepared “to pursue that interest 
without either moral pretension or apology” (Kennan, 1953, p. 166). The U.S. should 
“see virtue in our minding our own business wherever there is not some overwhelming 
reason for minding the business of others” (Kennan, 1953, p. 176).  
Consequently, realists do not reject detachment of the foreign policy establishment 
from the citizenry. To realists, public support is not a necessary precondition to the 
republican virtue of U.S. foreign policy. On the contrary, American foreign policy at its 
                                                 
14 Cited in Loch K. Johnson, America as a World Power: Foreign Policy in a Constitutional Framework. 
p. 239. New York: McGraw Hill, 1991. 
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most principled moments owed its idealism less to democratic means than to 
democratic aims. Those aims are derived, moreover, not from popular whims but from 
the ideas of a specific political system (Kaplan, 1999). A democratic means for 
formulating foreign policy may result in an anti-democratic agenda, such as unilateral 
action as a rejection of a global issues agenda. The disposition of populist statecraft 
could just as easily be nationalistic, even mean-spirited (Kaplan, 1999). Some 
occasions arise in which popular opinion on international matters fell short and elites 
got things right – most notably, regarding the threat posed by Nazi Germany and the 
U.S. public’s reluctance to react toward that threat during the early years of the FDR 
administration. 
Therefore, it is arguable that the making of foreign policy might be insulated from 
public pressure. Kennan (1951) suggests that in the short term public opinion “can be 
easily led astray into areas of emotionalism and subjectivity which make it a poor and 
inadequate guide for national action” (p. 93). For instance, he relates the outbreak of 
the Spanish-American War in1900 to fantastic warmongering conducted by a section of 
the American press. He also relates the outbreak of the Korean War to anti-communist 
hysteria – McCarthyism – and the China Lobby fueled by the Chiang Kai-shek regime 
(Kennan, 1951). He saw the U.S. media exaggerated America’s security in 1900 the 
same way it exaggerated America’s insecurity in 1951 (Kennan, 1951, p. 1). In both 
cases, public orators, newspaper reporters and columnists, and television announcers 
reduced complexities to crude stereotype and frames, which prevailed over 
sophisticated analysis and detailed study, and, to make things worse, “lent itself to 
domestic exploitation” (Kennan, 1951, p. 167).  
Even the staunchest defenders of modern Liberalism, from Locke to Madison to 
Tocqueville, specifically questioned the wisdom of allowing for democratic 
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participation in matters of foreign affairs (Kaplan, 1999). In the early nineteenth 
century, Tocqueville found the dilemma, or “the Tocqueville problem in American 
history,” that in conducting foreign affairs, “democratic government do appear 
decidedly inferior to others” because diplomacy requires none of the good qualities 
peculiar to democracy but demands cultivation of those sorely lacking (Tocqueville, 
1969, p. 228-229). Democracy found it difficult to coordinate the details of a great 
undertaking and to fix on a plan and carry it through with determination. In addition, it 
had little capacity for combining measures in secret and waiting patiently for the result. 
(Tocqueville, 1969, 228-229). Locke, Rousseau, and Madison excluded foreign affairs 
from their respective litanies of a citizen’s right (Kaplan, 1999).  
In some extreme occasions, realist diplomats see American democracy as “one of 
those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as a room and brain the size of a pin, 
either lying in his comfortable primeval mud and paying little attention to his 
environment, or, being disturbed, exhibiting blind determination to destroy not only his 
adversary but largely his native habitat (Kennan, 1951, 66). Lippmann (1955) notes that 
the prevailing public has been destructively wrong at critical junctures of foreign 
affairs. He lamented that the people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of 
informed and responsible officials: “They have compelled the governments, which 
usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or more expedient, to be 
too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose 
in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent” (Lippmann, 1955, 
p. 20). Therefore, the executive branch of government often justifies insularity of 
foreign policy-making from public opinion on the basis of national interest. Foreign 
policy debate has been deliberately shielded from the effects of democratic debate, with 
virtually no institutionalized democratic participation (Alterman, 1998, p. 4).  In 1989, 
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the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs conducted a survey, asking 
foreign policy establishment, i.e., government officials, congressional staffs, inside 
academics, think-tank scholars, lawyers, and bankers: “whether there should be 
democracy in foreign policy making?” Nearly 50 percent of those questioned disagreed 
with the statement that the general public is qualified to participate in framing U.S. 
foreign policy. 
However, many other arguments are apologetic for public accountability of U.S. 
foreign policy. Basically, the U.S. could not claim to be a functional democracy when 
its foreign policy-making process is shielded from the effects of democratic debate and 
civic participation (Alterman, 1998, p. 4-5). The public life is the fundamental concept 
of the entire liberal tradition. “The press justifies itself in the name of the public” 
(Carey, 1995, p. 236). Liberal society is formed around the notion of a virtuous public 
whose members, to justify their membership, are always willing and prepared to accept 
a calling to take part in rational and critical discourse. This public discourse is 
conducted in public space where a member of the public are expected to converse like a 
stranger, to welcome fellow disputants or conversationalists as stranger too, to be 
willing to answer questions, to be forthright, to disclose hidden motives, to transcend 
private interest, “to avoid intimacy, to wear a public mask, to shun the personal, to 
clamp some control on affect, and in general to achieve some psychological distant 
from the self” (Carey, 1995, p. 237).  
Actually, the U.S. public has over time demonstrated an impressive consistency in 
supporting liberal republican values articulated by the country’s founding fathers, one 
that is easily obscured by polling data that focus on immediate reactions to various 
crises (Alterman, 1998, p. 6). The public may have a more sound grasp of the basic 
principles governing foreign policy than those of the establishment that professes to 
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represent them (Alterman, 1998). A popularly conceived foreign policy would no 
longer sustain repressive regimes, blindly pursue open markets, and more generally, 
compromise democratic values (Alterman, 1998). The problem is not that the public’s 
preferences in foreign affairs are imprudent or impracticable, but “how to force the 
government to respond to its preference” (p. 6).  
Foreign policy-making is an important part of public affairs. How can the United 
States claim to be a functioning democracy when one of the most crucial aspects of 
public policy allows for almost no democratic participation? Given the increasing 
intertwinement of domestic issues and foreign-policy issues in the form of “issue 
networks” or “intermestic politics,”15 it is increasingly urgent to reinforce the civic 
engagement in foreign policy making. The public’s disengagement in, ignorance of, 
and apathy toward foreign affairs could contribute to the general public cynicism 
toward democratic institution and the long-term civic malaise in the representative 
democracy (Norris, 2000, p. 4). To remedy the civic malaise, Norris suggests that news 
media reinforce their three basic roles as (1) a civic forum or public sphere encouraging 
pluralistic debate on public policy choices, (2) a watchdog against the abuse of power, 
and (3) a mobilizing agent encouraging public learning and participation in the policy- 
making process (p. 12).  
This dissertation research looks into the media-policy nexus and elite/non-elite 
inputting in the mediated debate on the policy tradeoff between the U.S.-China trade 
and human rights to find out to what extent the making of U.S.-China policy affirms or 
disregards the republican virtue of American foreign policy.  
Besides the aforementioned analysis of American foreign policy tradition in terms of 
power (realism) and principle (democratic idealism), the investigator pays special 
                                                 
15 See in Jentlesen B. W. (2004). American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 33 
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attention to “prosperity” (international political economy), the third P of Jentlesen’s 4Ps 
framework with regard to dynamics of American foreign policy choices. The 
investigator chooses to conduct a descriptive overview of corporate America’s China 
lobby in 1990s to illustrate political economy of the American foreign policy. The 
investigator assumes that analysis of corporate America’s China lobby could be an 
important supplement for reexamination of the policy-making process in addition to the 
media-policy framework. Furthermore, a reasonable critique of the policy tradeoff 
between economic cooperation and human rights should include analysis of the 
corporate force behind the engineering of a non-judgmental U.S.-China relations in the 
post-Cold War years. 
2.  U.S.-China Relations in the 1990s 
President Nixon’s historic visit to China was probably the most important and 
intelligent American foreign policy maneuver since the Truman administration’s 
Marshall Plan. While the Marshall Plan was initiated in support of American ideals, the 
U.S.-China diplomacy was conceived largely in spite of American ideals. By 1971, the 
publication of a report authored by a U.S. Senate subcommittee made the nature of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) known to the U.S. public – under Mao Tse-Tong’s 
rule, 64 million of Chinese people died of either starvation which resulted from reckless 
economic policy or ruthless political purgation.16
When President Nixon proposed to Mao Tse-Tong in February1972 that U.S.-China 
diplomatic relations be established, he acknowledged that what brought the two 
ideological adversaries together was a common recognition of a new situation in the 
world. On America’s part, the new consensus was that “what is important is not a 
nation’s internal political philosophy,” but “its policy toward the rest of the world and 
                                                 
16 Human Cost Of Communism In China, Report issued by Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Ninety-Second Congress, 
1971. Cited by John F. McManus (1992) in his book, The Insiders.
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toward us” (Richelson, 1999). Starting from this geopolitical insight and diplomatic 
pragmatism, the U.S. and China engaged in a bizarre “marriage of convenience” (Gertz, 
2000). The ulterior intention of Nixon administration’s China diplomacy was to incite 
confrontation between communist China and the Soviet Union, hoping that the two 
communist powers would cancel each other out and the United States would obtain the 
decisive weight (Waldron, 1999). To do so, however, the U.S. has had to show a 
drooping eyelid toward China’s human rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s (Mufson, 
1999) and “gave China virtually a blanket exemption from the human right standards 
that they so ardently applied elsewhere” (Mann, 1999). 
However, with victory in the Cold War, the U.S. was released from the moral 
ambiguities and hypocrisy with regard to human rights. The 1989 Tiananmen Square 
crackdown of the democratic movement in China provided an opportunity for the U.S. 
government to rebuild a new consensus for U.S.-China relations, i.e., a consensus of 
outrage toward an oppressive communist dictatorship. In the new context of the post-
Cold War geopolitics, a sudden proliferation of issues emerged between the U.S. and 
China. China suddenly became the last bastion of communism, a huge new strain on 
global energy supplies, a next big source of global warming and acid rain, a potential 
supplier of missile technology to rogue countries, a new world factory to idle American 
production and drain American jobs, a brutal pagan nation, and a potential fascist 
country that shared the same wound of pride like the German’s before the Second 
World War (Kristof, 1993).  
In 1992, presidential candidate Clinton accused the Bush administration of coddling 
the oppressive Chinese government with a kid-glove policy (Bernstein and Munro, 
1997, p. 96). He declared that Bush’s policies toward China had been weak and that his 
would be tougher. He vowed that his administration would ruthlessly punish all those 
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tyrants from Baghdad to Beijing (Bernstein and Munro, 1997, p. 97). He won the 
presidential election largely because he differentiated himself from his predecessor on 
the basis of indignation toward tyrants abroad and resolve for fixing economy at home. 
In 1993, the U.S. Congress led a campaign to pressure members of the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) to vote against China’s bid for hosting the 2000 Olympic 
Games. The U.S. Senate’s resolution insinuated that the 2000 Olympiad held in Beijing 
would be the same as 1936 Berlin Olympiad, just legitimizing the political oppression. 
In 1993, from July 23 to August 29, the U.S. Navy fleets, based on intelligence that 
China was shipping chemical weapon precursors to Iran, detained China’s “Yin He” 
(Galaxy) cargo ship for 33 days on the high seas to conduct an exhaustive and offensive 
inspection. While nothing suspicious was detected, the U.S. government refused to 
apologize for its indiscretion.17 In 1995 and 1996, the U.S. government sent two battle 
groups around the carriers Independence and Nimitz near Taiwan Strait in response to 
Chinese People Liberation Army’s (PLA) missile drill aimed at deterring and 
preventing Taiwan’s independence movement. Both the U.S. and China called home 
their Ambassadors to signal their resolve to downgrade bilateral diplomatic relations. In 
May 1999, a U.S. B-52 bombed China’s Embassy in Yugoslavia with cruise missiles 
and killed three Chinese journalists in the building. The U.S. government’s explanation 
of the bombing was that the target has been selected by the CIA based on an outdated 
map of Belgrade, which mistook Chinese embassy as Yugoslavia military stronghold. 
All these confrontations notwithstanding, the Clinton administration’s China policy 
was soon characterized by conservative commentators as relentless flip-flops (Safire, 
2000) and outrageous “betrayal” of the U.S. national interests (Gertz, 1999). Liberal 
democrats decried that President Clinton allowed the Chinese government, at the behest 
                                                 
17 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China on “Yin He” (Galaxy) 
Incident, dated September 4, 1993. Available at:  www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ynhe0993.htm
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of the U.S. China lobby, to write American foreign policy regardless of the egregious 
violation of human rights by the CCP government. According to some commentators, 
by removing the link between China’s human rights improvements and the annual 
renewal of China’s “Most Favored Nations”(MFN) status, by turning blind eyes to 
China’s selling of missile technology around the world (Gertz, 1999, p. 81), by 
allowing U.S. companies to transfer space technology and atomic warfare material to 
China (Smith, 2003), and by conferring the strategic partnership on U.S.-China 
relations, “the candidate who in 1992 rejected the coddling of Beijing has become the 
Coddler-in-Chief”(Waldron, 1999), and thus constituted a “Clinton-China Axis” 
(Nguyen, 1999).  
Indeed, according to Zalmay Khalilzad, a think-tank scholar of the Rand 
Corporation and Project for New America Century (PNAC) in 1990s and currently U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq, behind the flip-flops of the Clinton administration’s China policy 
grows a fundamental turnabout of bipartisan consensus with regard to U.S.-China 
policy. Throughout the 1990s, the consensus of outrage in the wake of the Tiananmen 
Massacre gradually gave way to a new China policy consensus: “congagement”18 – a 
bizarre combination of two competing policy orientations: engagement and 
containment (Khalilzad, 1999). 
Bill Gertz, a national security reporter of The Washington Times, a conservative 
commentator, and a perennial China critic, commented that, once in office, President 
Clinton formed an unusual alliance with American high-technology industrialists and 
“treated China with kid gloves” (Gertz, 1999, p. 81). Broadly speaking, after 40 years 
of battle fatigue of the Cold War, the United States’ foreign policy began to revert to 
                                                 
18 According to Rand Paper, “congagement” is a combination of containment and engagement, by which 
the U.S. can “continue to try to bring China into the current international system while giving equal 
attention to deterrence and preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to this system while seeking to 
convince the Chinese leadership that a challenge would be difficult to prepare and extremely risky to 
pursue.” Available at: www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP187/IP187.html   
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dollar diplomacy (Dreyfuss, 1997).The rationale was: “Now that the Cold War is over, 
it’s economic policy that’s most important. We won the war, let’s reap the benefits” 
(Dreyfuss, 1997). Besides, President Clinton found that to fix American economy, he 
simply cannot resist the attraction of the huge Chinese market. With the rise of 
globalization, the U.S. and China became increasingly economically interdependent; 
the needs of doing business increasingly took precedence over all other concerns, such 
as political freedom. “Nobody wants to prevent Americans from getting richer” 
(Sontag, 2000). 
Besides the economic agenda, to conduct post-Cold War diplomacy, the Clinton 
administration also espoused a “peace” (international liberalism) strategy, the second P 
of Jentlesen’s 4P framework with regard to the dynamics of policy choice.  The Clinton 
administration tended more to use international regimes, collective actions and 
coordination to solve international problems in the hope that problems of world politics 
would be managed, regulated, and tempered, rather than being eliminated, which is the 
key point of realism diplomacy (Jentlesen, 2000, p. 13-14).  
Eventually, President Clinton, who threatened in 1993 that he would not renew 
China’s MFN status without seeing significant progress in human rights, declared on 
May 26, 1994, that he would extend the MFN regardless of human rights record 
(Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 108). In granting MFN, the Clinton administration 
theorized that economic interaction, and the ensuing interplay of trade, free enterprise, 
people-to-people contacts, and ideas, can do more to advance freedom and the rule of 
law in China (Weissman, 1997). 
Actually, beginning in the mid 1990s, a new bipartisan consensus of engagement 
with regard to U.S.-China relations replaced the consensus of outrage. The new 
consensus theorized that (1) over time, growing interdependence will have a 
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liberalizing effect on China, and ultimately, universal values will prevail in China; (2) 
the new engagement policy “would not let China off the hook for human rights 
abuses”; and (3) the U.S. government “knows clearly where to build a bridge when 
possible and where to draw a red line when necessary” (Friedman, 2001). 
On China’s part, the global bankruptcy of communism threw the CCP into a deep 
anxiety because “for the vast majority of the world, democracy is the sole surviving 
source of political legitimacy” (Zakaria, 2003, p. 13). In this new world order, it is no 
wonder the CCP government was treated as an international pariah in the early 1990s 
(Crampton, 2001). 
Facing such a crisis of legitimacy, the CCP government needed to keep a prosperous 
economy to justify its political legitimacy. CCP elders nailed down a new party line: 
prosperity-for-stability, i.e., to survive the global setback of communism, the CCP must 
strive to maintain a long-term economic prosperity. Segal (1994) notes that, in the post-
Tiananmen era, the CCP has embarked on a risky strategy that ties the legitimacy of its 
authoritarian ruling in China to its ability to produce prosperity there (p. 43). To 
legitimize its ruling authority, the CCP struck a bargain with the Chinese people: “You 
let us continue to rule, even though communist ideology is no longer functional, and we 
will guarantee rising living standards” (Friedman, 2001, p. A21). To fulfill its promise, 
the CCP government needed a steady inflow of U.S. investment, technology to China, 
and a smooth outflow of China goods to the U.S. market. Therefore, maintaining a non-
confrontational China-U.S. relationship, at least at the economic level, became the 
lifeline of the CCP (Yan, 2002). 
Ironically, both the U.S. and China have been enmeshed in the global economy of 
the post-Cold War world (Friedman, 2001). Neither could afford to alienate each other 
too far and too long. The CCP knew well that the U.S. businessmen need a stable China 
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and a non-confrontational U.S.-China relation for making profit there. Shortly before 
the Tiananmen incident, Deng Xiaoping envisioned, “China cannot allow people to 
demonstrate whenever they please…. Tightening our control in this area will not deter 
foreign businessmen from investing in China; on the contrary, it will reassure them.”19 
Indeed, in the post-Tiananmen era, U.S. companies have become the largest foreign 
investors in China and have been instrumental in China’s economic takeoff (Friedman, 
2001). Both corporate America and the CCP government have strong incentives to 
conduct an issue management of U.S.-China policy to make it remain non-judgmental 
in spite of, or exactly because of, the ideological confrontation. 
In summary, the U.S.-China “friendship” was structured in the context of the Cold 
War but lingered in a post-Cold War, post-Tiananmen, and increasingly democratic, 
world, to an extent that “a president as capable as Clinton has been unable to change it” 
(Waldron, 1999). From Reagan to Clinton, every president attempted to break out of 
the mold of the 1970s’ China policy, but ended up practicing that policy more 
vigorously than its originators (Mann, 1999; Waldron, 1999). In the meantime, the CCP 
government maintained a poor human rights record, remained unrepentant about the 
Tiananmen crackdown, and thus, clung to “the wrong side of history.”20 Seventeen 
years after the Tiananmen Massacre, Chinese economy has grown six times and 
became the third largest trading power in the world; personal freedom, in terms of 
migration, electronic communication, and investment, has significantly improved. 
However, Chinese society has made remarkably little progress in political liberalization. 
The topic of political reform is a taboo while it was openly discussed and well-planned 
in 1980s by two purged General Secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu 
Yaobang (1980-1986) and Zhao Ziyang (1986-1989). 
                                                 
19 Deng Xiaoping: “China will tolerate no disturbances.”   People’s Daily March 4, 1989.  
20 President Clinton confronted China President Jiang Zemin in 1997 during joint press conference by 
saying that, by abusing human rights, the Chinese government is always “on the wrong side of history.” 
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How could a non-judgmental U.S.-China relation engineered in the Cold War times 
continue to function in the post-Cold War years? Besides geopolitical considerations, 
i.e., balance of power and international melioration, one needs to factor prosperity into 
the dynamics of U.S.-China policy. The investigator conducts a content analysis of 
mass-mediated policy debate and a case study of corporate America’s issue 
management of the U.S.-China relations to determine how the policy tradeoff, and 
hence the undermining of republic virtue of the U.S. foreign policy, has been 
accomplished. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
The theoretical foundation of this research is the Communitarian construct of the new 
media as a venue for citizens’ “co-operative inquiry,” citizens’ pursuit of “common 
values and mutual responsibility,” and finally, citizens’ empowerment in the 
democratic decision-making process (Tam, 1998, p. 12-18). Communitarians maintain 
that those three undertakings, and henceforward, the resuscitation of the public life and 
the communal discourse, could be accomplished only with the leadership of the news 
media, particularly, Communitarian journalism (Christians et al, 1993). Unless 
Communitarian norms are integrated into media institutions, journalism cannot reorient 
its mission toward civic transformation and citizen empowerment (Christians, et al, 
1993). Furthermore, public journalism, a rejuvenation of public life and civic dialogue 
via journalism, could not be viable until it is synchronized with Communitarian theory 
of the press and treat Communitarian philosophy as its ethical bedrock (Coleman, 2000, 
p.42). Given Communitarian journalism’s enthusiastic championing of the public 
participation in the democratic politics and given the close relation between 
Communitarian journalism and civic participation in public affairs, it is advisable to 
investigate the republican virtue of the U.S.-China policy from a communitarian 
perspective in the hope that this investigation is not merely about “what it is,” but also 
about “what ought to be.” 
Aristotle is often cited as a major source of communitarian thinking. He rejected the 
assertion by his tutor, Plato, of a higher knowledge beyond the reach of ordinary people 
and maintained that all knowledge about this world and our position in it must begin 
with the empirical world as we experience it. Henceforward, knowledge about political 
life is to be obtained through co-operative inquiries. In the eighteenth century, 
communitarian thinking is typically expressed by Voltaire and Diderot who challenged 
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knowledge establishment – the Church and the state guardian – by forming 
communities of co-operative inquirers. Later on, Communitarianism was articulated by 
naïve socialists such as Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and Pierre Joseph Proudhon, 
who advocated gradualist and community-based transformation of society. The modern 
Communitarian thinking was developed by Oxford philosophers Thomas Hill Green 
and Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, and the 
American educationalist John Dewey. They combated “the distortion of liberal ideals 
into free market slogans in praise of the ‘everyone for themselves’ brand of 
individualism” (Tam, 1998, pp. 21-22) and insisted that “liberty is a mode of power 
relationship which must be progressively extended to all citizens if society is to attain 
the status of a truly inclusive community” (p. 23).  
Contemporary Communitarianism is a social philosophy championed by Amitai 
Etzioni, Alasdair MacIntyre, Philip Selznick, Robert Bellah, and Michael Sandel, 
among others. As a social movement, Communitarianism started in the aftermath of the 
1989 anti-Communist revolutions. Tam (1998) notes that the emergence of the 
Communitarian movement is actually an endeavor to re-map the ideological 
battleground in the wake of “suspicions about authoritarian approaches to government 
coupled with disillusionment with the individualism that pervades free market 
thinking” (pp. 23-24). It is a political reform movement striving to surpass the 
superficial divide between the “Left” and the “Right,” and henceforward, to realize the 
long-term vision of liberty. Overall, Communitarians try to sublate the weakness of 
both market individualism and authoritarianism in defining the power relationship in a 
democratic society.  
As a political reform program, Communitarianism is endorsed by both liberal and 
conservative political leaders such as U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, U.K. Liberal 
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Democrats leader Paddy Ashdown, Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl, U.S. former 
Vice President Al Gore, former Republican Vice President nominee Jack Kemp, and 
former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev. It transcends the traditional Left-
Right dichotomy, particularly, looking beyond the hegemony of market individualism 
for a sustainable alternative that avoids authoritarian pitfalls (Tam, 1998, p. 203). 
“Communitarians see themselves not as a midpoint between but as an alternative to the 
individualism-authoritarian and liberal-conservative polarities” (Myers, 2000, p. 190); 
they see their “third way” political ideals an excellent synthesis of some of the best 
ideas from both camps. For communitarians, “if we don’t balance concern for 
individual right with concern for the commons, we risk chaos and a new fascism” 
(Myers, 2000, p. 191).   
In the United States, Communitarianism is lauded as a remedy for the eclipse of 
public life, the increase of public debt, and the deepening of civic disengagement, 
among other social malaises. “Communitarian platform,” signed by William Galston, 
President Clinton’s domestic policy adviser, John Gardner, Common Cause founder, 
Betty Freidan, Feminist Rights activist, among others, holds “that the preservation of 
individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society” 
and that communities and body politics, in turn, have duty to foster their members’ 
participation and deliberation in social and political life (“The Responsive 
Communitarian Platform,” 1998). 
This dissertation research adopts Communitarianism as a normative framework 
because the Communitarian model of the news media – i.e., the news media as an arena 
for “co-operative enquiry” and a device for democratizing power relations – provides a 
theoretical justification for examination of the republican virtue of the opinion-policy 
process in regard to U.S. – China relations. Besides, the investigator looks into other 
30
normative theories about media democracy, public opinion, and newsmaking vis-à-vis 
policy-making to describe and analyze the mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China policy 
from real-world perspectives, a perspective that is less aspiring in terms of rejuvenating 
democratic conversation and public life in a post-industry society. 
1. What is Communitarianism?  
Basically, Communitarianism is an alternative to both individualism and 
authoritarianism as social practice and political ideology. However, it does not merely 
synthesize atomism and collectivism, but “restructures the discourse around the nature 
of humanity” and fundamentally reconceptualizes the issues and conclusions of 
democratic politics (Christians et al, 1993, p. 13, p. 45). It recognizes the revolutionary 
character of libertarian individualism against tyrants who determine the power relations 
in the name of divine prerogatives; it acknowledges that libertarian autonomy is 
critically important for enlightening citizenry in the sense that people’s actual exercise 
of independent rational judgment against paternalism must be built in at the outset; it 
acknowledges that individualism supports democracy by stimulating initiative, 
creativity, and equal rights for all individuals. On the other hand, it articulates a 
normative social ethics that is visionary in character without being merely a variant of 
classical socialism. 
According to Henry Tam’s (1998) summary, Communitarianism has three central 
principles developed at the epistemological level, the moral level, and the political level 
respectively:  
(1) Co-operative inquiry: “Any claims to truth may be judged to be valid only if 
informed participants deliberating together under conditions of co-operative inquiry 
would accept that claim” (p. 13); “questions about what collective action is to be taken 
for the common good are not to be left either to political elites who are rarely 
31
answerable to their fellow citizens (perhaps once every four or five years), or to 
individuals in the marketplace, but are considered through informed community 
discussions” (p. 7). Based on this principle, the provisional consensus reached by one 
section of society must be open to possible revision resulting from input by other 
sections or groups (p. 13). Public-policy making should be openly discussed to survive 
the critical deliberations of ever-expanding circles of co-operative inquirers who keep 
learning from their common experience.  
(2) Common value and mutual responsibility: “All members of any community take 
responsibility for enabling each other to pursue common values” (p. 14); “questions 
about values are not allowed to be hijacked by authoritarians who want to impose their 
views on others, or to be ignored in the name of liberal neutrality, but are dealt with by 
citizens themselves deliberating over what values and responsibilities they share” (p. 
7). As a result of such co-operative learning and discussion, certain types of common 
values, such as love, wisdom, justice, and fulfillment, are distilled and well established 
across communities and serve as a clear basis for defining mutual responsibilities. No 
community on Earth can pretend that what other communities believe and do will have 
no bearing on its own well-being or on the well-being of common values. Every 
community belongs to a larger public or citizenry. Etzioni (1996) sums up the 
communitarian ideal as a “new golden rule: respect and uphold society’s moral order as 
you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy” 
(3) Communitarianism-based power relations: Power relations are not to be 
determined for the exclusive benefit of any particular religious, racial, gender, or 
socioeconomic group, but “to be continuously revised to approximate the conditions 
wherein all citizens can play a constructive part in applying collective power in pursuit 
of common values” (Tam, 1998, p.7). Whereas libertarian liberals defend the private 
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economy and egalitarian liberals defend the welfare state, communitarians worry about 
the concentration of power in both the corporate economy and the bureaucratic state 
(Sandel, 1984, p.17). Communitarianism-based power relations are more democratic, 
not only in terms of periodic election, but also in terms of citizens’ ever-expanding 
mutual enrichment of political knowledge, their collaboration in discovering truth and 
establishing justice, their endeavor for expanding opportunities for genuine fulfillment, 
and their perennial participation in the decision-making of various social institutions. 
Communitarian power relations ask for the removal of those structural barriers which 
prevent people from acquiring political acumen, performing critical deliberation, and 
putting forward their suggestions. Communitarian power structure requires an inclusive 
community – which itself belongs to a larger public – enabling all the members to 
participate in collective processes and to share the overall power for determining 
collective actions. Communitarians see the inclusive community as the only context in 
which true freedom can be realized through, at minimum, tolerance, and, at the 
maximum, love (Berry, 1990, p. 200). 
To Communitarians, community is a public forum in which people discover the 
truth and good life together rather than a neutral arena in which self-interested 
individuals pursue incompatible mercenary goods. In a sense, the public forum and the 
community advocated by Communitarians are approximately the same political idea as 
the “public sphere” and “civil society” theoretically mapped out by Jurgen Habermas. 
According to Habermas (1989), civil society includes all those components of life that 
classic liberals sought to protect from state control. The bourgeois revolutions of the 
eighteenth century were among the undertakings to build a wall of separation between 
state and civil society, of which the self-seeking activities in the marketplace is one 
part. Habermas (1989) defined the public sphere as a virtual or imaginary community 
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which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable space. In its ideal form, the public 
sphere is “made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the 
needs of society with the state” (Habermas, 1989, p. 176). Through acts of assembly 
and dialogue, the public sphere generates opinions and attitudes which serve to affirm 
or challenge – therefore, to guide – the affairs of state. In ideal terms, the public sphere 
is the source of public opinion needed to "legitimate authority in any functioning 
democracy" (Rutherford, 2000, p. 18). 
In addition, public sphere is a hypothetical space between civil society and the state 
in which citizens could address state affairs while leaving their individual interest 
behind. To be specific, public sphere is more like a circumstance in which individual 
citizens hide their personal interests behind veils of ignorance, i.e., they are absolutely 
equal and free in public sphere although they were altogether unequal in terms of 
wealth, status, class, religion, etc. while framing and inputting their argument with 
regard to state affairs. Besides that, their argument and discussions are observable and 
accessible to everyone in the public sphere. Therefore, “with private considerations 
hidden behind a veil and with the powerful under the virtual scrutiny of the entire 
citizenry, public discussion would necessarily be rational and public deliberations 
would necessarily be directed toward the common good” (Nerone, 1995, p. 155). 
While public-sphere theorists try to restore the golden time of bourgeois society, 
Communitarians find some structural weakness of the bourgeois society, both in its 
revolutionary years and in its atrophied years. First, Communitarians observe that the 
market individualism’s cancerous effects on community life lie in negative freedom – 
“freedom understood as an end in itself”, and thus, the estrangement of freedom from 
moral order by equating liberty with freedom from external and arbitrary restraint and 
by “stridently insisting on individual autonomy as nonnegotiable” (Christians et al, 
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1993, p. 13). In the early nineteenth century, Tocqueville observed that “radical 
individualism corrodes the public spirit” and feared that “a society of radical 
individualist would be vulnerable to despotism” (Myers, 2000, p.163). To be specific, 
Tocqueville worried that people, “alike and equal, constantly [are] circling around in 
pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their souls. Each one of 
them, withdrawn into himself, is almost unaware of the fate of the rest” (p. 692). As a 
result, they delegate what should, and could, have been accomplished through family, 
churches, and communal organizations to big and arbitrary bureaucracies, and thus, 
lose their freedom.        
To market individualism, “collective life is little more than the voluntary association 
of free agents, a way for individuals to pursue their self-interests with minimal 
interference from others” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 70). Life together is not a struggle 
for social change but for self-realization. Society is highlighted by the fundamental 
separateness of persons; the gaps between them are bridged voluntarily and rationally, 
never out of the recognition that humans must live with and for other person (Christians 
et al, 1993, p. 71). The individual and society stand in natural opposition. Society is an 
aggregate of the self-seeking automatons; government is an artifice instituted by mutual 
agreement for protecting individual liberty, life and property. All the social institutions 
are instruments, even expedients, created by the fiat of self-contained individuals, and 
thus could be employed or discarded without fundamentally altering one’s humanity 
(Girvetz, 1950, p. 23). As a result, accountability to self becomes the operating norm, 
and protecting the legitimate boundary lines of other selves the only social axiom 
(Christians, 1993, p. 13).  
To communitarians, “human beings are not autonomous mental substances linked 
only by contract to protect person and property. Differences are deep, but 
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commonalities, ambiguous perhaps and distinguished by language and tradition, are 
more profound still” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 7). Communitarians hold that the central 
feature of human being is community. The true understanding of individuals is 
anchored on the knowledge of the communal. “Community is axiologically and 
ontologically prior to persons” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 14). “The individual is not 
discrete. He cannot find his fulfillment outside of the community; but he also cannot 
find fulfillment completely within society. In-so-far as he finds fulfillment within 
society he must abate his individual ambitions” (Niebuhr, 1952, Chapter 3). Atomism’s 
failure is its profound lack of appreciation for the wholeness of reality. It fundamentally 
rejects the notion of interrelatedness. 
Second, Communitarians find the deficiencies of negative liberty lie in that it 
“refuses to identify freedom with conditions for fulfillment” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 
28), and thus take democracy “not as an end in itself but only a utilitarian device to 
safeguard the highest political end: liberty” (p. 31). To Communitarians, community, 
basically a public forum in which the dialogic self discovers and pursues the common 
good together, is the only context in which true freedom can be realized. Human beings 
are social, though independent; they exist spatiotemporally as persons in community. 
“We appear to think and decide and act with a large degree of independence. Yet we 
are every bit communal” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 62). For Macmurray (1978), one’s 
whole being cannot experience uniqueness except in openness to the uniqueness of 
others (p. 17-18). Action, to be meaningful, must be for community building and for the 
sake of fellowship; the bonding of persons is the epicenter of cultural formation (p. 18). 
“[U]nless I use my freedom to help others flourish, I deny my own well-being. Because 
fulfillment as persons is never achieved in isolation, but only in relation, our encounter 
inheres in our beingness” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 65). 
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Communitarians admit that not all community life is good life and enables their 
members to attain human fulfillment. There are times and occasions when community 
is formed for destroying or diminishing human life and property and for exploiting 
either members or outsiders. Actually, “community life is tragic… because it involves 
unremittingly the need to survive mortality, partiality, and evil …. No community can 
survive that cannot survive the worst” (Berry, 1990, p. 154-158). Yet, human society 
needs to build a wider and wider community as shared domain of cooperative 
experience and identity formation. A moral community is a condition for personhood. 
Community is no guarantee of happiness, but could be human society’s only best 
chance at being able to endure unhappiness (Berry, 1990, p. 154).  
The third weakness of market individualism is that market individualism is geared to 
benefit those good at the economic game of market transactions (Tam, 1998, p. 5). 
Political liberalism actually privileges a particular social order and insures the 
perpetuation of systematic disadvantages. Forces as competitive individualism 
concealed the real character of capitalist exploitation and “thwart human cooperation 
and fraternity” (Wright, 1996, p. 22). They elevate greed and ignore public need. Under 
the reign of market individualism, most individuals, when freed from the community-
defined power relations, do not thereby come to inhabit a pure realm of self-
government and self-fulfillment, but live in a world in which private power of assorted 
kinds holds sway to the extent that it becomes more, not less, difficult for individuals to 
advance their own agenda (Wright, 1996, p. 146).  
Overall, Communitarianism requires that society not be understood as merely a 
maelstrom of atomized individuals but as a moral community embedded in a dense 
fabric of social relationships and mutual responsibilities and capable of framing 
common purpose and pursuing public interests. 
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In summary, Communitarian politics requires the development of inclusive 
community where people can (1) “take part in co-operative enquiries determining a 
wide arrange of issues;” (2) “recognize that they share a respect for common values and 
accept the responsibilities these values imply;”  and (3) “actively support the 
transformation of power relations for the common good” (Tam, 1998, p. 8). To realize 
those political ideals, communitarian journalism might be a practical endeavor. 
Communitarian theorists actually maintain that communitarian journalism is a narrative 
construct that “enables cultural beings to fulfill their civic tasks” (Christians et al, 1993, 
p. 14). To communitarians, news is a semiotic agent of community formation 
(Christians et al, 1993, p. 89). 
2. What Is the Communitarian Journalism? 
The communitarian analysis of media communication is an innovation of both 
libertarian theory of the media and the social responsibility theory of the media 
(Nerone, 1995). According to communitarian’s reconstruction of American journalism 
history, “the press” in the text of the First Amendment is a “town meeting” model of 
the mediated public sphere (Nerone, 1995, p. 49). The press was meant to bring 
community to the forefront and to create and sustain community, fellowship, and 
democracy (Christians et al, 1993; Dewey, 1954). Therefore, freedom of the press 
actually should be something that belongs to all citizens. Freedom of the press was 
situated in “a context of a healthy community of intelligent, independent, and therefore 
virtuous citizens.” Henceforward, freedom of the press has more to do with the 
republican life-style, virtuous community, and conversational public, and has least to 
do with the partisan printer, commercial broadcasters, professional communicators, and 
even watchdog journalism (Carey, 1995, pp. 228-256; Carey, 1986, pp. 144-188). 
Communitarian journalism emphasizes developing citizens’ abilities in formulating 
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co-operative solutions to common problems rather than informing the public to 
facilitate buying into some specific options floated by elites and pundits. 
“Communitarian journalists would view the public as a partner in setting the agenda at 
the same time that they would not merely offer an unreflective representation of public 
opinion” (Borden, 2005, p. 40). In Communitarian media, news should be driven, not 
by public opinion or prejudices, but by transnational human norms – such as love, 
truthfulness, wisdom, justice, and empowerment – that fosters good communities 
(Christians, et al, 1993).       
Communitarian theory of journalism asks the news media to make a decisive break 
with individualistic capitalism or, in more cultural terms, with power pragmatism. The 
classical liberalism theory of free expression anchored in individual rights cannot 
resolve certain fundamental disagreement (Christians et al, 1993, p. 42). “Driven by the 
absence of restraint, libertarianism does not set a comprehensive framework but merely 
endorses the individual interests of media owners” (p. 43). 
Classical liberalism views the press as “the Fourth Estate” of the state and the 
watchdog of public affairs. Accordingly, it assumes that reporters are independent 
agents whose social contract, the First Amendment, grants them professional freedom 
in exchange for the exposure of misdeeds in government and business. However, to 
Communitarians, the most conspicuous scandal of today’s journalism lies in that the 
news media actually participates in policymaking, and the journalists themselves work 
for business. A built-in conflict of interest exists in today’s mass communication 
system which is supposed to be an impartial provider of information. Actually, as 
Christians et al (1993) observes, “the line between news reporters and publicists is 
sometimes as unclear as a foul line in minor-league ballpark the day after the 
thunderstorm” (p. 9). When the story itself is known to carry – intentionally and with 
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predictable consequences – the specific commercial or political interests of the source, 
how can we call it “news” while it is stark propaganda for manipulation and control 
(Christians et al, 1993, p. 10)? To Communitarians, “the Fourth Estate” status of the 
news media and watchdog journalism may be the cause of the public’s disenchantment 
with the mass communication system. 
In a democratic society, it is the public who should govern; democratic media then 
should let people talk to each other rather than just listen to experts and elites (Nerone, 
1995, p. 100). “Rather than drowning audiences with data and fattening company 
coffers, communitarian journalism engenders a like-minded world view among a public 
still inclined toward individual autonomy” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 14). 
Communitarian journalism is to amplify “public” conversation rather than the talking 
points of those “snarling pundits or bland professionals we see on political talk shows” 
(Rosen, 1997, p. 203). When “the press sees its role as limited to informing whomever 
happens to turn up at the end of the communication channel, it explicitly abandons its 
role as an agency for carrying on the conversation of the culture” (Carey, 1997, p. 220).  
According to the Communitarian theory of journalism, mass media discourse only 
makes sense in relation to the public and public life. The fundamental problem in 
journalism is to reconstitute the public, to bring it into existence (Carey, 1995, pp. 228-
256). Contrary to classic liberalism’s condescending viewpoint, Communitarians 
maintain that the news media does not “inform” the public; it is “the public” that ought 
to inform the news media (Rosen, 1997, p. 191). “Journalism at its best arises from and 
feeds into public life” (Rosen, 1997, p. 192). The true subject matter of journalism is 
the conversation the public is having with itself. If this conversation does not happen or 
falls apart, then journalism doesn’t work – for us – although it may work well for 
journalists seeking to further their professional status (Rosen, 1997, p. 191). “The 
40
public will only begin to reawaken when they are addressed as a conversational partner 
and are encouraged to join the talk rather than sit passively as spectators before a 
discussion conducted by journalists and experts” (Carey, 1987. p. 14). 
Communitarians advocate that social institutions such as universities and the news 
media should empower the public sphere by breathing air into the collapsed lungs of 
public life, nurturing worldview, celebrating human solidarity, enabling co-operative 
inquiry, encouraging conversation and discussion, and fostering a conception of the 
common good, rather than being preoccupied with governmental business, 
professionalism expertise, and careerism-driven scholarship. To Communitarians, 
information atrophies unless it vivifies human needs and revitalizes civic dialogue 
(Nerone, 1995, p. 70). The true influence of the education system and the mass 
communication system lies in their “direct engagement in popular political 
controversy” and their preoccupation with “the stirring and poignant events of the 
times” (Bender, 1993, p. 56). News should be an agent of civic transformation rather 
than a device for social control. Facilitating a thorough understanding of public life is 
the news media’s beacon. “The press has a bigger fish to fry than merely improve 
technology and streamlining performance, important as those advances may be. The 
issue is whether reporting serves to activate the polis” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 87). 
According to communitarian’s reading of American journalism history, from the 
moment the U.S. Constitution was ratified, newspapers never really developed into the 
public-spirited vehicles envisioned by men like Thomas Jefferson. Just like “the 
republican forms of government were and still are odd and aberrant occurrences in 
history” (Carey, 1997, p. 207), political communities founded on civic ties rather than 
on domination-submission pattern are rare creatures in history (p. 207). The sole 
meaning of the First Amendment for most people today is merely the “rights” of rugged 
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individuals, rebellious individuals, and sometimes, predator individuals. People act as if 
democracy will perpetuate itself automatically if they only pay due regard to the law 
and rights.  
Nevertheless, the Bill of Rights was framed as a foundation “through which people 
constitute themselves as a political community” (Carey, 1997, p. 209). The First 
Amendment “is an injunction as to how we might live together as a people, peacefully 
and argumentatively but civilly and progressively” (p. 209). It embodies a civic and 
republican culture “that cuts across and modifies all our vast and individual difference” 
(p. 209); it embodies hope and aspiration for a republican way of life – give and take of 
ideas, facts, and experiences in a daily basis.  
Under this reading of the history of American journalism, merely legal rights 
guarantee little if the civic culture is actually “aborted by isolation, mutual suspicion, 
abuse, fear, and hatred” (Carey, 1997, p. 209). The Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
actually assume a set of personal disposition and the existence of certain social 
conditions: the thriving of public discourse, argument, conversation, disputation, and 
debate, inclusive community, participation of members of society in political decision-
making. Therefore, the First Amendment is an injunction for creating a conversational 
society while the news media “is merely a recording device, is largely an extension and 
amplification, an ‘outering’ of conversation” (Carey, 1997, p. 217-218). A news media 
independent of the conversational public, or existing in the absence of such a 
conversation, “is likely to be a menace to public life and an effective politics” ( Carey, 
1997, p. 218).  
Communitarians find that the conversational public has been largely evaporated with 
the emergence of the public opinion industry and the apparatus of polling. Professional 
communicators and journalists have colonized “the press” in its original meaning in the 
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First Amendment. The public was replaced by the interest groups as the key political 
actors “whose relationship to public life is essentially propagandistic and manipulative” 
(Carey, 1997, p. 218). Public opinion polling has prevented authentic public opinion 
from forming (Carey, 1997, p. 218). Overall, “while the word public continues in our 
language as an ancient memory and a pious hope, the public as a feature and factor of 
real politics disappears” (p. 219). 
In summary, the media content supplied by Communitarian journalism is generated 
only by public conversation. Unlike conventional journalism which disarms people, 
treats them as client seer from afar, and narcotizes them to participate in the media fares 
that help to govern their lives, Communitarian journalism fulfills the prerequisite of the 
First Amendment by encouraging public conversation, engaging the talking public, 
extending the circle of debate, and cultivating the virtues of clarity of thought, of 
eloquence, and sound judgment (Carey, 1997, p. 219-210). Overall, Communitarian 
journalism is an endeavor to recreate the public realm, to encourage the public 
conversation, and, thus, to secure a republic which, as Benjamin Franklin has worried 
during the Constitution Convention, may fall to the mercy of all the vicissitudes of 
history (Carey, 1991, p. 207). 
3. Media Democracy in America   
As the previous literature shows, the success of the democratic government rests upon 
and requires the exercise of a well-informed and sensible opinion by the great bulk of 
the citizens. Democracy requires a healthy public debate and a free press to serve that 
purpose. Journalism and democracy should be names for the same thing – “a 
discoursing public” (Carey, 1997, p. 192). Tocqueville (1969) observed that, to be 
excellent, democracy needs some prerequisites such as minimum equality of condition 
among citizens, ubiquity of civic/political associations, greater newspaper readership, 
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the habit to discourse on public affairs coherently and impartially, and hence the 
muturation of the public sphere. Apparently, the mass media system is an indispensable 
part for a workable and legitimate democracy. Whenever the formation of public 
opinion is artfully manipulated, the integrity of democracy is in question. 
Mass communication media are central to the dynamics of the relationship between 
governors and the governed in all types of political regimes (Mughan & Gunther, 2000, 
p. 3). This is because mass media are basically a social institution playing an important 
political role (Cook, 1998, p. 3). In some sense, news media are a political institution 
because news reports often are key participants in decision-making and policy-making 
(Cook, 1998, p. 3-8).  
Since the beginning of the print era, political advocacy has been a central function of 
news media. “Even where journalist may be sincerely committed to a professional 
ideology of ‘objectivity,’ news incorporates political values” (Halling & Mancini, 
2004a, p. 26). News media are producers of meaning, creators of social consciousness 
(Halling, 1985. p. 141). Although journalistic professionalization and journalistic 
autonomy beginning at commercial press era could overshadow the interlocking 
between media and political parties, the media system largely reflects the major 
political divisions in society. No serious media research would argue that journalism 
anywhere in the world is literally neutral (Halling and Mancini, 2004a, p. 21-26). Stuart 
Hall argues that communication is always linked to power and that the media 
discourses appear to reflect reality while in fact they construct it.21 “The media... tend, 
faithfully and impartially, to reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in 
society's institutional order.”22 Particularly, when it comes to foreign affairs, media 
content largely are political (Cook, 1998, p. 7-11). 
                                                 
21 Daniel Chandler, Marxism Media Theory. See:  http://media.ankara.edu.tr/~erdogan/marxism.htm
22 Cited in Daniel Chandler, Notes on the construction of reality in TV news programs. Available at:    
       www.aber.ac.uk/media/Modules/TF33120/news.html
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Yet, being political and partisan doesn’t necessarily prevent the mass media system 
from serving the working of democracy in real world. “Mass media are the connective 
tissue, or oxygen” of democracy ever since its existence (Mughan & Gunther, 2000, p. 
1). Thomas Jefferson visualized an ideal newspaper functioning like a vast town hall 
meeting, which would make government unnecessary (Nerone, 1995, p. 48-49). The 
ideal newspaper should operate as an avenue through which people can “deliberate 
rationally on public affairs, not just as passive readers but as active citizens, 
participating at all times, not just at election time” (Nerone, 1995, p. 48). Under that 
condition, Jefferson chooses newspapers over government because newspapers – the 
“town meeting” model of the mediated public forum – guarantee self-government and 
democracy more effectively than any other social institutions. Yet, Jefferson 
acknowledged that freedom of the press is good and workable “only in the context of a 
healthy community of intelligent, independent, and therefore virtuous citizens” 
(Nerone, 1995, p. 49). Therefore, the critical question is: Should the community/society 
blame itself for being not so virtuous to make a town meeting-like newspaper workable, 
or should the media blame themselves for failure of leadership in empowering or 
activating public conversation?  
To make things worse, when it comes to the electronic media, mass media are 
increasingly not accessible to all who wish to use them, and thus, more problematic in 
serving democracy. On one hand, freedom of speech is limited in corporate broadcast 
media because of government-imposed “civic” programming or because of “Fairness 
Doctrine.” On the other hand, the heavy exposure to television programming and 
commercials may result in people’s low level of civic participation.  
Justice White redefined an ideal broadcasting medium in a working democracy as “a 
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are 
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representative of [his] community.”23 After all, he said, “it is the right of the viewers 
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”24 A media system 
can be equivalent to a working democracy only when it is free, independent, and 
accessible to all. In another word, a media system can reflect American public’s deep 
commitment to self-governance only when the debate on public issues is “uninhibited, 
robust and wide-open.”25  
Again, even in the electronic time, it is widely acknowledged that the value of media 
freedom lies in creating community and sustaining civic dialogue. “The meaning of the 
First Amendment should not concentrate solely on legal ‘rights’ of rebellious 
individual, but should concentrate more on its securing participation of members of 
society in political decision making, and defining the nature of public life” (Carey, 
1991). “Communication best fulfills its functions not as messages flashing across space 
for purpose of control, but as rituals of fellowship and democracy” (Carey, 1995). The 
press is the foundation of the public realm. “The ‘public’ is the God term of the press, 
the term without which the press does not make any sense” (Carey, 1995). The 
legitimate content of news media should be that generated by public conversation. “We 
devalue the press to the degree it seeks to inform us and turns us into silent spectators” 
(Carey, 1995). 
Democracy does not need to be the most efficient form of government, but it 
definitely should be the most educational one which “extends the circle of debate as 
widely as possible and thus asks us all to articulate our views, to put them at risk, and to 
cultivate the virtues of clarity of thought, of eloquence and sound judgment” (Lasch, 
1996). Democratic media should facilitate the “co-operative inquiry” among the public 
rather than make itself a colony of various eloquent pundits. The free press protects the 
                                                 
23 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. (1969). 395 U.S. at 394.  
24 Ibid. 
25 New York Times v. Sullivan 
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means of democracy as well as the ends of democracy – a republic of full participation 
of members of society in political decision-making. 
Although falling short of an empowerment of public life, the mass media system in 
today’s democratic societies basically works to accomplish self-government and human 
development through the information they convey to the public, since “a broadly and 
equitably informed citizenry helps assure a democracy that is both responsive and 
responsible” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 1). Based on that standard, the American 
democracy has been called “media democracy” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995, p. 77). 
Although commercialization and conglomeratization of the American media system in 
the past decades is corrosive to the health of democracy, American media democracy 
remains the role model for the development of political communication in Western 
democracies.  
In American media democracy, media have significantly displaced “churches, 
parties, trade unions, and other traditional organizations of civil society as the central 
means by which individuals are connected to the wider social and political world” 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 33-34). Journalistic discourse, perceived as representative 
of a generalized public opinion cutting across the lines of political parties and social 
groups, has significant influence on the actions of policy makers, public debate on 
social and political issues, and polices made by public institutions (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004b, p. 37; Djerff-Pierre, 2000, p. 254). Mutz & Martin (2001) note that the 
American public is “exposed to far more dissimilar political views via news media than 
through interpersonal political discussants” (p. 97). The mediated exposure to cross-
cutting viewpoints with regard to public policy ensures that “no one could see the end 
result as arbitrary rather than reasonable and justifiable, even if not what he or she 
happened to see as most justifiable” (Fearon 1998, p. 62). Furthermore, this media-
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based exposure to conflicting viewpoints is deemed a central element needed in 
political dialogue to maintain a democratic citizenry (Barber 1984; Habermas 1989). 
Yet, mass communication media failed American democracy in various ways. The 
media system is increasingly becoming an apparatus of political parties’ top-down 
political communication aimed at electoral success. Issues and topics of critical 
importance are ignored by political communication (Swanson, 2004. p. 51). Journalism 
becomes more entertaining and less informative (Swanson, 2004, p. 52). Government is 
closely bound with public relations (Swanson, 2004, p. 52), and “government by 
publicity” (Cook, 1998, p. 117) has serious effects on the independence of the news 
media as a public forum and contributes to the growing public cynicism and mistrust of 
political actors and institutions.    
Behind this failure of the media system as democratic institution is the fading 
popular sovereignty. The routine operation of American government has relied on 
large-scale mobilization of the public to a far greater extent than it does today. As 
government has learned to manage the public business without public participation and 
involvement, it also has diminished the occasions for the kind of popular mobilization 
that demands reshaping of public policy or changing of political institutions. “Today, 
American politics is no longer exceptional for its feats of grass-root mobilization,” and 
a wide disparity exists between mass immobility and elite agitation (Crenson & 
Ginsberg, 2002, p. 1-3). Strategic political communication becomes more crucial for 
political success than popular support. The idea that the public sphere and public 
opinion become increasingly important for policy-making is met with skepticism on the 
part of public-policy analysts. Von Beyme (1994) suggests that we should not overrate 
even the relevance of mediated debate on public policy because the routine political 
process remains largely separate from the public sphere. Overall, “the vitality of the 
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public as a force in American politics is crumbling, and the time may soon arrive when 
the most pressing and yet disturbing question in American politics is ‘Who cares?’” 
(Crenson & Ginsberg, 2000, p. 244). 
This dissertation looks into the U.S. public’s participation in formation of the U.S.-
China policy by the way of the mainstream media to find out to what extent the actual 
policy reorientation could claim popular support or public accountability and how the 
differences of opinions among various social groups relate to the actual policy 
orientation.    
4. News Media Are Major Representation of Public Opinion 
The assessment of public opinion, the fundamental dynamics of working democracy, 
has been “one of the most frustrating and challenging of democratic practice” (Herbst, 
1998, p. 1). “Conceptions of public opinion are tethered to models of democracy” (p. 
16). “The processes of constructing public opinion have vital implication for 
democratic theory and practice” (p. 2). To understand the fundamental dynamics of 
working democracy, one needs to look into how the various players in the democratic 
enterprise conceptualize public opinion and the public sphere. 
Generally speaking, public opinion is the perceived will of the people. Conventional 
conception of public opinion is a mixture of media content, expressive action (rallies), 
constituent mail, phone calls, opinion polling, election returns, town hall meetings, 
coffeehouse dialogue, and so forth. However, it is difficult to gauge the public’s will. 
Therefore, Lippmann (1922) characterized public opinion as a “phantom.” He argued 
that a concrete and measurable public opinion was empirically absent from the policy 
process, and that it should be. He saw an extraordinarily close connection between 
public opinion and media and held that “public opinion and mass media are largely 
conflated” (Herbst, 1998, p. 5).  
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Public opinion can be constructed as popular sentiment expressed in opinion polling, 
the aggregation of individual opinions solicited and recorded by trained, objective 
survey researchers and interviewers. “Contemporary scholars have moved away from 
the group-oriented model, thinking about public opinion as mass opinion” (Herbst, 
1998, p. 6). However, some limitations exist with regard to the reliability and 
accountability of mass opinion polling. Mass opinion research methods – survey 
research, experimentation, and simulation of public opinion – often diminish or omit 
contextual factors of opinion formation which are critical to argumentation of political 
life (Herbst, 1998, p. 7). Sometimes, poll data cannot be taken as public opinion 
because the questionnaire forms employed most certainly determine what public 
opinion looks like. Public opinion in this form of polling data can easily be manipulated 
by pollsters and other political operatives. Berinsky (1999) finds that the 
misrepresentation of individual opinion in the survey interview is largely because of 
bias affected by social environment factors and/or by the complex and idiosyncratic 
cultural forces of the survey interview. Therefore, “aggregate opinion polls may 
provide an inaccurate picture of true public sentiment on sensitive issues” (Berinsky, 
1999, p. 1230). Thus, it is problematic for policy formation and evaluation to use polls 
to serve as barometers of public sentiment on policy controversies. Actually, in national 
politics, polls play a far less important role in executive and congressional decision-
making than we think (Herbst, 1998, p. 10). 
Public opinion also could be constructed as group opinion. Tocqueville, James 
Bryce, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, Herbert Blumer, and other nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century observers of American politics believed that group opinion and 
public opinion were one and the same. Herbst (1998) observes that it is common in 
today’s political science that pluralistic groups represent public opinion: “Groups 
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funnel nebulous opinions into the entity we recognize as public opinion.” To some 
policy makers, public opinion is interest groups and lobbyists who represent public 
opinion. 
Overall, the public is vague in its feelings and can be manipulated easily during 
opinion polling. In addition, “the public is better at making ‘big picture’ decision with 
limited information than evaluating specific policy decision requiring greater 
attentiveness and involvement” (Chambers & Goidel, 2005, p. 28). Therefore, it is 
efficient to look to the sources of persuasion – interest groups or issue advocates and 
media – if one is to understand the nature of public opinion. Herbst’s (1998) study on 
reading of public opinion finds that policy experts usually believe mass media content 
and/or the expression of interest groups are public opinion. (p. 64-74). The policy elites 
see an extraordinarily close connection between public opinion and media. Policy 
experts in federal and state governments tend to see that “media content and interest 
groups are excellent crystallizers of a nebulous public opinion” (Herbst, 1998, p. 75). 
Public opinion has largely been constructed by the mass media. Many mass 
communication researchers find that exposure to the news media and public opinion 
formation are closely linked. Newspaper, television, or radio content is not simply a 
conduit for public opinion expression; it is the very essence of public opinion. 
Lippmann (1922) directly equated public opinion to journalistic opinion. He asserted 
that if media content did not appeal to attitudinal currents already flowing through the 
social world, the readers would not find such texts attractive or relevant to their lives.  
News media’s shaping of public opinion is accomplished by journalists who are 
trying to report as best as they can on public affairs (Herbst, 1998, p. 18). Journalist 
may report on popular sentiments in a variety of ways that legitimate or condemn 
particular meanings of public opinions. Journalists often take the statements or 
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narratives of individuals featured in episodic stories to be representations of public 
opinion (Herbst, 1998, p. 18). Bennett (1990) finds that media can construct public 
opinion by broadcasting the comments of individuals claiming a distinct insight into 
public opinion. In some extreme cases, public opinion is the spin of the moment on 
different issues presented by major newspapers. Overall, news media are, at least, the 
key forces shaping our conception of public opinion (Herbst, 1998). 
Although Dewey challenged Lippmann’s skepticism toward the public’s 
competence to judge foreign affairs by asserting that true learning takes place through 
communication and participation, he did not elaborate on how to inspire the culture of 
communication and citizen inquiry (Alterman, 1998, p. 69). In an ideal republic, 
citizens would have perfect access to their official representatives, perfect information 
about their actions, and perfect understanding of the issues involved (Alterman, 1998, 
p. 152). But the population is too large and the government is too complex for even 
Ralph Nader to keep track of everything. Journalists provide the metaphorical bridge 
between the representatives and the represented. Almost by definition, any attempt to 
improve the system’s accountability requires the cooperation of the media as its 
messengers (Alterman, 1998, 152). 
In summary, media opinion and public opinion are largely conflated (Herbst, 1998, 
p. 65). This dissertation research takes the major foreign policy newspapers’ 
“international news” and Op/Ed pages and major TV network’s foreign report as 
typical representations of public opinion to attest the public accountability of U.S.-
China policy.  
5. Newsmaking and Policy-Making 
Paradigmatic change in political life usually necessitates mass communication 
campaign aims at manufacturing the desired climate of public opinion. Mass persuasion 
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in political life is similar to scientific development in that paradigm change in both 
sciences and politics occurs when a sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is 
widely accepted by the research community as well as by political actors (Kuhn, 1962, 
p. 92-93). In both, so long as a given paradigm is in dominance, “both fact collection 
and theory articulation became highly directed activities” within the paradigm (Kuhn, 
1962, p. 18). As to political life, whenever a crisis happens, “the society is divided into 
competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, 
the others seeking to institute some new one” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 93). The parties to a 
revolutionary conflict could resort to the techniques of mass persuasion (Kuhn, 1962, p. 
93). The mass persuasion, by way of highly directed “fact collection and theory 
articulation,” could be a promising device employed by policymakers as well as by 
stakeholders, such as issue advocacy groups, governmental institutions, and corporate 
community, to enlist public support, to produce a specific climate of opinion, and 
finally, to facilitate policy reorientation in favor of their specific advantage. 
Consequently, mass media, legislative bodies, and other public forums, the major 
carriers of mass persuasion, could be the battleground where competing political camps 
struggle to defend or institute their favorite political paradigm. 
Whenever paradigmatic change in public policy is needed, news coverage and the 
mediated debate on public affairs could become highly directed fact collection and 
theory articulation. These political communications actually influence the way in which 
citizens structure their attitudinal and behavioral orientation toward politics. Therefore, 
political elites widely, if not universally, believe that “the media are of paramount 
importance in shaping these orientations” (Mughan & Gunther, 2000, p. 3). In 1928, 
Edward Bernays acutely perceived a new mechanism of governance – “the conscious 
and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinion of the masses” by 
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relatively small number of people “who understand the mental processes” and “pull the 
wires which control the public mind” (Bernays, 1928, p. 9-10).  
Cook (1998) notes that “the news media should be thought of not only as an 
institution but as political; in other words, journalists are political actors” (p. 85). In the 
United States, news media have become part of government (Cook, 1998, p. 86). The 
political role of news media lies in “augmenting the reaches of those who are already 
political powerful, … in buttressing official authority” (p. 86).  
According to Marxism analysis, the news media are part of the state-apparatus and 
assist in the process of political hegemony. News media are more inclined to create 
certain kinds of stories with particular values than others. Those news stories “reveal 
not only journalists’ understanding of how the world works but suggests a conception 
of how the world should work” (Cook, 1998, p. 88). The search for newsworthy stories 
and newsworthy events does not equally favor all political actors and all issues (p. 89). 
The political actors can and do anticipate what is likely to attract journalists when 
planning their actions and words (p. 89). The results of these negotiations between 
source and newspaper are “a political coloration to the news that consistently favors 
only certain approaches and outcomes” (Cook, 1998, p. 89). Most ordinary citizens lack 
the authoritative resources to attract journalists; therefore, American newsmaking 
process is dominated by officialdom (Cook, 1998, p. 95). The news media don’t 
completely shut out unofficial activities, but their access is narrow in time and limited 
in scope (Cook, 1998, p. 109). As a result, political news largely “is a constant if rarely 
conscious coproduction of officials and journalist” (Cook, 1998, p. 109). 
Bennett (1990) observes that the routine professional decision on what is news 
usually results in news being “indexed” implicitly to the range and dynamics of 
governmental debate but has little relation to expressed public opinion (p. 103). 
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Journalists usually select the sources through whose eyes the public views the world,” 
and those eyes are predominantly official (Graber, 1993a). Fishman (1982) finds that 
the way the media determine the newsworthiness of occurrences is based on schemes of 
interpretation originating from and used by authorities and officials, which usually are 
staple sources of new media. Therefore, what the news media excluded from public 
view usually are those that might challenge the legitimacy of the institutions reporters 
depend on for news. By participant observation, he finds that there is an implicit 
agreement between journalists and officials with regard to the scheme by which a news 
event is spotted and properly interpreted. “Journalists simply do not regularly expose 
themselves to ‘unofficial’ interpretative schemes” (Fishman, 1982, p. 216). 
Public officials are granted a monopoly of news by which they can restrict diversity 
in the politically volatile marketplace of ideas. Lawrence’s (2000) “official dominance” 
model of news suggests that officials usually are primary definers of events and issues 
in the news. To many journalists, institutionally positioned officials are “authorized 
knowers” and the most legitimate source of news (Lawrence, 2000, p. 5; Bennett 2003; 
Cook, 1998; Tuchman, 1978). In addition, Bagdikian (1985) finds that this routine 
newsroom decision-making with regard to newsworthiness can safeguard the business 
culture of media conglomerate, and thus, facilitate the corporate values and the central 
aims of media owners to be imbedded in the news (p. 97-109) and leave unreported 
large areas of genuine relevance that authorities choose not to talk about (174-192).  
Spitzer’s (1993) “media-policy linkage” suggests that the mass media possesses a 
distinctive capacity to shape public policy (p. 5). “Yet, whatever the mass media’s 
influence on policy, it is no more a part of the government than, say, interest groups” 
(p. 6). Media cannot make policy, but they can play a pivotal role in influencing policy 
because they are “the conduit, the pipeline, the funnel regulating the flow of 
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communication between policymakers and others in the political system who might 
seek any different policy” (Spitzer, 1993, p. 9). News media directly influence political 
elites by helping to highlight particular issues, influence perceptions of public mood, 
and shape the context of legislation (Cook, 1998. p. 11).  
Cook (1998) notes that “making news can be making policy in and of itself” (p. 124) 
because “the publicity provided by the news media can offer key assistance to officials” 
(p. 126). To public officials, “the savvy use of publicity can elevate a particular policy 
response” (p. 128). “Media strategies are useful for persuading others to act” (p. 126). 
“Media persuasion is a more attractive and efficient use of resources” (p. 125). All the 
three branches of the U.S. government invest so much time and resources to going 
public and to media relations that news media can be called the fourth branch of the 
government and that “individual journalist are mere cogs in a huge news producing 
machine” of the government (Cook, 1998, p. 15).  
Being media-minded, public officials tend to address those high-salience and low-
conflict issues. They also plan massive news events to manage the news and 
communicate with the public and to assert the importance and factual status of “their” 
occurrences (Lawrence, 2000, p. 7). Similarly, being so intertwined with government 
officials, the perception of journalistic autonomy simply means that journalists have 
internalized the demands on them from superiors, sources, and audiences, and obtain 
satisfaction by creatively crafting a commissioned news product (Sigelman, 1973, p. 
132-151).  
Media coverage of issues influences policy debate by defining not only what the 
issues are “really all about” but also what “the” two sides of the issue are (Cook, 1998, 
p. 127). News reporting can influence or even create an opinion climate that may or 
may not be favorable to a certain issue or policy proposal, “giving a sense of 
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favorability, even inevitability, to some sort of resolution of the newly publicized 
problem” (Cook, 1998, p. 129). By highlighting certain aspects or particular facts of a 
problem, news media can influence the policy deliberation and the result of policy 
bargaining (Cook, 1998, p. 129). Graber (1993b) finds that journalists can “provide the 
raw materials and the tools for creating and sustaining cognitive, emotional, and moral 
beliefs that undergird our society’s political structures and policies” (p. 22). 
6. Opinion-Policy Nexus 
The opinion-policy process is a theoretical framework in which what people think is 
related to what government does (Hennessy, 1965, p. 11). To have a better 
understanding of the process, one should look into who thinks what and whose opinion 
counts. 
Public opinion in its conventional form is more like a popular pressure to conform 
than a controversial exchange of conflicting ideas among citizens and between citizens 
and responsive political elites (Hennessy, 1965, p. 10 -11). The populistic theory of 
democracy holds that democracy is workable only when government responds directly 
and immediately to the wishes of the citizenry (Downs, 1957). However, democracy 
based solely on popular pressure to conform is workable only in a sociopolitical 
situation in which the impartial, truth-seeking, and rational individual was the basic unit 
of the body politics (Hennessy, 1965, p. 11). In today’s pluralistic society, the basic 
unit of body politics is various sociological groups. Every individual is a sum of rich 
and complex group relations. Thus, “public opinion is filtered, colored, and 
transformed in countless ways by individual and group subjectivization of fact and 
other opinion” (Hennessy, 1965, p.19). Generalized public opinion, in the form of 
opinion polls, is not a matter of the highest priority in governmental decision-making. 
The public opinion that counts in policy-making is a complex of views, either of group 
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or of individual, that are shared by members of publics. The declared public policy 
virtually is “the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment” 
(Hennessy, 1965, p. 20). 
Page and Barabas (2000) observed persistent gaps in policy preferences between 
elites and citizens. For example, in foreign policy, citizens generally put a higher 
priority than elites on expanding progressive social programs worldwide. Compared to 
elites, citizens are more willing to bomb and more reluctant to commit ground troops. 
Many of the gaps reflect different values and interests between leaders and citizens and 
suggest a failure of elites to enlighten and educate the public, to convey the relevant 
information and reasoning, and to engineer a well-informed and deliberative public (p. 
339-340). 
Page and Shapiro (1983) cautioned that while “public opinion is often a proximate 
cause of policy, affecting policy more than policy influences opinion,” one should not 
rush to a conclusion that “democratic responsiveness pervades American politics” (p. 
175). Governments, no matter authoritarian or democratic, have massive resources to 
create, strengthen, and guide popular pressure to conform by employing information 
manipulation and opinion mobilization. Popular pressure to conform is more like a 
majority tyranny, and thus, an inhibitor of full citizen involvement in an uninhibited 
public discussion of controversial issues. Faultless public communication and 
“omnicompetent citizen” are just unavailable in a modern, industrialized, urbanized, 
and specialized society (Lippmman, 1922). Thus, modern public opinion tends to take 
the form of a “complex of preferences expressed by a significant number of people on 
an issue of general importance” (Lippmman, 1922, p. 11).  
Actually, as the framers of the Constitution envisioned, a well-functioning 
democracy always tries to insulate government decision-making from popular pressure 
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(Lowi et al, 2002, p. 402). Page and Barabas (2000) also note that realists and some 
international relations theorist have argued that foreign policymakers should “act as 
Burkean trustees rather than democratically instructed delegates, and must simply defy 
the public’s wishes” to defend the national interest (p. 341). 
Beginning in the twentieth century, the “expert advisory” in the form of impartial, 
non-judgmental, and scientific research products was more sought after by 
representative government agencies. When it comes to diplomatic affairs, “the unhappy 
truth is that the prevailing public has been destructively wrong at critical junctures” 
(Lippmann, 1922). Most ordinary citizens cannot grasp the complex realities of foreign 
affairs. Public opinion usually is based on incomplete, poorly comprehended media 
reports when people respond to their own “maps” or “images” of the world rather than 
to the real world itself. Therefore, Lippmann (1922) cautioned that when mass opinion 
dominates the government, the result is a morbid derangement of the true functions of 
power. Representative government (participatory democracy or deliberative 
democracy) cannot be workable in the absence of an independent, expert organization 
which can make the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions 
(Lippmann, 1922). Consequently, as Abelson (1995) notes, policy makers rely 
increasingly on scholars from policy research institutions to identify, develop, shape, 
and at times implement, policy ideas (p. 1). 
Overall, modern democracy’s opinion-policy process is more dominated by 
“competing elites” than by generalized public opinion (in the manner of Gallup’s 
national polls) and more dominated by group bargain than by the electorate process. 
The public’s concerns often are shaped by powerful political forces (Lowi et al, 2002, 
p. 400). Opinion-policy process in the U.S. does not guarantee that popular majorities 
will control policies. On the contrary, a substantial stratum of educated persons with 
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strong beliefs and skill in the democratic processes – such as media relations, issues 
advocacy, and pressure politics – “can normally ensure that democratic values are 
reasonably well respected” (Christenson, 1973, p. 42). An issue becomes important 
because it attains great visibility among political leaders and in the mass media rather 
than because of a groundswell of public interest in the issue (Christenson, 1973, p. 40). 
Callahan (1999) notes that the more significant change in American politics today may 
not lie in voting results, “but rather in the rise and fall of different ideas and their 
attendant policy agendas.” Therefore, more attention needs to be directed to the issue 
raising, issue framing, and issue suppression process in American politics today. 
This dissertation research conducts a content analysis of foreign affairs reporting and 
foreign policy debate in foreign policy papers and the network news with regard to 
U.S.-China relations. Particularly, the investigator pays more attention to elite groups, 
professional communicators, policy-makers, and ordinary citizen’s framing of issue and 
their policy deliberation. 
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Chapter 4. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review, this dissertation looks into the news coverage of China 
and mediated debate on the U.S.-China policy to determine:  
(1) How do pluralistic social groups – political activists, legislators, journalists, 
think-tank scholars, administration officials, members of congress, and foreign 
public relations – participate in U.S.-China policy debates and how their 
opinions relate to the republican virtue of the U.S.-China policy? 
(2) How do the media democracy and newsmaking-policymaking process in the 
U.S. contrast to the communitarian journalism as a rejuvenation of public life, 
and hence, the sustenance of democracy?  
Specifically, the investigator conducts a content analysis of newspaper articles and 
television news transcripts to investigate the following three research questions and 
three hypotheses with regard to the republican virtue of U.S.-China policy. 
Q1: Who participated the policy debate and whose policy perspective has the highest 
congruence with the actual policy, i.e., the tradeoff between human rights and trade?  
Q2: Among various political actors and social groups involved in the mediated 
debate on U.S.-China relations, whose input with regard to the U.S.-China policy is the 
most salient in terms of opinion manufacturing and media citation? 
Q3: Which foreign policy ideology – realism (power) vs. liberal internationalism 
(peace) and international political economy (prosperity) vs. principle (human rights) – 
is most prominent in media discourse with regard to U.S.-China policy? Who is arguing 
for those perspectives?  
H1. Given the high relevance between newsmaking and policymaking, the foreign 
policy-making community, by authoring opinion and supplying quotation in the 
national media, generally supports the policy tradeoff between trade and human rights 
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and has the most prominent presence in the media. 
H2. A significant discrepancy exists between government officials and ordinary 
citizens in terms of media visibility and policy proposals. 
H3. Compared to ordinary citizens’ perspective with regard to U.S.-China policy, 
the perspective of news people, such as pundits, columnists, commentators, anchors, 
and reporters, is more congruent with government’s actual policy framework. 
62
Chapter 5. Method 
To examine the republican virtue of U.S.-China policy, i.e., the public accountability 
and the democratic morality of U.S.-China policy, the investigator chose major media 
discourses as the representation of public opinion. This is because, as the literature 
review has illustrated, policy-makers and policy-shapers tend to hold that public 
opinion and media content are interchangeable and that “mass media content and 
interest groups are excellent crystallizers of a nebulous public opinion” (Herbst 1998, p. 
75). Therefore, to understand the true nature of public opinion, “it is most efficient to 
look to the source of persuasion – interest groups and media” (p.75). In some situations, 
“even if public opinion is not activated yet with regard to a given issue, policy makers 
respond differently to it when the issue becomes a more salient one in the media” 
(Cook, 1998, p.126).  
Based on that realization, various political actors resort to publicity to communicate 
across institutional divides, to direct attention to certain issues, to activate and reinforce 
latent attitudes among the public, and subsequently, to form a perceived consensus 
about those issues. Media visibility is an especially important priority for various 
political actors and social groups whose principal missions are to promote their policy 
agenda among policy makers (Rich and Weaver, 2000, p. 81). To them, “the savvy use 
of publicity can elevate a particular policy response” (Cook, 1998, p. 128) and securing 
salient presence in the national media, such as the NYT and CNN, is an important goal 
in making a difference in public policy choices (Cigler & Loomis, 1995, p. 393). 
1. Content Selection and Data Gathering 
The conflation of media’s narrative/judgmental content and public opinion and the fact 
that various institutions and political actors go about their business in a completely 
media-saturated environment enables the investigator to choose news reporting articles 
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and editorial/opinion pieces of the New York Times (NYT) and Cable News Network 
(CNN) as the representation of mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China policy. 
Furthermore, based on reviewing the methodology of mass communication research, 
the investigator finds that NYT and CNN were the dominant sources of information 
and major representation of public opinion against which many other media outlets and 
political actors make their viewpoints with regard to public affairs. 
NYT is probably the most prominent daily newspaper in the U.S. It has been 
referred to as America's “newspaper of record” in the past century, or “representing 
American news reporting at its best,” or the elite newspaper. It often prints full 
transcripts of major speeches and debates on major public policy. Particularly, NYT is 
the No.1 foreign-policy newspaper in the U.S. It is credited as the most influential and 
authoritative newspaper in international reporting. Its “Foreign Desk” news reporting 
and “Editorial Desk” opinion pieces with regard to foreign affairs have enormous 
influence in the foreign policy-making community (Page, 1996, p. 17). Particularly, its 
Op/Ed pages are among the most important public forums for foreign policy 
deliberation (Page, 1996, p. 17) and have enormous and disproportionate significance 
in shaping public perception about the propriety of possible foreign policy actions. 
Overall, NYT’s international reporting in the “Foreign Desk” and the opinion pieces in 
the “Editorial Desk” have the most conspicuous agenda-setting effects on various 
public forums such as local/national newspapers, magazines, talk radio, TV news, 
political weblogs, academic research, public lectures, university courses, and so forth. 
Therefore, the quality of deliberation on public affairs in NYT could affect the quality 
of public-policy debate generally (Page, 1996. p. 17). 
CNN reached the peak of its reputation during the 1991 Gulf War and remains the 
most renowned international news channel in the world. According to Nielsen ratings 
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in terms of TV news’s cumulative effect on viewers, CNN was America’s No. 1 cable 
news channel in the 1990s. It was available to 88 million U.S. households by the end of 
2004, and globally available to 1.5 billion viewers in more than 212 countries and 
territories. Besides, the real-time, 24-hour CNN news broadcasting has immediate and 
substantial agenda-setting effects on the foreign policy-making process because of the 
“CNN Effect,” i.e., the making of U.S. foreign policy is increasingly subject to the 
images flickering across television screen 24/7. In one sense, CNN is the most effective 
agenda-setting agent in the foreign policy community; the extent, depth, and speed of 
CNN’s agenda-setting effects are qualitatively different from those that preceded it. 
The saturation coverage of CNN was viewed as being strongly influential in bringing 
images and issues to the immediate forefront of American political consciousness. 
Other research suggests that the “CNN Effect” also includes “an impediment to the 
achievement of desired policy goals” and “an accelerant to policy decision-making.”26 
This “CNN Effect” is also framed as “CNN factor” by which it is meant that the media 
agenda influences a broad range of policy initiatives and that, by extension, lack of 
media coverage contributes to lack of policy (Hawkins, 2002, p.225).   
Besides prominence, the investigator chooses NYT and CNN because both news 
outlets have espoused a centrist, if not slightly liberal-leaning, editorial ideology in 
recent years (Groseclose, 2004). NYT has been criticized for being either too liberal or 
too conservative. However, based on media outlet’s citation of various think tanks and 
policy groups and by comparing media’s citation pattern to U.S. senator’s citation 
patterns and their voting scores, Groseclose (2004) finds that NYT is basically a 
newspaper of centrist ideology. Furthermore, based on the Lexis-Nexis search, both 
NYT and CNN generate the largest number of news relevant to China in both print and 
                                                 
26 “The CNN Effect: How 24-Hour News Coverage Affects Government Decisions and Public Opinion.” 
Brookings Institute/Harvard University Forum Transcript. 2002. www.brookings.edu/comm/transcripts/ 
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broadcast media. Based on the searching of “Lexis-Nexis Academics,” from January 1, 
1993 to December 31, 2000, roughly the presidential term of President Bill Clinton, 
NYT published 14,454 news and opinion items significantly related as well as 
negligibly related to “China,” and the CNN Transcript in Lexis-Nexis has 5,496 items 
significantly as well as negligibly related to “China.” 
Overall, by searching “Lexis-Nexis,” the investigator harvested 19,950 articles from 
NYT archives and CNN New Transcripts. These 19,950 articles constitute the gross 
media content for the quantitative study. As to the articles in the NYT, the investigator 
assumes that articles in some sections, such as “National Desk,” “Business/Financial 
Desk,” “Metropolitan Desk,” “Arts/Cultural Desk,” “City Weekly Desk,” “Week in 
Review Desk,” “Performing Arts/Weekend Desk,” and “Leisure/Weekend Desk,” are 
basically irrelevant to the policy debate with regard to the U.S.-China relations, and 
thus could be deleted from the media content without damaging the overall validity of 
the content analysis. Therefore, by choosing only “Foreign Desk” and “Editorial Desk” 
items for content analysis, the investigator gathered 4,963 items as the gross population 
of the NYT articles to be sampled and quantitatively analyzed. 
Among those 4,963 articles, the investigator deleted some confounding or highly 
irrelevant cases which (1) repeat themselves in the “news brief” and in the “Desks;” (2) 
identify “China” as porcelain wares; (3) mention “China” in stories dealing with 
Chinese Americans or life in “Chinatowns” of the U.S.; (4) mention “China” in stories 
dealing with illegal immigration in the U.S.; (5) mention “China” as a neighboring 
country of Japan or other Asian countries which are the major subject of the news 
story; (6) mention “China” as a very minor factor of the U.S.’s bilateral relations with 
other countries such as Haiti, Bosnia, Peru, among others; (7) mention “China”  as a 
very minor factor of the U.S. domestic politics, for example, an opinion item dealing 
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mainly with partisan hassle with regard to campaign finance reform, but refers to 
China’s campaign donation in a rather insignificant way. This resulted in 3,853 items as 
the legitimate population of the NYT content to be sampled and coded. All the 3,853 
items are lined up in the “Foreign Desk” category and “Op/Ed Desk” category 
according to publication date, for example, from 010193_a, 010193_b, 011193_a, … to 
123100_a. Whenever there is more than one article in one day, those articles in the 
same day are sub-labeled. For example, the collected five articles in March 30, 1997, 
are sub-labeled, randomly, as 033097_a, 033097_b, 033097_c, 033097_d, and 
033097_e.   
In collecting and sifting the 5,496 items generated from “CNN News Transcript” of 
“Lexis-Nexis,” the investigator adopted the same procedure as used in determining 
legitimate NYT items for content analysis. Besides, the investigator deleted those 
confounding or highly irrelevant cases which (1) repeat themselves in different 
episodes of CNN shows; (2) refers to “China” in “South China Sea” where some news 
took place but the news subjects are not China; (3) refer to “China” as the name of a 
heroin called “China Cat;” (4) mention “China” in stories dealing with the airline crash 
of Chinese Airline of Taiwan; (5) mention China in stories dealing with Chinese grand 
panda in American zoo. (6) mention “China” in stories dealing mainly with “sports,” 
“entertainment,” “show biz,” “travel and adventure”; (7) mention China in news stories 
dealing with “herbs,” “acupuncture,” “Chinese cuisine,” “feng shui” “Qigong,” “kung 
fu,” “traditional Chinese fashion” such as three-inch-lotus-shoes, and “folk arts and 
music”; (8) mention China in “immigrant smuggling,” or “illegal immigration”; and (9) 
mention China in news dealing with “stock market index” or “monetary exchange 
rate.” As a result, the investigator determines that 2,714 CNN items constitute the 
legitimate population of the broadcast media content to be quantitatively analyzed. All 
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the 2,714 items are lined up according to airing time the same way as NYT articles are 
lined up according to publication time.  
Finally, this resulted in the 6,567 items (2,714 CNN transcript items + 3,853 NYT 
articles) as legitimate content population of NYT and CNN to be sampled and 
quantitatively analyzed (See Table 1).  


























1993 337 142 1378 322 334 240 132 82 
1994 435 201 1413 301 297 220 131 81 
1995 344 181 1595 408 378 275 187 133 
1996 461 288 1851 420 373 273 223 147 
1997 1121 610 2030 609 501 381 302 228 
1998 664 402 1918 522 490 377 223 145 
1999 1027 578 2224 699 679 520 262 179 
2000 1107 312 2045 572 551 434 200 138 
Total 5496 2714 14454 3853 3603 2720 1660 1133 
 
Given the time constraint and the objective of the research – supporting or refuting 
research hypotheses, the investigator uses a probability sample of the content 
population to perform the content analysis. Given all the items in the content population 
are regularly lined up according to publication or broadcasting date, it is appropriate to 
use proportionate stratified sampling to get adequate and unbiased representation of the 
data set. To be specific, the investigator selected every fifth article in the population 
category of (1). CNN Transcript, (2). NYT’s “Foreign Desk,” and (3). NYT’s 
“Editorial Desk.” This stratified sampling generated 1,313 sample items – one-fifth of 
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the data population (6,567) – to be content analyzed. To be specific, 543 CNN items 
and 771 NYT items (550 international news items + 221 Op/Ed pieces) are sampled 
and quantitatively analyzed. 
The investigator uses a common coding protocol to analyze both the newspaper 
items and the television news transcripts. Each individual news or opinion article is the 
basic coding unit. Eleven variables are measured and recorded using common coding 
protocol (See Appendix 1). Most of the variables are nominal in terms of measurement. 
The investigator chose one-tenth of the sample articles, i.e., 65 NYT samples and 65 
CNN transcript samples to conduct inter-coder reliability test. The investigator and an 
American senior undergraduate student majoring in mass communication conducted the 
inter-coder reliability test. If any disagreements arose, the coders discussed the point of 
contradiction until a suitable frame could be distinguished. After three times of 
reliability check, the two coders’ average inter-coder reliability of all the 11 nominal 
variables, derived from Holsti’s percent agreement formula for two coders, achieved 
81%, a passable reliability result for categorical variables. 
2. Coding and Measurement Protocol  
The 11 variables of this content analysis basically focus on “who said what.” To be 
specific, “who” refers to media visibility of various participants of political 
communication; “what” refers to policy framework and policy orientation proposed, or 
suggested by those participants. Therefore, media visibility and perspective are two 
basic categories of the content analysis.  
Media visibility is usually measured in terms of: 
1. Authorship of a given policy proposal, argument, or perspective either 
published in Op/Ed pages of mainstream newspapers or aired on 
television debate/monologue. 
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2. The positive citations or references of a political actor, such as 
government official, scholars, or ordinary citizen, in support of a given 
frame of the story, or in support of the viewpoint of the opinion piece. 
Perspective is measured in terms of: 
1. Topic or issue covered in the articles. 
2. Importance level designated to various issues, such as human rights, military 
rivalry, and trade, in support of issue tradeoff 
3. Paradigms or mega-policy-frameworks against which a given topic or issue is 
discussed and weighed. 
To interpret those 11 variables in details (See Appendix 1): 
V1. All the articles are categorized as belonging either to print media (NYT) or to 
broadcasting media (CNN). 
V2. All the articles are classified as either news items or opinion items. 
V3. Authors of news items could be reporters, correspondents, writers, and 
anchorpersons of NYT or CNN, or wire service writers such as AP or Reuter reporters, 
or personnel from other agencies. 
V4. Authors of opinion items includes 25 categories: editorial board of NYT, CNN 
news people, NYT columnists, commentators, editors, writers, political analyst, 
strategist, pollsters, administration officials, U.S. senators, U.S. representatives, 
university faculty, experts, scholars, public intellectuals, scientist, economists, think 
tank scholars, former administration officials, business people, lawyers, issue 
advocates, activists, NGO, spokesman for interest groups, public figures, ordinary 
citizens, Chinese dissidents, officials and ordinary citizens of People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), Taiwan (ROC), and Hong Kong Special Administration Region (SAR) of 
PRC, Tibetans, international officials, and others; authors of NYT Op/Ed articles – 
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editorial essays authored by editorial board, letter-to-editor authored by a wide range of 
political participants, regular column articles authored by NYT columnists, and essays 
or comics authored by other writers and political actors - could easily be identified 
through byline information; authors of opinion pieces on CNN are identified and thus 
designated as those who uttered the major argument in congruence with the headline 
information of the item. 
V5. As to the citation and reference, the investigator counts only those positive 
citations and references, meaning: 
a)  The citation counted must have “substantive content” (Rich and 
Weaver, 2000, p. 89), not just mentioning the name of a given source 
without presenting its relevant policy proposal; 
b) The citation counted must be the viewpoints favorably cited or 
referred in support of the main idea of the opinion piece (Mundy, 1996, p. 
18).  
c) Whenever multiple citations support the main idea, only the first one 
is counted. 
V6. The authorship of the citation is identified and designated with the same 25 
categories as those used in identifying authorship of opinion pieces (See V4). 
V7. The topics/issues of the news/opinion items are broken down to 30 categories. 
V8. All those 30 issues or topics could be grouped into four national-interest 
frameworks (4Ps) determining the “dynamics of choice” of the U.S. foreign policy: 
principle, power, prosperity, and peace (see definition of the 4Ps in Technical 
Appendix 1). For example, the issues or topics such as Chinese military threat to 
American primacy, Chinese espionage in the U.S., China’s geopolitical activities, the 
U.S.-China military confrontation and strife; and Chinese nuclear proliferation and 
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weapon testing could be grouped together as relating to “power” framework of the U.S. 
national interest; issues or topics such as China’s environment and energy problem, 
AIDS and other disease, disarmament effort, China’s effort to join transnational 
organizations, and China’s conflict with regional or global powers could be grouped 
together as relating to peace framework of the U.S. national interest. Apparently, 
China’s human rights, corruption, oppressive polity, arbitrary family planning, and 
campaign donation to Democratic party could be grouped as relating to principle 
framework of the U.S. national interest; and U.S.-China trade relations, WTO entry, 
China’s piracy on U.S. products, and the trade imbalance, strife, and irregularities could 
be grouped as relating to prosperity framework of the U.S. national interest. In the end, 
nearly all the 30 issues covered in the U.S. mainstream media fall into the 4P national-
interest frameworks of the U.S. foreign policy. 
Jentleson (2000) argued that the foreign policy strategies of the United States are 
basically tradeoffs among those four national interests - principle, power, prosperity, 
and peace – in a given context of an international system. The core goal of American 
foreign policy is to make sound judgments of actions according to choice of national 
interest. The different degree of stress directed to the four national-interest goals 
corresponds to the four major schools of foreign policy theory (See Table 2).  
Table 2: American foreign policy: Goals and theories 
 
National interest goal                       Corresponding foreign policy theory  
   Principles                                         Democratic Idealism 
   Power                                               Realism 
   Prosperity                                         International Political Economy 






By measuring the four frameworks of national interest, the investigator may find 
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which foreign policy theory (and theorist) won out in the competition of ideas and thus 
occupied the commanding height to direct “fact collection and theory articulation” 
(Kuhn, 1962, p.18) during political communication. 
Given that the 4Ps framework can direct “fact collection and theory articulation,” the 
investigator finds that the 4Ps policy frame could be related to the media frame of the 
coverage of the U.S.-China relations. As Gitlin (1980) observed, media frames “are 
persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, 
and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse” (p. 7). 
Significant similarities exist between the policy frame and the media frame. 
Therefore, the investigator takes the 4Ps frame as the four news frames of the coverage 
of the U.S.-China relations: 
  a). Ideopolitical struggle (principle); 
  b). Darwinian struggle for geopolitical predominance or the so-called 
American primacy in the new world order (power); 
  c). Business interdependence (prosperity); 
  d). Common value and coexistence of all human race (peace). 
The prevalence of one news frame could result in the prevalence of the corresponding 
policy frame, and vice versa. 
V9-V10. In measuring the policy proposal with regard to the fundamental tradeoff 
between trade (prosperity) and human rights (principle), the investigator detects and 
infers those major opinion-framers’ attitude toward human rights and U.S.-China trade 
in terms of the importance level of the issue designated by them during their policy 
deliberation. For example, from a given article authored by a given political actor, the 
investigator can detect the policy proposal by identifying whether the opinion-framer 
designated 0 – “no mention of the issue,” or 1 – “not important,” or 2 – “important,” or 
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3 – “critically important” to a given issue, such as human rights or trade. 
To be specific, when a human rights issue is “critically important,” it means that the 
U.S. should hold the Chinese Communist government accountable to human rights 
abuse and link the renewal of China’s trade status to the significant improvement in 
human rights; when human rights is “important,” it means that U.S. should pursue 
human rights by way of dialogue, trade, personnel exchange, economic interaction, and 
principled engagement with China; when human rights is “not important at all,” it 
means the U.S. should brush aside the human rights issue and single-mindedly pursue 
other national interests, or accommodate the Chinese government’s definition of human 
rights as, first and foremost, “the right to survive” with food and shelter. 
On the other hand, when trade is “critically important,” it means the U.S. should 
normalize the U.S.-China trade relations, deepen the economic cooperation regardless 
of China’s human rights issue, and stay in the huge Chinese market to compete with 
other countries; when trade is “important,” it means the U.S. should do business with 
China in the hope that trade may liberalize Chinese political system, and in doing so, 
U.S. businesses should keep distance from controversial or unethical trade practice, 
such as importing China’s prison labor products, disregarding China’s infringement of 
intellectual property, investing in environment-unfriendly project, yielding to Chinese 
government’s press censorship, exporting sensitive technology, corrupting Chinese 
official for contract, and so forth; when trade is “not important at all,” it implies that the 
U.S. should not do business with Communist China because business transaction with 
China may strengthen America’s next enemy in the future. 
V11. In the end, the investigator measures the overall policy stance in terms of 
engagement, containment, and congagement. The Clinton administration advocated 
“engagement with China” by which it meant that the U.S. should maintain dialogue 
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with China in regard to human rights, trade, and Taiwan independence issue, expand 
economic interaction with China in the hope that a chain reaction could be detonated in 
the following pattern: U.S.-China trade relations leads to liberalization of China’s 
economy which, in turn, necessitates political liberalization of China. Also, engagement 
stance is based on realization that China is an indispensable partner for the U.S. to rein 
in global warming, transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, epidemic disease, and 
regional conflict. “Contain China” is a policy stance espoused by anti-China, anti-
communist lawmakers and government officials, advocating ruthless pursuit of the 
human rights agenda and single-minded isolation of China as a strategic competitor 
against the U.S. primacy. “Congagement with China,” according to Khalilzad (1999), is 
a bizarre combination of engagement and containment by which by which it means that 
the U.S. should preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy while deterring China 
from becoming hostile and hedging against the possibility that a strong China might 
challenge U.S. interests; to be specific, the U.S. can “continue to try to bring China into 
the current international system while giving equal attention to deterrence and 
preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to this system while seeking to convince the 
Chinese leadership that a challenge would be difficult to prepare and extremely risky to 
pursue” (Khalilzard, 1999). 
Overall, the investigator tries to determine whether the mass-mediated policy debate 
on the U.S.–China relations support the actual policy tradeoff, and if so, who tipped the 
balance? 
3. Conceptualization of “Ordinary Citizen”  
In this research, all the opinion makers/quotation suppliers could be broken down into 
15 categories. Basically, those 15 groups of political actors in the mass-mediated policy 
debate are government officials, professional communicators, pundits, academics, 
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corporate representatives, interest groups, and people who cannot be identified as 
belonging to each of the aforementioned groups.  
The researcher has tried to use “Google” and other reference books to identify these 
opinion makers/quotation suppliers, especially those who authored “letters-to-the-
editor” without indicating their institutional or organizational affiliation. The results is 
that 52 opinion makers and 5 quotation suppliers cannot be identified in any way as 
belonging to any of the aforementioned social groups. Therefore, the researcher 
identified the 57 authors as “ordinary citizen” although they aren’t literally “ordinary” 
citizens because they are so involved in public affairs, so knowledgeable with issues, 
and so capable of coherent deliberation of public policy issue that they can have their 
opinion pieces or statements published/broadcasted by national media. 
 Actually, the researcher tends to deem these obscure and unaffiliated opinion makers 
the real public in its canonical sense. They are real public because they are independent 
of obvious “pressure groups.” Their everyday interpersonal dialogue in regard to public 
affairs composes the lifeblood of civic space. News media only serve as a springboard 
for their conversation. Their relationship with the news media is natural and 
spontaneous. The news media are valuable only because they help to initiate the 
conversation among citizens and to sense the shifting directions of the conversation. 
 While admitting that those 57 opinion makers are in no ways ordinary citizens, the 
investigator can not simply label them as “issue advocates” or “issue public” because 
issue advocates, when pretended to be representative of the grassroots and often 
reluctant to disclose their affiliation, actually belong to “interest groups.” Their 
relationship with the news media is often manipulative. On the other hand, the 
investigator cannot simply label those 57 opinion makers as mobs howling in the street. 
Their opinion is in no way the facile, shallow, and popular sentiment of the moment. 
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Rather, their opinion are mature “social judgment reached after experiences have been 
recounted, hopes and fears expressed and results weighed.”27     
In this research, the opinion of ordinary citizens is the most valuable for two 
reasons: (1) As the normative theory of media democracy indicates, the conversation of 
ordinary citizens, especially those who have higher political awareness with issues but 
choose to hide behind “the veil of ignorance,”28 is the true origination of public opinion 
and real tissue of media democracy. (2) By contrasting their opinion with opinions of 
professional communicators, interest groups, and policy-makers, the investigator may 
generate meaningful finding in regard to the public accountability of the policy tradeoff 
between U.S.-China trade and human rights issues. 
                                                 
27 Clyde Lyndon King, “Public Opinion as Viewed by Eminent Political Theorists.” Cited by Susan 
Herbst in Reading public opinion, p. 108 
28 According to philosopher John Rawls, “the veil of ignorance” implies that people make decisions 
based on what is good for their community as a whole, and without regard to their own self-interest 
(since they operate behind a veil of ignorance and don't know enough about what would benefit them) 
although they could never actually eliminate all of their personal biases and prejudices. By hiding behind 
the veil of ignorance, they endeavor to minimize those personal bias and prejudices. “Behind such a veil 




Chapter 6. Results and Discussion 
Overall, the news coverage (916 items) of Chinese affairs and the opinions (396 items) 
on U.S.-China relations increased dramatically during President Clinton’s second term 
(See Figure 1). During that time, the paradoxical aspect of U.S.-China policy – 
“strategic partnership” and “constructive engagement” on one hand, the ever increasing 
drumbeat about the coming conflict between the U.S. and the PRC on the other hand – 
were reflected by intensive news events. These included mutual visits of the national 
leaders, surge in trade volume, bickering with regard to Hong Kong handover and 
Taiwan’s “two states” initiative, U.S. B-52’s bombing of Chinese embassy in 
Yugoslavia, allegations of Chinese military espionage and campaign donations to the 
Democratic Party, and China’s WTO entry. The perennial question obsessed by policy-
makers is: Will economic cooperation with China, and hence, China’s economic 
growth, lead to an easing of the repression in China and the emergence of an open and 
democratic society?  Or will it simply prop up the hard-liners, subsidize a potential 
strategic competitor, and help to keep the Communists in power? Reflecting those 
hopes and anxieties, this news coverage and the concurrent mass-mediated policy 
debate might be a perfect occasion to reexamine the opinion-policy nexus. 
1. Answers to Research Questions 
To answer the first research question – Who participated in the policy debate and 
whose policy perspective has the highest congruence with the actual policy tradeoff 
between human rights and trade? – the investigator finds that professional 
communicators at NYT/CNN authored one third of the 396 opinion pieces. Those 
professional communicators are the in-residence reporters, correspondents, anchors, 
columnists, and members of editorial board of NYT/CNN. Ordinary U.S. citizens 
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Figure 1: The volume of news/opinion items with regard to China by NYT/CNN during the Clinton years (1993-2000)
79
the 396 opinion pieces, most as letters-to-the-editor. The other major opinion-makers 
are university faculty (6.6%), members of Congress (6.3%), think-tank scholars (4.8%), 
incumbent administration officials (4.3%), business community (4.3%), former 
government officials (4.1%), media pundits (3.8%), issue advocates and NGO (3.3%), 
Chinese dissidents (2.5%), and public intellectuals (2.3%).  
 However, by combining the citations in news/opinion and authoring of opinion 
pieces, the investigator finds that incumbent administration officials have the most 
conspicuous presence (22.8%), surpassing ordinary citizens’ media presence (16.3%) 
(See Table 3). The overwhelming presence of administration officials in news coverage 
through citations (18.5%) may confer significant leeway to policy-makers for framing 
issues and setting the agenda.  
Other major participants of the mass-mediated policy debate are members of 
Congress (15.9%), NYT columnists (14.6%), NYT editorial board (11.8%), CNN 
reporters/anchors (11.1%)), issue advocates, interest groups and NGO (12.4%), 
business community (10.5%), think-tank scholars (10.3%), Chinese dissidents (9.8%), 
Chinese citizens (9.6%), former U.S. government officials (8.9%), and university 
faculty (8.9%) (See Table 3).  
The results suggest that incumbent administration officials have predominant 
presence in the policy debate by having their perspective transmitted by professional 
communicators and by having their perspective resonated among other social groups. 
The reason administration officials are more likely to be cited by mass media than 
authoring opinion pieces themselves may lie in that citations can confer more authority 
to incumbent officials in framing news stories. Perhaps administration officials are 
more likely to direct the fact-collection than to articulate foreign policy theories. The 
fact that ordinary U.S. citizen are very rarely cited or referred to in the news coverage 
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Table 3: The ten most prominent political actors in the mass-mediated debate*  
            Citation/authorship 
 
     














Administration officials 104 18.5 17 4.3 22.8 
Ordinary citizen (issue 
public)  5 .9 61 15.4 16.3 
Members of Congress 54 9.6 25 6.3 15.9 
NYT columnist 2 .4 56 14.2 14.6 
Issue advocates, interest 
groups, and NGO 51 9.1 13 3.3 12.4 
Editorial board of NYT 2 .4 45 11.4 11.8 
CNN reporter/anchor 0 0 44 11.1 11.1 
Business community 35 6.2 17 4.3 10.5 
Think tank scholars 31 5.5 19 4.8 10.3 
Total of frequency  561 100 395 100 200 
 
                                                 
* To be concise, the table leaves out some political actors whose combined media salience is no more 
than 5% (10/200).  
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with regard to the U.S.-China policy (.9%) may suggest that they have very negligible 
influence on the direction of “fact collection” of the mass media. On the other hand, 
members of Congress (9.6%), issue advocates (9.1%), Chinese citizens (9.3%), Chinese 
dissidents (7.3%), the U.S. business community (6.2%), and think tanks (5.5%) have 
more frequently been cited or solicited for opinions by the media. The inessential 
citation of ordinary citizens, even in terms of opinion polls, in the news stories may 
suggest their inconsequential influence on the direction of “fact-collection” of the mass 
media. Also, compared to citations of other social groups and administration officials, 
citations of the Congress (9.6%) is not impressive given that the Congress should have 
reclaimed more foreign policy-making authority in the post-Cold War years and given 
that the U.S. Congress, the deliberative body of the republic, was envisaged by 
Founders as a refined representation of popular sentiment and a major mechanism for 
civic participation. 
As to whose perspective is more congruent with the actual policy tradeoff between 
trade and human rights, the investigator finds that generally print media are more 
concerned with principle issues than are broadcast media. In terms of policy stance – 
containment (value = 1), or engagement (value = 3), or congagement (value = 2) – the 
NYT (2.10) leans more to congagement than CNN (2.37). The NYT tends more to 
argue for disciplined engagement (human rights/trade = 2.58/2.11 = 1.22) than CNN 
(human rights/trade = 2.51/2.59 = .97) (See Table 4). In addition, compared to opinion 
items, the news items slightly leans to supporting the policy tradeoff and engagement 
policy, showing that the intensive citations of administration officials may have some 
sway over the policy debate in support of the actual policy tradeoff (See Table 4). 
While NYT distributed one quarter of its China coverage to oppressive polity and 
human rights violations in China and has half of its China coverage framed as the 
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Table 4: Difference between NYT & CNN and between News & Op/Ed in regard 
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principle issue of the U.S. foreign policy, CNN distributed only 12.7% of China 
coverage to oppressive policy and human rights abuses in China and has 37.9% of its 
China coverage framed as principle issue of U.S. foreign policy. Overall, it seems that 
CNN leans more to a sympathetic “engagement with China” policy.  
However, comparing news items and opinion items in terms of the importance level 
of human rights, the investigator finds no significant difference between CNN and 
NYT (F = 2.295. p = .13) and between news and opinion (F =.133, p = .716 ) (See 
Table 5). As to the importance level of the U.S.-China trade, the investigator finds 
significant difference between CNN and NYT (F = 45.689, p<.05) and between news 
and opinion (F = 16.194, p<.05) (See Table 6). As to the policy stance, significance 
difference exists between CNN and NYT (F = 26.478, p<.05) and no significant 
difference exists between news and opinion (F = 2.115, p = .146) (See Table 7). 
As to whose perspective is more congruent with the actual “engagement” policy, the 
investigator finds that among various opinion-framers, the business community, 
university faculty, incumbent administration officials, and former government officials 
are most eager to propose “engagement with China.” Comparing citations of various 
political participants, again it is the business community, university faculty, incumbent 
administration officials, and former government officials who are most likely to 
propose the “engagement” policy. The business community spearheaded the 
engagement policy, administration officials and university faculty backed the initiative 
(See Table 8). 
To answer the second research question – Among various political actors and social 
groups involved in the mediated debate on U.S.-China relations, whose input with 
regard to the U.S.-China policy is most salient in terms of opinion manufacturing and 
media citation? – the investigator finds that, among the 25 political actor groups that 
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Table 5: ANOVA of importance level of human rights between NYT & CNN and 
between News & Op/Ed 
 
 
  Sum of Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .736 1 .736 2.295 .130 
Within Groups 233.264 727 .321   NYT - CNN 
Total 234.000 728    
Between Groups .043 1 .043 .133 .716 
Within Groups 233.957 727 .322   News – Op/Ed 
Total 234.000 728    
 
 
Table 6: ANOVA of importance level of U.S.-China trade between NYT & CNN 
and between News & Op/Ed 
 
 
  Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 24.357 1 24.357 45.689 .000 
Within Groups 227.634 427 .533   NYT - CNN 
Total 251.991 428    
Between Groups 9.208 1 9.208 16.194 .000 
Within Groups 242.783 427 .569   News – Op/Ed 
Total 251.991 428    
 
 




  Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 13.172 1 13.172 26.478 .000 
Within Groups 372.120 748 .497   NYT - CNN 
Total 385.292 749    
Between Groups 1.086 1 1.086 2.115 .146 
Within Groups 384.206 748 .514   News – Op/Ed 
Total 385.292 749    
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Table 8: Mean value of policy stance (contain/congage/engage) among political actors 
 




















Editorial board of NYT 1.81 37 n/a n/a 
CNN reporter, 
correspondent and news 
anchor person 
2.42 33 n/a n/a 
NYT columnist 1.63 54 1,00 1 
Administration officials 2.47 17 2.42 100 
Members of Congress 2.04 23 1.94 49 
Former government 
officials 2.47 15 2.41 27 
Think tank scholars 2.43 14 2.25 28 
Business community 2.80 15 2.79 29 
Issue advocates, interest 
groups, and NGO 2.10 10 1.93 29 
University faculty 2.75 20 2.50 10 
Ordinary citizen having no 
apparent affiliation 2.08 52 2.20 5 
Chinese dissident 2.33 6 1.86 22 
Tibetan 2.00 1 2.36 22 
Average of total 2.17 331 2.27 398*
 
                                                 
* To be concise, the table leaves out several categories of authors due to inessential amount of either opinion 
authoring or being cited in the mass-mediated debate or both. 
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participated through authorship and citations to the mass-mediated policy debate on the 
U.S.-China relations, the top ten most prominent participants are: 
(1) Incumbent administration official (22.8%),  
(2) Ordinary U.S. citizen (16.3%),  
(3) Member of Congress (15.9%),  
(4) NYT columnist (14.6%),  
(5) Issue advocate, interest group, and NGO (12.4%),  
(6) NYT editorial board (11.8%),  
(7) CNN correspondent/anchor (11.1%),  
(8) Business community (10.5%),  
(9) Think tank scholar (10.3%),  
(10) Chinese dissident (9.8%).  
By combining administration officials and members of Congress and labeling it as 
“government officials,” the top five policy-shapers are government officials 
(22.8%+15.9% = 38.7%), media people (CNN+NYT) (14.6%+11.8%+11.1% = 
37.5%), issue advocates (interest groups + think tank scholars) (12.4%+10.3% = 
22.7%), ordinary citizens (16.3%), and business community (10.5%) (See Table 9).  
Nearly half  (98.9% ÷200% = 49.5%) of the media content with regard to the China 
policy debate is occupied by the big three – government officials (38.7%), media 
people (37.5%), and issue advocates (22.7%). Of the 60 Op/Ed items arguing for 
American prosperity, the business community (25%), CNN (17%), and administration 
officials (10%) are top three advocates (See Table 10). Of the 110 citations in support 
of American prosperity, the business community (26.4%), administration officials 
(17.3%), and members of Congress (13.6%) are the top three defenders (See Table 11).      
 Given the predominant presence of government officials in the mass-mediated 
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Table 9: Top five policy shapers based on opinion-authoring and citation 
 
The top five 
policy shapers 
Combination Intensity of participation 
Government 




NYT columnist + NYT editorial 
board + CNN reporter 
37.5% 
Issue advocates 
Issue advocates + Interest groups + 
NGO + think tank 
22.7% 
Citizens  16.3% 
Business  10.5% 
Total   125.7% (a) 
(a) The result is a combination of opinion authorship and citation authorship. So, the 
true weight of participation of each individual group should be divided by 200%. For 
example, comparing to other social groups, the true weight of government’s 
participation in the policy debate should be 38.7% ÷ 200% = 19.3% 
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Table 10. Crosstabulation of Op/Ed’s Authorship vs. 4P foreign policy theories 
 
                   














































  Count 29 12 20 7 32 8 6 3 13 2 1 10 36 10 199 
  % within 4P 15 6 10 4 16 4 3 2 7 1 1 5 18 5 100 Principle  
  % within author 64 48 45 37 57 53 35 19 50 22 6 77 59 100 50 
  Count 11 8 9 4 11 4 4 6 3 1 0 1 7 0 72 
  % within 4P 15 11 13 6 15 6 6 8 4 1 0 1 10 0 100 Power 
  % within author 24 32 20 21 20 27 24 38 12 11 0 8 11 0 18 
  Count 3 4 10 1 5 1 6 3 1 5 15 0 3 0 60 
  % within  4P 5 7 17 2 8 2 10 5 2 8 25 0 5 0 100 Prosperity 
  % within author 7 16 23 5 9 7 35 19 4 56 88 0 5 0 15 
  Count 2 0 4 5 6 2 1 4 8 0 1 2 12 0 51 
  % within 4P 4 0 8 10 12 4 2 8 16 0 2 4 24 0 100 Peace 
  % within author 4 0 9 26 11 13 6 25 31 0 6 15 20 0 13 
Total   Count 45 25 44 19 56 15 17 16 26 9 17 13 61 10 395*
 
                                                 
* To be concise, this table leaves out 13 items adopting “other frames.” 
89
Table 11. Crosstabulation of citations’ authorship vs. 4P foreign policy theories 
 
                                      4P frameworks 
Authorship of citations Principle Power Prosperity Peace  Total 
Count 51 26 19 7 104 
Expected Count 53.0 20.0 20.4 9.5 104.0Administration  officials 
% within 4p frames 17.8% 24.1% 17.3% 13.7% 18.5%
Count 23 15 15 0 54 
Expected Count 27.5 10.4 10.6 4.9 54.0 Member of Congress 
% within 4p frames 8.0% 13.9% 13.6% .0% 9.6% 
Count 6 9 6 6 27 
Expected Count 13.8 5.2 5.3 2.5 27.0 Fmr govn’t officials 
% within 4p frames 2.1% 8.3% 5.5% 11.8% 4.8% 
Count 9 11 4 6 31 
Expected Count 15.8 6.0 6.1 2.8 31.0 Think tankers 
% within 4p frames 3.1% 10.2% 3.6% 11.8% 5.5% 
Count 4 2 29 0 35 
Expected Count 17.8 6.7 6.9 3.2 35.0 Business community 
% within 4p frames 1.4% 1.9% 26.4% .0% 6.2% 
Count 39 5 4 3 51 
Expected Count 26.0 9.8 10.0 4.6 51.0 Issue advocates, NGO 
% within 4p frames 13.6% 4.6% 3.6% 5.9% 9.1% 
Count 40 0 0 1 41 
Expected Count 20.9 7.9 8.0 3.7 41.0 Chinese dissident 
% within 4p frames 14.0% .0% .0% 2.0% 7.3% 
Count 12 7 6 6 31 
Expected Count 15.8 6.0 6.1 2.8 31.0 Chinese govn’t officials 
% within 4p frames 4.2% 6.5% 5.5% 11.8% 5.5% 
Count 19 3 2 2 26 
Expected Count 13.3 5.0 5.1 2.4 26.0 Hong Kong people 
% within 4p frames 6.6% 2.8% 1.8% 3.9% 4.6% 
Count 11 13 3 4 31 
Expected Count 15.8 6.0 6.1 2.8 31.0 Int’l  officials 
% within 4p frames 3.8% 12.0% 2.7% 7.8% 5.5% 
Count 30 4 10 7 52 
Expected Count 26.5 10.0 10.2 4.7 52.0 Chinese citizen 
% within 4p frames 10.5% 3.7% 9.1% 13.7% 9.3% 
Total Count 286 108 110 51 561*
 
                                                 
* To be concise, this table leaves out 6 items adopting the “other frames.” 
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debate on the U.S.-China policy and given that governmental officials are more 
supportive of the American prosperity agenda than other social groups (except for the 
business community and CNN people), it is understandable that the American 
prosperity agenda and the support for policy tradeoff can occupy certain time-space in 
the overall mass-mediated policy debate.  
However, it is noticeable that among the 4P (power, principle, prosperity, and peace) 
policy frames, government officials (administration officials and members of Congress) 
give major support to the principle issue of the U.S.-China relations either by way of 
opinion authoring or by way of citations. There is no way to project that policy tradeoff 
has won the support of public opinion in terms of media discourse of which 
government official occupied a big chunk. Therefore, it is safe to say that policy 
tradeoff between U.S.-China trade and human rights has not won the support of public 
opinion.     
To answer the third research question – Which foreign policy ideology – realism 
(power) vs. liberal internationalism (peace) and international political economy 
(prosperity) vs. principle (human rights) – is the most prominent one in media discourse 
with regard to U.S.-China policy and who is arguing for those perspectives?  – the 
investigator finds that realism (power) (18.7%) narrowly prevails over liberal 
internationalism (peace) (11.9%) and that democratic idealism (principle) (45.4%) 
overwhelmingly prevails over international political economy (prosperity) (16.1%) 
(See Figure 2). 
By crosstabulating authorship of the 395 opinion pieces with adoption of the 4P 
framework, the investigator finds that the ordinary U.S. citizens (18%), NYT 
columnists (16%), and the editorial board of the NYT (15%) are the first three 




















Figure 2: Distribution of 4P foreign policy theories in the mass-mediated debate 
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do their analyses; NYT columnists (15%),  the NYT editorial board (15%), and CNN 
reporters/correspondents/anchors (13%) are the first three categories of authors most 
likely to espouse realism (power) theory for their analyses; business community (25%), 
CNN reporters/correspondents/anchors (17%), and administration officials (10%) are 
the first three categories of authors more likely to espouse international political 
economy (prosperity) theory in their analyses; ordinary U.S. citizens (24%), university 
faculty (16%), and the NYT columnists (12%) are the first three categories of opinion-
framers who are most eager to put the U.S.-China relations in the perspective of liberal 
internationalism (peace) (See Table 10). 
In addition, the Chi-square test of the correlation between the authorship and the 
incorporation of a specific foreign policy theory into their analysis indicates a strong 
association between the two (Phi=.759, p<.05) (See Table 12). To apply the result of 
the test, it is highly unlikely for the ordinary U.S. citizens to discuss the U.S.-China 
policy with an American prosperity perspective, and similarly, it is highly unlikely for 
the business community to discuss the U.S.-China policy with an American principle 
perspective. 
The data indicate that, among 561 citations, the top ten most cited political actors are 
predominantly administration officials (President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright, 
Former Ambassador and American Enterprise Institute (AEI) scholar James Lilly) and 
members of Congress (Representatives from California: Republican Christopher Cox 
and Democrat Nancy Pelosi) (See Table 13). 
By crosstabulating the 561 citations’ authorship with the 4P framework, the 
investigator finds that administration officials (17.8%), Chinese dissidents (14%), and 
issue advocates (13.6%) are the top three most cited in the principle-oriented policy 
debate; administration officials (24.1%), members of Congress (13.9%), and 
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Table 12. Chi-Square test of the correlation between authorship and 4P frames 
 
 Value Df Approx. Sig. (tow sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 227.279(a) 88 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 186.186 88 .000 
Phi .759  .000 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V .379  .000 
 N of Valid Cases 395 
a.  90 cells (78.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03. 
 
 
Table 13. Top ten most cited political actors in NYT/CNN 
 
Name Affiliation o Cr association with ited 
Bill Clinton The Presiden t of the U.S. 28 
Madeleine Former U.S. y of State Albright Representative to U.N. and lately Secretar 9 
James Lilly Former U.S. ar  ambassador to China and lately AEI schol 8 
Wei Jingsh Veteran Chineng ese dissident 7 
Robin Mun The chief sporo kesman for “Human Rights Watch.” 7 
Christopher Representativ ina es Cox 
e (R-CA), author of  “Cox Report” on Ch
pionage 7 
Chris Patte The last Govn ernor of Hong Kong 7 
Nancy Pelo Representativsi e (D-CA) 6 
Charlene B US Trade Rearshefsky presentative 6 
Warren Ch Secretary of ristopher State during Clinton’s first term 6 
 
 
Table 14. Chi-Square test of the correlation between citation and 4P frames 
 Value Df Approx. Sig. (tow sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 269.111(a) 92 .000
Likelihood Ratio 251.504 92 .000
Phi .693  .000
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V .342  .000
 N of Valid Cases 561
a  83 cells (69.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01. 
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international officials (12.0%) are the top three most cited for the power-related policy 
debate; business community (26.4%), administration officials (20.4%), and members of 
Congress (13.6%) are the top three most cited for defending American prosperity; 
Chinese citizens (13.7%%), administration officials (13.7%), Chinese government 
officials (11.8%), former U.S. government officials (11.8%), and think-tank scholars 
(11.8%) are the most cited in arguing for peaceful coexistence of the U.S. and China 
(See Table 11). In addition, the Chi-Square test indicates a strong association between 
the authorship of the citation and a specific policy framework espoused in the mass-
mediated debate (Phi = .693, p<.05) (See Table 14). 
Democratic idealism (principle) prevails over international political economy 
(prosperity); realism (power) prevails over liberal internationalism (peace) (See Table 
15 and Table 16). Democratic idealism is the most prominent foreign policy theory 
espoused by various opinion makers, especially by ordinary U.S. citizens, NYT 
columnists, and NYT editorial board (See Table 15). Administration officials, Chinese 
dissidents, and issue advocates are top three most cited in support of democratic 
idealism theory (See Table 16). As to realism theory, NYT columnists, NYT editorial 
board, and CNN reporters/anchors are top three opinion-makers supporting a realism 
(power) framework of the U.S.-China relations. Administration officials, members of 
Congress and international officials are the top three most cited in supporting power 
rivalry between the U.S. and China.  
Overall, based on the number of opinion-framers arguing for a given foreign policy 
framework, the 4P framework could be prioritized as:  
1) Principle (109) 
2) Power (72) 
3) Prosperity (60) 
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Table 15: Authorship of opinion vs. prioritization of the 4P framework





Author of opinion 
Principle Power Prosperity Peace Other frames Total 
Ordinary citizens 36 7 3 12 3 61 
NYT columnist 32 11 5 6 2 56 
Editorial board 29 11 3 2 0 45 
CNN reporter/anchors 20 9 10 4 1 44 
University faculty 13 3 1 8 1 26 
Members of Congress 12 8 4 0 1 25 
Think tank scholars 7 4 1 5 2 19 
Business community 1 0 15 1 0 17 
Administration 
officials 6 4 6 1 0 17 
Former government 
officials 3 6 3 4 0 16 
Pundit 8 4 1 2 0 15 
Issue advocates, 
interest groups, and 
NGO 
10 1 0 2 0 13 
Chinese dissident 10 0 0 0 0 10 
Public intellectuals 2 1 5 0 1 9 
Total 199 72 60 51 13 395*
 
                                                 
* To be concise, this table leaves out those political actors who have authored no more than 6 opinion 
articles.  
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Table 16. Authorship of citations vs. prioritization of the 4P framework
                Policy frames 
 
Author of Citations 
Principle  Power   Prosperity Peace  Total  
Administration officials 51 26 19 7 104 
Members of Congress 23 15 15 0 54 
Chinese citizen 30 4 10 7 52 
Issue advocates, interest 
groups, and NGO 39 5 4 3 51 
Chinese dissident 40 0 0 1 41 
Business community 4 2 29 0 35 
Think tank scholars 9 11 4 6 31 
Chinese government officials 12 7 6 6 31 
International officials 11 13 3 4 31 
Former government officials 6 9 6 6 27 
Hong Kong people 19 3 2 2 26 
Hong Kong officials 10 0 2 4 16 
Taiwan officials 3 4 0 2 10 
University faculty 8 2 2 1 13 
Pundits 5 3 1 0 9 
Public intellectuals 2 3 3 0 8 
Taiwan people 4 0 1 1 6 
Ordinary citizens 1 1 2 1 5 
Total 286 108 110 51 561*
 
                                                 
* To be concise, this table leaves out those political actors who are seldom cited by the mass media. 
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4) Peace (51) 
Based on number of citations, the 4P framework could be prioritized as:  
1) Principle (286)  
2) Prosperity (110)  
3) Power (108) 
4) Peace (51) 
It is noteworthy that, in their opinion-framing, ordinary U.S. citizens prioritize the 
4Ps as (See Table 10):  
1) Principle (36) 
2) Peace (12), 
3) Power (7), 
4) Prosperity (3) 
Noticeably, the business community prioritized prosperity over principle as the top 
framework of the U.S.-China policy, both in opinion authoring and in citations (See 
Table 10 and Table 11). Administration officials prioritized prosperity as the top 
framework of the U.S.-China policy in opinion authoring (See Table 10). However, 
based on citations, ordinary citizens, though the rarest cited (0.9% of the 561 citations), 
prioritized prosperity over principle (See Table 11). 
Overall, democratic idealism (American principle) is the mainstream voice of media 
discourse as a representation of public opinion. Therefore, the public accountability of 
the policy tradeoff is in serious question.   
2. Test of Hypotheses 
To test the first hypothesis – Given the high relevance between newsmaking and 
policymaking, the foreign policy making community generally will support the policy 
98
tradeoff between trade and human rights and have the most prominent presence in the 
media – the investigator finds that by combining the opinion authorship and citation 
authorship, administration officials (the chief foreign policy-makers) have the most 
conspicuous presence in the media. Also, as Table 13 indicates, the President of the 
U.S., Secretary of State, and other officials in charge of Chinese affairs have the most 
conspicuous citations in the media. When members of Congress and think-tank scholars 
are incorporated into the foreign policy-making community, the foreign policy-making 
community has the most intensive input into media content ([22.8%+15.9%+10.3% 
]÷200% = 24.5%) (See Table 3). Nearly one quarter of media content is comprised of 
foreign policy-makers’ perspectives. No other social groups can surpass the policy-
maker community in saturating media. Even professional communicators in residence 
of NYT and CNN (37.5%÷200%=18.75%) can not surpass policy makers in saturating 
the media with their perspectives and opinions (See Table 9).    
Of the 561 citations, 67 citations deal with U.S.-China trade issue. Actually, those 
news/opinion items dealing with economic aspect of the U.S.-China relations, such as 
overall trade relations (109), trade irregularities (17), China’s WTO entry (20), Chinese 
piracy (11), and Chinese prosperity (34), are the most citation-saturated (See Table 17). 
News/opinion articles dealing with political aspect of the U.S.-China relations (human 
rights violation and oppressive polity) are the second citation saturated (See Table 17). 
Of the 1,312 items to be content analyzed, 269 items deal with political issues of the 
U.S.-China relations, and 191 items deal with economy/business issue of the U.S.-
China relations. The issue distribution and citation saturation – the amount of citations 
in all the articles dealing with a given issue – indicate that economic/trade issues have 
significant influence on the overall policy debate on the U.S.-China relations. For 
example, U.S.-China trade relations are the fourth most intensively covered issue 
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Table 17: Distribution of issue among all the news/opinion articles 
 
                                               Distribution 





Saturation of citation 
in regard to the issue 
Trade imbalance, strife, and irregularities 17 1.3 11/17=.64 
Chinese piracy 11 .8 7/11=.63 
U.S.-China trade relations 109 8.3 67/109=.61 
Overall U.S.-China relations 74 5.6 41/74=.55 
Hong Kong / Marco handover 88 6.7 47/88=.53 
Human rights violation in China 123 9.4 64/123=.52 
U.S.-Taiwan weapon deal 6 .5 3/6=.50 
Chinese military threat 29 2.2 14/29=.48 
U.S.-China diplomatic activities 111 8.5 53/111=.47 
Taiwan independence 76 5.8 36/76=.47 
U.S.-China military strife and confrontation 55 4.2 24/55=.44 
China's Olympic bidding 7 .5 3/7=.43 
Incompetence of Chinese bureaucracy 14 1.1 6/14=.42 
Oppressive polity in China 146 11.1 60/146=.42 
Chinese espionage 54 4.1 22/54=.41 
Chinese prosperity and development  34 2.6 13/34=.38 
China's environmental problem 21 1.6 8/21=.38 
Animal rights abuse  8 .6 3/8=.375 
Tibet separation 41 3.1 14/41=.34 
Arbitrary family planning 6 .5 2/6=.33 
Chinese donation to Democratic campaign 31 2.4 9/31=.29 
Chinese nuclear proliferation 25 1.9 7/25=.28 
Chinese leaders 26 2.0 7/26=.27 
Corruption and crime in China 16 1.2 4/16=.25 
China's foreign affairs with other countries 83 6.3 20/83=.24 
AIDS and other disease in China 9 .7 2/9=.22 
Chinese WTO (GATT) entry 20 1.5 8/20=.4 
Other 41 3.1 0/41=0 
Natural disaster, accident, and crash 29 2.2 0/29=0 
American propaganda toward China 2 .2 0/2=0 
Total 1312 100.0 561/1312=.43 
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among the China reporting; in the meantime, new reports of U.S.-China trade relations 
are the third most citation-saturated among the China reporting. While China’s human 
rights and oppressive polity are most intensively covered, the reporting dealing with 
those issues are less citation-saturated than reporting dealing with trade issues. Given 
that policy-making community is the most heavily cited, it is reasonable to project that 
policy-making community confer more authority to economic/trade issue than to 
political issue.      
 Actually, of those 67 citations dealing with U.S.-China trade issue, administration 
officials (20), members of Congress (17), and the business community (11) are the top 
three sources of citation (48/67=.71). Of those 124 citations dealing with human rights 
and oppressive polity in China, administration officials (8+6 = 14), members of 
Congress (4+1 = 5), and the business community (0+0 = 0) have a rather light 
concentration (19/124=.15) (See Table 18). Apparently, based on the distribution of 
citations among various social groups, the chief foreign policy-makers (administration 
officials and members of Congress) are likely to stand by trade issue and are more 
likely to highlight trade issues than human rights issues. 
Of the 395 opinion items, 80 deal with issues of principle, such as human rights 
violation and oppressive polity in China, and most of those 80 articles are authored by 
ordinary citizens (15), NYT editorial board (15), NYT columnists (14), and Chinese 
dissidents (8). Of those 42 items dealing with U.S.-China trade relations, the top four 
opinion makers are ordinary citizens (8), the business community (7), members of 
Congress (6), and administration officials (5) (See Table 19). Again, the policy-making 
community is the major supporter of the U.S.-China trade relations in the mass-
mediated policy debate.   
Based on surveying the distribution of authorship/citation across 30 issues of the 
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Table 18: Crosstabulation of issue vs. citations’ authorship 
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Administration  15 8 6 0 16 20 2 5 2 0 5 1 3 0 7 5 4 1 2 0 2 0 104 
Congress 4 4 1 0 8 17 3 0 1 0 3 0 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 
Chinese citizen 4 5 15 0 4 1 0 1 1 6 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 1 4 52 
Issue advocates 1 15 9 1 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 5 1 1 0 0 0 51 
Chinese dissident 0 24 12 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 41 
Business community 2 0 0 1 5 11 4 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 35 
Think tank scholars 4 1 4 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 0 0 2 1 0 1 31 
Chinese govn’t 0 0 2 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 3 3 2 1 0 31 
Int’l officials 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 1 3 0 6 9 0 0 0 31 
Ex-govn’t officials 8 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 27 
Hong Kong people 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 20 1 1 0 0 26 
Hong Kong officials 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 1 0 0 16 
Faculty 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 13 
Taiwan officials 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Total 41 64 60 6 53 67 11 7 8 13 14 7 22 9 24 36 14 47 20 8 7 6 561*
 
                                                 
* To be concise, some issues are deleted due to low coverage (less than five articles); some political actors are deleted due to low citation (less than 10).  
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Table 19: Crosstabulation of issue vs. Op/Ed’s authorship 
 

















































hina's foreign affairs 
Total 
Ordinary citizen 12 5 8 4 7 3 1 1 1 3 2 2 0 4 1 1 2 61 
NYT columnist 10 15 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 2 0 3 1 1 1 56 
Editorial board 7 3 3 6 1 8 4 2 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 45 
CNN reporter 2 4 4 7 1 0 2 6 4 2 4 1 3 0 0 2 1 44 
University faculty 5 3 1 1 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 0 0 26 
Members of Congress 1 2 6 6 0 0 3 0 1 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 25 
Think tank scholars 4 2 1 1 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 19 
Business community 0 2 7 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 17 
Administration  officials 0 1 5 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 17 
Fmr govn't officials 0 4 1 1 1 0 3 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 16 
Pundit 3 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 15 
Issue advocates 5 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Chinese dissident 2 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Total 53 42 42 38 32 27 21 20 19 16 11 10 10 9 8 7 7 395*
 
                                                 
* To be concise, some issues and political actors are left out due to small case numbers 
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U.S.-China relations, the investigator finds foreign policy-makers (administration 
officials, members of Congress, and think-tank scholars) are more likely to be 
associated with trade issues with regard to U.S.-China policy. Chi-Square test also 
shows that this kind of association is statistically significant (Chi-Square: authorship of 
opinion = 418.268, p< .05; Chi-Square: authorship of citations = 593.610, p<.05) (See 
Table 20). Therefore, the first hypothesis, that the foreign policy-makers have the most 
salient presence in the mass-mediated debate and are major supporters of the tradeoff 
between human rights and trade, is supported. That is to say, foreign policy-makers 
spoke in the mass media exactly for what they have practiced in the real world. Overall, 
there is no significant discrepancy between government officials’ news-making and 
policy-making. Table 15 also reaffirmed the hypothesis by showing that chief foreign 
policy makers (administration officials), by authoring opinion piece in national media, 
prioritize the 4P frameworks as:  
1) Principle (6)  
2) Prosperity (6)  
3) Power (4) 
4) Peace (1) 
This ranking indicates that foreign policy-makers apparently are caught up in a tough 
choice: American principle or American prosperity?  
To test the second hypothesis – There is significant discrepancy between 
government official and ordinary citizens in regard to media visibility and policy 
orientation. The investigator, by crosstabulating authorship/citation with (1) importance 
of human rights, (2) importance of trade, and (3) containment/ congagement/engage-
ment, finds that: (1) in both opinion making and citations, ordinary citizens (2.51/2.67) 
give a slightly higher score to the importance of human rights (mean score = 2.57 
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Table 20: Chi-Square test of opinion author/citation and issue coverage 
 
 Authorship of opinion 
Issue 











Df 22 29 df 23 29
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 Asymp. Sig. .000 .000
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell 
frequency is 17.2. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell 
frequency is 43.7. 
c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell 
frequency is 43.7. 
d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell 
frequency is 23.4. 
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(opinion) /2.60 (citations), with 1 = marginal, 2 = important, 3 = crucial) than 
administration officials (2.33/2.65) (See Table 21). (2) In both opinion framing and 
citations, administration officials (2.80/2.72) designate a higher score to the importance 
of trade (mean score = 2.17 (opinion) / 2.48 (citations), with 1 = marginal, 2 = 
important, 3 = crucial) than the ordinary U.S. citizens (1.60/2.65). (3) In both opinion- 
making and citations, ordinary citizens (2.08/2.20) advocate a “disciplined 
engagement” with China, while administration officials (2.47/2.42) lean more to 
“engagement” policy (mean score = 2.17/2.27, with 1 = containment, 2 = congagement, 
3 = engagement). (4) Chi-Square test (See Table 22) indicate a high degree of 
correlation between authorship of citation/opinion and the importance level designated 
to human rights (Chi-Square = 342.000, p<.05), trade (Chi-Square = 75.874, p<.05). (5) 
Chi-Square test indicates a high degree of association between authorship of 
citation/opinion and adoption of a specific China policy stance: containment, 
congagement, or engagement (Chi-Square = 89.928, p<.05). 
In summary, significant differences exist between administration officials and 
ordinary U.S. citizens in regard to the importance level of human rights, the importance 
level of the U.S.-China trade, and the advocate of a specific policy stance – 
containment, or congagement, or engagement. In addition this difference is statistically 
significant because of the high degree of association between authorship and policy 
stance. Therefore, the second hypothesis – There is significant discrepancy between 
administration officials and ordinary U.S. citizens in terms of media visibility and 
policy stance – is supported. That is to say, the tradeoff of the U.S.-China policy 
between human rights and trade is not accountable to the ordinary citizens’ will 
expressed in the mass-mediated debate. 
Indeed, according to some typical opinion polls, the U.S. public largely holds a 
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Table 21: Policy stance (human rights, trade, contain-engage) across groups 
 
Opinion-framing Citations             Policy proposal in 
                     

















Transcript  2.80 3.00 2.83 3.00 n/a n/a 
              Editorial  board 2.88 1.96 1.81 3.00 n/a n/a 
CNN reporter 2.53 2.55 2.42 n/a n/a n/a 
NYT columnist 2.75 1.61 1.63 3.00 2.00 1.00 
Pundit  2.50 2.67 2.10 3.00 3.00 2.14 
Administration officials 2.33 2.80 2.47 2.65 2.72 2.42 
Members of Congress 2.76 2.05 2.04 2.74 2.13 1.94 
Fmr. Govn’t officials 2.14 2.60 2.47 2.23 2.38 2.41 
University faculty 2.38 2.86 2.75 2.56 3.00 2.50 
Public intellectuals 2.00 3.00 2.43 2.50 3.00 2.20 
Think tank scholars 2.40 2.33 2.43 2.47 2.33 2.25 
Business community 1.67 2.88 2.80 2.06 2.79 2.79 
Issue advocates 2.87 n/a 2.10 2.85 1.56 1.93 
Public figures n/a n/a n/a 3.00 n/a 2.00 
Ordinary citizen 2.51 1.60 2.08 2.67 2.50 2.20 
Chinese dissident 2.70 2.33 2.33 2.83 1.78 1.86 
Chinese govn’t officials n/a 3.00 3.00 1.75 2.56 2.69 
Hong Kong officials 2.67 3.00 2.00 2.83 2.50 2.20 
Hong Kong people n/a 3.00 3.00 2.55 2.80 1.92 
Taiwan officials 3.00 2.00 1.67 2.75 n/a 1.50 
Taiwan people n/a n/a n/a 2.80 3.00 2.20 
Int’l officials 2.33 n/a 2.50 2.50 2.88 2.36 
Tibetan 3.00 n/a 2.00 2.50 n/a n/a 
Chinese citizen 2.00 n/a 3.00 2.39 2.56 2.53 
Others 2.00 n/a 3.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 
Total 2.57 2.17 2.17 2.60 2.48 2.27 
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23 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
  a  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 23.4. 
  b  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 243.0. 
  c  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 23.4. 
  d  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 143.0. 
  e  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 23.4. 
  f  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 250.0. 
  g  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.2. 
  h  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 243.0. 
  i  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.2. 
  j  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 143.0. 
  k  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.2. 
  l  0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 250.0. 
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different point of view in regard to the policy tradeoff from the policy-makers:  
(1) CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted in September 1995 and May 
1996 showed that, when being asked whether the U.S. should maintain 
good trade relations with China, despite disagreements the U.S. might 
have with the Chinese government’s human rights policies, or whether 
the U.S. should demand that China improve its human rights policies 
if it wants to continue to enjoy current trade status with the U.S., sixty 
percent of the respondents in both polls insisted that the U.S. demand 
improvement in human right as condition for good U.S.-China trade 
relations; only 30-33% of the respondents in both polls thinks that the 
U.S. can maintain good relations with China despite disagreements in 
human rights policies.29 
(2) CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted in July-November 2005 
indicates that the U.S. public largely maintains the aforementioned 
policy stance even in the post-9/11 years when China was deemed a 
valuable ally of the U.S. in its war against terrorism. When being 
asked the same question aforemetioned, fifty-three percent of the 
respondents insisted that the U.S. demand improvements in human 
rights as a condition for good U.S.-China trade relations.30  
(3) Another three opinion polls conducted by CNN/Time in May 1996, 
February 1997, and May 1999 showed that, when being asked whether 
the U.S. should take a strong stand on human rights even if this might 
jeopardize its diplomatic and trade relations with China, or should the 
U.S. establish strong diplomatic and trade relations with China, even if 
                                                 
29 Available at www.pollingreport.com/china.htm
30 Ibid. 
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that requires overlooking some of China’s human rights violations, 
fifty-four to fifty-seven percent of the respondents in the three polls 
think that the U.S. should take a strong stand on human rights even if 
this might jeopardize U.S.-China trade relations; only 28-32% of the 
respondents in the three polls agrees that the U.S. can overlook human 
rights violations while keeping a strong economic ties with China31. 
(4) In March1999, Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll shows that, when being 
asked whether the Clinton administration, in maintaining a 
constructive working relationship with China “has acted appropriately 
or gone too far” in trying to maintain this kind of relationship with 
China, forty-seven percent of the respondents answered “gone too far” 
while 46% of the respondents answered “acted appropriately.”32 
(5) In January1999, an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll showed that, 
when being asked whether the U.S. government, in an effort to stop 
Chinese government’s crackdown on political debate and its detaining 
dissidents and human rights advocates, can be more effective with 
China by using quiet diplomacy or by taking public actions such as 
cutting back on economic ties, forty-two percent of the respondents 
answered “taking public actions” while 41% of the respondents 
answered “using quiet diplomacy.”33 
To summary those opinion polls, the majority, if not overwhelmingly, of the U.S. 
public, while acknowledging the importance of U.S.-China trade relations and the 
wisdom of reconciliation, decried the moral ambiguity of the policy tradeoff. Tien and 
Nathan (2001) note that, depending on the wording of poll questions – from 
                                                 




juxtaposing human rights issue with economic benefits of the U.S.-China trade to 
juxtaposing human rights with overall U.S.-China relations – the U.S. public showed an 
increased support to principle issue. Overall, by summarizing all the opinion polls 
during 1997-1999, they observed that “between 39 and 67 percent of respondents 
believe that human rights issues should receive priority when the U.S. makes foreign 
policy toward China” (p. 129). 
To test the third hypothesis – The viewpoints of the professional communicators and 
media pundits are congruent with the viewpoints of government officials – the 
investigator finds that given the high degree of association between authorship and 
policy stance established during testing the second hypothesis, it is highly unlikely that 
professional communicators and government officials hold the same viewpoints. 
Also, Table 21 shows a significant gap between NYT columnist/editorial board and 
administration officials in regard to human rights, trade, and overall policy stance. To 
be specific, in opinion-making, the NYT editorial board (2.88) and NYT columnist 
(2.75) give a high score to the importance of human rights, while government officials 
(2.33) scored below the average (2.57). As to the importance of U.S.-China trade, NYT 
editorial board (1.96) and NYT columnist (1.61) give a low score, while administration 
officials (2.80) scored far above the average (2.17). When it comes to the overall policy 
stance toward China, the average score is 2.17, roughly representing “guarded 
engagement,” or “disciplined engagement.” Administration officials scored 2.47, 
leaning optimistically to “engagement,” while NYT editorial board scored 1.81, and 
NYT columnists scored 1.63, roughly representing “guarded containment,” or 
“restrained engagement.” CNN news people and media pundits are very different from 
NYT news people in all those three categories, falling in the midway between 
administration officials’ optimistic viewpoint and NYT news people’s pessimistic 
111
viewpoint in regard to the U.S.-China relations. 
Therefore, the third hypothesis is rejected. That is to say, when a high degree of 
relevance exists between newsmaking and policy-making, the news people’s news-
making can still be independent from administration officials’ news-making. Media 
people, especially the NYT, do not simply index the government’s viewpoints. 
3. Major Findings 
In summary, the quantitative study finds that:  
(1) Among various social groups, policy makers, especially government officials, 
have the highest saturation of the mass media content.  
(2) Professional communicators roughly represented the average policy orientation 
of the public. 
(3) A significant correlation exists between a given social group and a given policy 
stance. 
(4) Government officials, although giving major attention to principle issues, are 
more likely to stand by American prosperity and to ally with business group in support 
of the U.S.-China trade relations. 
(5) Ordinary citizens are among the staunchest supporter groups arguing for 
“disciplined engagement” and principled relationship with non-democratic countries. 
(6) The policy tradeoff between human rights and trade cannot claim the support of 
public opinion represented by major mass media discourse, and thus, cannot past the 
test of public accountability. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion and Policy Critique 
Based on the results enumerated in Chapter 6, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
paradigmatic shift of U.S.-China policy – from indignation to engagement and from 
democratic idealism to the international political economy – cannot claim to have the 
support of public opinion in general. To be specific, a significant discrepancy exists 
among various social groups, especially between the foreign policy-making community 
and ordinary U.S. citizens and among professional communicators, policy-makers, and 
policy-shapers, with regard to the policy tradeoff between human rights and U.S.-China 
trade relations. On the other hand, some degree of agreement exists between 
administration officials and the business community with regard to the policy tradeoff. 
Beginning in 1994, the policy tradeoff between human rights and U.S.-China trade 
broke through the overwhelming concern about and protest against human rights 
violations in China. How could a public policy without the mandate of public opinion 
be executed for years in the face of the ever-increasing consolidation of authoritarian 
rule in China? What does it mean to media democracy in the U.S.? In this chapter, the 
investigator tries to put the results into the Communitarian perspective - the “co-
operative inquiry” and “empowerment in the democratic decision-making process” – to 
conduct a policy critique. To be specific, the policy critique breaks down to three parts: 
(1) the Communitarian critique of the public opinion-public policy process with regard 
to U.S.-China relations; (2) a case study of the public relations-public policy process: 
Corporate America’s issue management of U.S.-China relations; (3) contextualizing 
globalization to examine its true nature: an enlargement of capitalism rather than a 
spreading of democratic peace.        
1. Public Accountability of the Policy Making Process 
As the results suggest, among various social groups, policy makers, especially 
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government officials, have the highest saturation of mass media content; the 
news/opinion articles dealing with economic aspect of the U.S.-China relations have 
the highest concentration of citations. The disproportionately intensive citation of 
policy makers in news stories, and with it, their dual support of both principle and 
prosperity, may confer legitimacy of national interest to the policy tradeoff. It is 
unreasonable to require the news media, which have a symbiotic relationship with the 
government apparatus, to give equal authority to both the governor and the governed. 
Most ordinary citizens lack the authoritative resources to attract journalists. Therefore, 
the media democracy in the United States may have some inherent inadequacy to 
represent the will of the public whenever a significant difference of viewpoints exists 
between the government and ordinary citizens.  
As the literature review in Chapter 4 indicates, although the policy-making 
community thinks that mass media content is typical representation of public opinion, 
and although normative theory of media democracy acknowledges that mass media 
content and public opinion are largely conflated, it is dangerous to jump to the 
conclusion that a given public policy can claim to have public accountability whenever 
it is in congruence with media content, especially when the mass media content is short 
of civic participation in terms of opinion authoring, issue raising, and citation supplying. 
As to the mass-mediated debate on China policy, the significant lack in the citation of 
ordinary citizens and the disproportionately intensive citation of the policy-making 
community might have rendered a biased media discourse and a watered-down concern 
with the principle issue vis-à-vis the prosperity issue. 
As to the mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China relations, the battle of ideas is 
significantly influenced by the intensive barrage of the policy-making community, 
namely, administration officials, members of Congress, and think tanks. The result is 
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that the prosperity agenda won some legitimacy in the public forum, and consequently, 
foreshadowed the policy tradeoff. On the other hand, ordinary U.S. citizens insist on 
holding a non-democratic government accountable to the universal value of human 
rights and democratic ideals. They are more likely than other social groups to propose 
“disciplined engagement” with a non-democratic government than other social groups. 
They are less likely to buy into a policy that bends principle for maintaining American 
competitiveness and profitability. The fact that ordinary citizens are more likely to 
show a clear moral compass than government officials when it comes to policy tradeoff 
between issues of principle and issues of bread and butter may vindicate the urgency to 
implement Communitarian program – empowerment of citizens in the democratic 
decision-making process. 
Based on Communitarian theory of the press, reporting of public affairs should be 
driven by community norms, not by markets or mechanical efficiency which means the 
good relationship with the advertisers and easy access to the authoritative sources; the 
media should be a network of vernacular discussion – journalism of conversation, not 
primarily as a vehicle of expert transmission (Carey, 1987, p. 14). The result of the 
policy debate may have been significantly changed, and hence, the actual exercising of 
the policy tradeoff may have been slowed down if ordinary citizens were given more 
media time to voice their judgment. “Markets or instrumental wizardry often impose 
criteria that an ethics of community would not condone” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 87). 
Public affairs reporting depleted of the public’s judgment makes no sense and results in 
the demise of journalism. The lack of civic participation in the policy debate and the 
neglect of the public’s judgment in public affairs reporting may contribute to the 
capability of a dubious policy framework staying afloat in the public forum. 
As this quantitative research indicates, government officials are the major 
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participants in the mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China relations, and the overall 
climate of opinion has been significantly altered to the advantage of policymakers. As a 
result, public accountability of the policy-making process has been discounted because 
public opinion itself, represented by media discourse, is significantly colonized by the 
policy-makers through their opinion authoring, information/quotation supplying, and 
news-making. 
The Communitarian theory of the press requires that the mass media be an avenue of 
liberal education by which free citizens perform co-operative enquiry. Mass media have 
a sacred task “to create wise citizens of free community,” and, through combination of 
citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness, “to enable men to give to human life 
that splendor which some few have shown that it can achieve” (Russell, 1938, p. 305). 
Mass media should be a research infrastructure and dialogic platform by which citizens 
cultivate reciprocal relationship in their self-education, their discovering truth, their 
deliberating moral value, and their determining common good. The community, by way 
of internal democracy and consensus building, should be arbiter of value and 
accountability. On the other hand, to overcome community-based relativism and 
community-based particularism or provincialism, Communitarianism requires that co-
operative citizens embrace the basic societal values and incorporate cross-societal and 
cross-cultural moral dialogue into their seeking of common good. By involving the 
diverse and broad communities into the cooperative inquiry and open discussion, 
Communitarian press could be a societal institution through which citizens “do not 
spend time and passion defending unjust privileges of their class or nation, but they aim 
at making the world as a whole happier, less cruel, less full of conflict between rival 
greeds” (Russell, 1919, p. 187).           
That mass-mediated policy debate is disproportionately dominated by professional 
116
communicators, especially the in-residence writers and columnists, indicates a shortcut 
for cooperative inquiry. Although professional communicators are more in congruence 
with the average attitude of all the social groups than any other individual social group 
when it comes to the U.S.-China policy, their deliberation cannot be substitute for 
citizen’s cooperative inquiry. The most effective and the most solid way to consolidate 
public accountability of public policy is to have more ordinary citizens contributing to 
the mass-mediated policy debate rather than pitting one elite group against another elite 
group. Ordinary citizens, having had the most potential to transcend their personal 
interests when contributing to the public forum, are more likely to frame a rational and 
morally sound verdict with regard to policy tradeoffs. 
According to the content analysis, authorship of opinion pieces and media citation 
matter a lot to the results of “the battle of ideas.” The data indicate a rather high degree 
of correlation between authorship and policy stance, analytical frameworks (theory 
articulation), issue coverage (fact collection), and balance of emphasis on specific 
choices, among others. Therefore, to change the climate of public opinion represented 
by mass media content, all the relevant social groups should strive to strengthen their 
presence in the national media lest one group’s voice is marginalized to the advantage 
of other group. Especially the public, who has the greatest potential to address the state 
while leaving individual interests behind, should be the major conversationalists of the 
mass-mediated open discussion. Mass media should be the gatekeeper of the public 
sphere. The professional autonomy of journalists cannot guarantee media democracy. 
Media democracy is realized only when democratic media “let the people talk to each 
other rather than just listen to experts” (Nerone, 1995, p. 100). The real accountability 
of the mass media, and with the accountability of the opinion-policy process, lies in that 
the mass media find their mission in activating the polis, nurturing the civic 
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transformation, facilitating a thorough understanding of public life, and bring the public 
back into existence (Christians, et al, 1993, p. 87). 
Based on this quantitative research, government officials, although giving sufficient 
attention to the principle issues, are more likely to stand by American prosperity and to 
ally with business groups in support of the U.S.-China trade relations. Putting this 
finding into Streeter’s (1996) perspective with regard to America’s corporate liberalism, 
it becomes more urgent to practice Communitarian’s political program – empowerment 
of citizens in the democratic decision-making process.  
According to Streeter (1996), beginning in the 1880s, corporate liberalism was 
introduced into American socio-economic system. Corporate liberalism is an upgraded 
version of traditional liberalism. Corporate liberalists demand that state bureaucracy 
and government intervention be incorporated into corporate management to save 
capitalistic production from cutthroat atomistic individualism and from self-destructive 
laissez faire competition. The reason corporate liberalists don’t refuse institutional 
intervention and administrative control of individual endeavor lies in a new way of 
thinking with regard to freedom and individualism: To corporate liberalism, freedom 
means to be a good piston of an engine working tunefully with other parts of the 
machine; public interest means the smooth operation of capitalistic production and a 
collective security of corporate community (Streeter, 1996). Along this train of thinking, 
the public interest is reified in the form of big government whose intervention can 
preempt chaos, economic cycle, and some radical alternatives. For example, 
government intervention has been introduced by corporate broadcasters to marginalize 
amateur broadcasters, to commoditize the public spectrum, to facilitate private 
broadcasters’ speculation on the public spectrum, and to legitimize monopolistic 
control of the public spectrum in the end (Streeter, 1996). 
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As a result, corporate liberalism may expatriate the real public, the god term of 
democracy, from democratic decision-making process and form a government-
corporate rapport to ensure the collective security of the corporate community. Actually, 
in the last century, corporate liberalism, either in the form of “regulation,” or 
“deregulation,” or “re-regulation,” represented an inherent conflict between capitalism 
and democracy because corporate liberalism is an effort to keep the public outside the 
beltway of policymakers. While corporate America has a huge stake in the well-being 
of U.S.-China relations, it is no wonder that the U.S. government’s policymaking and 
newsmaking with regard to the U.S.-China relations could be stretched to the point that 
actually there are no presidents seriously enforcing the human rights standard in dealing 
with Chinese Communist government. The high association of government and the 
corporate community in the making of China policy not only damages the integrity of 
the democratic decision-making process, but also possibly damages the public’s interest 
by outsourcing American jobs and by corrupting Chinese civil servants.  
Therefore, Communitarian’s empowerment agenda is highly valuable in that civic 
participation in the deliberation of public policy can help to build a wall between 
government and business to restore the public to the beltway of policymaking, 
especially when it comes to the making of important foreign policy. 
Based on reviewing the zigzag of the Clinton administration’s China policy in the 
1990s, the investigator concludes that the average policy stance expressed by the 
national media – 2.17 for opinion-framing and 2.27 for citations (1=containment, 
2=congagement, 3=engagement) – may have had some impact on the implementation 
of the engagement policy (value = 3). That the media discourse has argued strongly for 
“guarded engagement” or “disciplined engagement” may have encouraged the serious 
investigation of Chinese Communist Party’s political donations and the serious 
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reexamination of the dubious “strategic partnership” between the U.S. and China in the 
late 1990s. Unfortunately, some of the reexaminations were initiated through concerns 
about “balance of power” between the U.S. and China rather than through concerns 
about placing democratic peace in jeopardy when strengthening a strong Chinese 
economy coupled with oppressive polity. 
In summary, the results could relate to Communitarian theory of the press in that the 
sound judgment of public policy really necessitates the deepening of public 
participation in the policy debate and the expansion of the public sphere, in this case, 
the mass-mediated debate, to counterbalance the predominance of establishment voice. 
Given that university faculty and policy research institutes have significant influence on 
the result of policy debate, Communitarian politics should take education as one 
important battleground of their empowerment agenda. To be specific, universities and 
policy research institutes should be more associated with inclusive communities rather 
than affiliating with the dominant classes such as big government and big business. 
Scholars’ knowledge-claim should have more give and take with communities and 
ordinary citizens. The academic and research community should restore its civic 
foundation by which it means the merging into each other of the intellectual life and the 
public life, the centrality of city (urban) and civic culture in producing accomplishment 
in art, science, and literature, and the prosperity of democratic culture through 
intellectual’s rebuilding of the “we” relationship with the U.S. public (Bender, 1993, 
p.144). 
In spite of the strong skepticism expressed by the mass media toward the policy 
tradeoff, the delinkage of trade from China’s human rights, the “strategic partnership” 
between the U.S. and China, and the faith in the political benefit of economic 
liberalization in China becomes actual policy framework during the Clinton 
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administration. How could a public policy – the policy tradeoff – lacking in public 
accountability waltz through a country which elected a president in 1992 to stop moral 
equivocation of which President Nixon, President Carter, President Reagan, and 
President Bush each has been accused by their successor? To understand the 
conspicuous discrepancy between public opinion represented by the mass media and 
the actual policy, it is necessary to look into one important source of public opinion, the 
interest groups; in this case, it is the corporate America’s China lobbying.     
2. Corporate America’s Issue Management of U.S.-China Relations 
The building of new consensus of U.S.-China relations in the post-Tiananmen times is 
a paradigmatic change of U.S. foreign policy tradeoff from “power vis-à-vis principle” 
to “prosperity vis-à-vis principle.” Besides the mass-mediated battle of ideas, various 
social institutions’ lobbying, public relations, and grass-root campaigns are other forms 
of mass persuasion that aim at consensus rebuilding. In the case of U.S.-China policy in 
the post-Cold War years, it is worthwhile to investigate corporate America’s issue 
management of the policy tradeoff because corporate America is one of the major 
stakeholders of the policy tradeoff between human rights and the U.S.-China trade 
relations. The other stakeholder is the CCP government. In engineering the policy 
tradeoff, corporate America and the CCP are co-workers.   
Issue management is strategic planning of public relations to engineer building of 
political consensus. Coates et al (1986) define issue management as “the orchestrating 
of a positive plan for dealing with issues, rather than merely reacting to them” (p. 15); 
“It can make an organization an active participant in shaping its future, rather than a 
reactive victim of inadequately considered legislative and regulatory responses to 
problems” (Coates et al, 1986, p. 15). In the long term, both corporations and 
government institutions tend to employ issue management programs – a creative fusion 
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of journalism, advertising, and public relations – to “predict problems,” “anticipate 
threats,” “minimize surprise,” “resolve issues,” and “prevent crises” (Wilcox et al, 
2001, p.136). Miller (1999) notes issue management constitutes a link between 
organization reality and public perception, a lack of which results in failure of an 
organization “to effectively address the concerns of the public on whose support the 
success of the organization depends” (p.10). 
Harrison (1984) notes that the corporate community “has the moral and legal right to 
participate in the formation of public policy and not submit to and commit suicide 
before the whims and pressures of bureaucrats and activists” (p. 9). Issue management 
assists corporations and institutions to anticipate emerging issues, define or frame the 
issues in their own terms, and respond to them before they get out of hand. It is 
proactive because it tries to identify issues and influence decisions before they have a 
detrimental effect on an organization (Gaunt and Ollenburger, 1995, p.199). Through 
issue management, large corporations, which are increasingly becoming social and 
political institutions as well as economic institutions, could influence the framing of 
issues, sway interested publics’ viewpoints, and achieve more effective participation in 
the shaping of public policy (Jones, 1980, p. 27). 
The end of the Cold War altered the environment of the making of U.S. foreign 
policy. Gates and Skidmore (1997) note that “[A]bsent a single, unifying external threat, 
the foreign policy agenda becomes more diffuse, domestic cleavages intensify and 
proliferate, and deference to the executive branch recedes” (p. 514). As a result, a more 
pluralistic policymaking environment may weaken presidential authority in favor of 
Congress and contending societal groups. Particularly, the policymaking environment 
is more accessible and answerable to various organizations’ issue management of a 
given policy issue.  
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Both corporate America and the CCP government employed issue management to 
secure non-judgmental U.S.-China relations in the tumultuous post-Cold War world. 
The American China lobbying has been an outreach of CCP’s issue management of 
U.S.-China relations. The CCP government has artfully motivated and orchestrated, 
though quietly, corporate America’s issue management of U.S.–China relations. 
Knowing that “people who trade do not fight,” the CCP government utilized the 
economic interdependence between the U.S. and China to weather the tumultuous U.S.-
China relations, and thus, maintained a booming economy to justify its political 
legitimacy (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 106; Friedman, 2001). Throughout the 1990s, 
the CCP government tried very hard to practice Deng Xiaoping’s instruction on Sino-
U.S. diplomacy: “seeking cooperation and avoiding confrontation.” In the meantime, 
corporate America has done a good job of representing unofficially the CCP 
government in Washington (Dreyfuss, 1997). Several giant U.S. corporations which do 
business in China have their own in-house or retained public relations consultants who 
help the CCP on a case-by-case basis (Crowell & Hsieh, 2000). 
In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. Congress has shown an assertive posture in China 
policy-making (Tan, 1992, p. xii) and thus constituted a recurrent irritant for China’s 
desire to make secret deals with the executive branch of the U.S. government (Lim, 
1996). To cope with the new environment of China policy-making in the U.S., the CCP 
formed in 1995 a “Central Committee Task Force on the U.S. Congress” with Jiang 
Zemin as its head. At least a dozen U.S. senators and representatives of both parties 
were invited to visit China in 1996 with all expenses paid by the CCP government and 
were treated like heads of state (Fritz, 1997c). In the beginning of 1997 when U.S.-
China relations began to warm up, the CCP government fêted the U.S. press and 
advised U.S. journalists to “write something positive about China” so that their request 
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for access to news could be approved more quickly. Chinese officials asked the U.S. 
journalists in Beijing to “seize the opportunity” and “take an active part” to improve 
China’s press clippings in the U.S. now that President Clinton and President Jiang 
Zemin have agreed to play host to each other with state visits in 1997 and 1998 (Tyler, 
1997, p. 9). 
As an unpopular dictatorship in the post-Tiananmen era, CCP leaders are wistful of 
U.S. endorsement. The red-carpet reception in the South Lawn, the 21-gun salute, and 
the summit meeting in the White House are all what Jiang Zemin has long coveted to 
consolidate his authority. Many American friends of the CCP government lobbied hard 
to work out Jiang’s state visit to the U.S. in 1997 (Wehrfritz & Liu, 1997, p.44). The 
state visit and Jiang’s showy charisma were intensively covered by CCP propaganda 
and were hailed as Jiang’s political legacy. 
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), China is not one of the top 
10 countries lobbying in Washington. While occasionally hiring professional lobbyists, 
such as Hill & Knowlton, to take care of annual renewal of the “most favored nation” 
status (MFN) and to whitewash its human rights record (Silverstein, 1997; Silverstein, 
1998), the CCP government wisely kept a low-key strategy given its unpopularity 
among the American public. However, behind the scenes, the CCP government actively 
used the stick of trade retaliation and the carrot of access to the Chinese market to 
mobilize U.S. companies to do its bidding (Fritz, 1997b).  
Tyson (1998) notes that, the poor human rights record notwithstanding, the CCP 
government has not bothered to take care of the MFN issue because it knew “Beijing’s 
interests would be better served by allowing the U.S. business group to speak for 
themselves” (Tyson, 1998). Therefore, different from the “old China lobby” conducted 
by Taiwanese, the “new China lobby” is indeed the “U.S.–China lobby” (Dreyfuss, 
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1997). It is a Chinese public relations operation, but carried out by corporate America. 
In the post-Tiananmen years, the CCP government accurately discerned “a split in 
the Clinton administration between the human rights promoters at the State Department 
and the business-industry elements elsewhere in the government” (Bernstein & Munro, 
1997, p.107), and thus, skillfully and quietly, orchestrated American China lobbying for 
delinking the MFN renewal from the human rights record (p.108). Step by step, the 
CCP government had figured out a way, by the end of 1990s, to stop the U.S. human-
rights campaign “with an economic offensive aimed at enlisting American corporate 
support on behalf of China” (p. 105). 
For most American corporations, it had never been easy to make quick money in 
China. However, beginning in 1994, a cascade of lucrative contracts and windfalls 
came to them. In January 1994, the CCP government “floated a total of $1 billion in 
bonds in American financial markets” (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 105). In February, 
Ford China Operations kicked off. In April, China held “trade and investment fairs” in 
Los Angeles and New York, drawing 700 businessmen and women from 300 U.S. 
corporations to foray billions of dollars’ worth of deals. At the fair, Wu Yi, Chinese 
foreign trade minister, tantalized 200 businessmen with prospects of huge profits for 
investing in capital-and-technology-intensive projects in China (p. 108). In the end, 
China signed contracts and agreements worth $11.1 billion with U.S. companies (p. 
106). In the meantime, Microsoft’s Bill Gates met with Jiang Zemin to boost 
Microsoft's sales in China and publicly criticized any American “interference in China's 
internal affairs” (Kagan, 1997); Shanghai officials hosted guests from Time Warner and 
IBM to discuss joint ventures; China vice premier Zou Jiahua journeyed to AT&T’s 
office in New Jersey to sign contracts worth $500 million. According to CNN reports, 
in one situation, business leaders assembled by a conservative think tank urged the 
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Clinton administration “to let them tap into the surging Chinese market full steam 
ahead” (Chapman, 1994). In May, Boeing was about to complete a $5 billion sale of 
jetliners to China. The time coincided with the remarks of Tom Foley, the then speaker 
of the House, that “Clinton shouldn’t link trade with human rights” (Bernstein & 
Munro, 1997, p. 106). Foley spoke on behalf of the Spokane area of Washington state, 
the home of Boeing. Indeed, there are no China critics among the legislators coming 
from the state of Washington (p. 107). 
On June 2, 1994, President Clinton announced his administration would extend 
MFN for another year despite continued human rights abuses in China. In the 
meantime, the Clinton administration drafted a "voluntary code of conduct" for U.S. 
businesses operating in China where human rights violations are a regular occurrence 
(PR Watch, 1997) and where markets usually have a “morally disorientation effect on 
American businessmen” (Kagan, 1997). 
By delinking human rights and economic investment, President Clinton removed 
uncertainty from corporate America’s China business. More important, by delinking 
human rights improvements and trade status renewal, the CCP government established 
a precedent that human rights could be excluded from bilateral discussion and that 
“American pressure could not possibly succeed in curbing Chinese behavior on any 
issue” (Kagan, 1997). 
To accomplish the delinkage, the CCP government used to great effect the threat of 
economic punishment to enlist behind it one of the broadest business lobbying efforts 
to influence U.S.–China policy (Bernstein & Munro, p. 109). For example, in 1996, 
China’s Premier Li Peng punished Boeing by buying $1.5 billion worth of Airbus jets 
because European leaders “do not attach political strings to cooperation with China, 
unlike the Americans who arbitrarily resort to the threat of sanctions or the use of 
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sanction” (Kagan, 1997). Boeing responded by redoubling its China lobbying in 
Washington and by being willing to do almost anything for the CCP government to 
hold its share of China’s huge jetliner market. Although Boeing’s spokeswoman said 
the Chinese government was in no way directing, financing, or influencing Boeing’s 
lobbying effort, she admitted that Boeing could feel that the Chinese government was 
paying close attention to Boeing’s lobbying efforts. CCP officials never asked Boeing 
to lobby for them, but Boeing knew very well that the CCP government would be 
comfortable with Boeing’s lobbying efforts (Fritz, 1997b). 
China’s economic “carrot-and-stick” are accurately channeled to Washington by 
corporate America in an anguished tone: thirty billion dollars worth of 
telecommunications could be sold in the next five years in China; during the next three 
years, American auto parts sellers have extraordinary opportunities in China’s market 
valued at more than $29 billion; vigorous pursuit of China’s huge emerging market is 
the U.S.’s national imperative; if the U.S. lets the business opportunity in China slip 
away, American industries may suffer a long-term disability relative to their foreign 
competitors… and so forth (Kagan, 1997).  
 Consequently, the CCP government effectively used overt promises of economic 
benefits or implicit threats of economic punishment as means of exerting influence on 
the U.S. business community, and ultimately, on U.S.-China policy (Bernstein & 
Munro, 1997, p. 109). By doing so, the CCP government has successfully administered 
its issue management of U.S.-China trade relations. 
The primary focus of the American China lobbying has been the annual 
Congressional vote on MFN (Dreyfuss, 1997). Human rights groups urged revocation 
of MFN. But they were overridden by a business-driven bipartisan consensus. Anti-
communists, religious groups, AFL-CIO, and human rights groups for a time appeared 
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so strong that the House might revoke MFN. In the end, however, the American China 
lobby proved far too influential, and the House voted to reject withdrawal of MFN 
(Weissman, 1997). AFL-CIO’s Mark Anderson deplored that “the most ardent 
defenders of Chinese communism are U.S. capitalists” (PR Watch, 1997). 
The principal vehicle of the American China lobby is the U.S.-China Business 
Council, a group of more than 300 member firms, including Boeing, Philip Morris, and 
AT&T. A host of public relations firms, lobby shops, think tanks, and consulting firms 
supplemented the lobbying efforts of the council (Weissman, 1997). Members of the 
council donated money to the major parties and to members of Congress, pressing 
strenuously for MFN renewal and ratification of “Permanent Normal Trade Relation” 
(PNTR) with China (Weissman, 1997). More impressively, they orchestrated multi-
layered, synergistic grassroots lobbying and small business lobbying for U.S.-China 
trade, with leading corporations taking responsibility for delivering different states 
(Weissman, 1997). 
In 1996, the election year, China’s MFN became a hot-button issue again. In 
Washington, a coalition of labor, consumer, environmentalist, and human rights groups 
joined in alliance with the dwindling remnants of the “old China lobby,” i.e., the 
Taiwanese lobby, raised an uprising against China and had the possibility of winning a 
congressional vote revoking MFN (Dreyfuss, 1997; Fritz, 1997b). Terrified by the 
situation, several U.S. corporations launched a covert public relations blitz to convince 
the public that “Chinese leadership is deserving of greater sympathy” (Silverstein, 
1996).  
To coordinate the public relations campaign budgeted at millions of dollars, these 
companies hired Hill & Knowlton to put company representatives in touch with 
members of Congress and to rent scholars to draft op-ed articles for major newspapers 
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or to speak at media events (Silverstein, 1996). These “third party” advocates, as they 
are dubbed by industry, are well paid but do not need to reveal their affiliations to the 
public (Silverstein, 1996). 
The success of the American China lobby lies in mobilizing small-business suppliers 
(Fritz, 1997b). According to a news story in The Seattle Times, Boeing has requested 
one small business, which supplies Boeing with appliances, to assist itself in a drive to 
urge Congress to renew MFN. The small company’s executive agreed gladly to contact 
her congressmen and arranged for local business leaders to attend a luncheon with a 
speaker recommended by Boeing. She did it because she realized that the bright future 
of her company depends on Boeing’s $124 billion in orders, i.e., 1,900 airplane sales to 
China, in the next two decades (Silverstein, 1996). By enlisting small business to 
pressure Congress for MFN renewal, the big companies created a false appearance of 
“grass-roots” support for MFN (Fritz, 1997a). The ability of major U.S. corporations to 
enlist their suppliers as lobbyists was seen as the magic to their winning the vote on 
MFN extension in 1996. The truth lies in that, in an election year, “members of 
Congress respond more readily to the concerns of small-business owners in their own 
districts than to high-pressure pitches from big business lobbyists” (Fritz, 1997a). 
Under “grass-roots” campaign initiatives, each big company in the “Business Coalition 
for U.S.-China Trade” was assigned one or several states where it was expected to 
recruit small business to press for China trade (Fritz, 1997a). For example, Boeing 
acted as “state captain” responsible for winning over congressional delegations in 
Washington state and Kansas state; Motorola took Illinois state and Texas state. The 
“state captains” rallied small business to promote trade with China by writing op-ed 
pieces, staging forums, and holding meetings with visiting lawmakers (Tyson, 1998, 
p.3).  
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The “Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade” was coordinated by the Emergency 
Committee for American Trade, the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, and the U.S.-China Business Council. It consisted of more than 1,200 
leading corporations and trade associations that supported granting MFN and PNTR to 
China (Urbina, 2000). In the 1996 campaign for MFN, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
devoted six months of intensive work contacting more than 200 local and state 
chambers and 6,800 member companies to gear up support for MFN. Its task force and 
congressional lobbying team worked strenuously to provide educational and public 
relations materials to grass-root companies. They developed a list of 103 House 
members who were undecided but who might be convinced to support MFN. Next, they 
mobilized thousands of smaller companies to contact members of Congress, especially 
those 103 House members. Eventually, they convinced 101 to vote for MFN extension 
(Dreyfuss, 1997). 
In the fall of 2000, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was at 
stake before the congressional ratification of PNTR with China. On behalf of the 
Business Roundtable, Goddard Claussen Porter Novelli (GCPN), a political consulting 
firm, managed a $4 million integrated campaign, including strategic counseling, 
message development, advertising, media relations, and grassroots communications to 
win Congress’ ratification of PNTR. GCPN’s PNTR campaign developed dozens of 
specifically tailored print and radio ads aimed at more than 100 congressional districts, 
as well as television advocacy spots aired nationally. For example, GCPN arranged TV 
advertisement series to be broadcast on ABC's “World News Tonight” to counterattack 
AFL-CIO’s commercial against PNTR. One spot, “Working Americans,” argued that 
working Americans – figureheaded by six men and women of ethnic backgrounds – 
need a “new frontiers” in China’s open market to build a brighter future in the 21st 
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century (Fenoglio, 2000, p.1304). With the congressional vote on PNTR fast 
approaching, GCPN tailored ads targeting specific districts, such as TV ads conveying 
tales of the vast Chinese wheat market to Northwest farmers, or ads briefing Floridians 
about the yet untapped Chinese colossal demand for citrus (Urbina, 2000). 
Besides ads, GCPN assisted the Business Roundtable in arranging dozens of local 
press conferences, placing op-ed items and “letters-to-the-editor,” and releasing 120 
reports demonstrating the value of China trade to local economies (GCPN). The media 
efforts first identified key stakeholders in China trade from across America’s business 
and agricultural sectors, then “provided texture and key arguments in support of the 
legislation as the debate evolved,” demonstrating, district-by-district, why it was in 
America’s best interest to pass PNTR (GCPN). 
The American China lobby also enlisted support from many U.S. consultants who 
advised corporate America about investing in China. Among these consultants are 
many former administration officials, including former Secretaries of State Henry 
Kissinger, Alexander Haig, George Shultz, James Baker III, and Lawrence Eagleburger 
(Silverstein, 1996; Urbina, 2000). Most of them had considerable financial interest in 
MFN extension. They wrote favorable Op-Ed pieces, pleaded China’s case in important 
U.S. public forums, called congressmen, and appeared on TV programs presenting the 
positive aspects of MFN or PNTR with China (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 77). 
Kissinger is the central adviser for the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade. He 
represented numerous companies doing business in China and has been paid multi-
million dollars for advising the U.S. government against imposing economic sanctions 
on China or “arguing that no government in the world should be expected to tolerate 
protesters’ occupation of a public square,” such as Tiananmen (Urbina, 2000). Haig, 
though not a registered lobbyist, has effectively represented several U.S. companies 
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doing business in China. In one occasion, human rights advocates complained that Haig 
“is a guy we worry about because every time we try to put together a piece of 
legislation (critical of China) Haig gets on the phone to Republican members and we 
suddenly find that we’ve got less votes than we thought we did” (Urbina, 2000).  
The American China lobby has manufactured numerous opinion pieces, briefing 
papers, and reports, and saturated the press with these public relations products 
pleading for a human rights-blind U.S.-China trade (Weissman, 1997; Urbina, 2000). 
The main talking point is: Economic interaction, and the ensuing interplay of trade, free 
enterprise, people-to-people contacts, and transaction of ideas, can do a better job to 
advance freedom and the rule of law than unilateral trade sanctions, which have only 
backfired with crippling effects on U.S.-China policy. Therefore, U.S. trade and 
investment are the best tools for supporting long-term progress on human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law in China (Weissman, 1997). 
In summary, the American China lobby has argued hard for the well-being of U.S.-
China trade without an explicit request from the CCP government. “China seems to 
command more loyalty from U.S. business than do other foreign countries” (Fritz, 
1997b). On the other hand, “American business executives in China took the side of the 
Chinese Government against the U.S., berating U.S. Secretary [of State] for 
jeopardizing their profits with this silly business about democracy” (Safire, 1994, p. ). 
No lobbying campaign has had greater influence over any other aspects of American 
foreign policy than the American China lobbying about U.S.-China policy (Bernstein & 
Munro, 1997, p. 124). That is why a policy tradeoff running starkly against public 
opinion represented by mass media could finally be carried out without scandalizing 
American democracy. Public opinion represented by interest groups – China lobby – 
will more easily have a sympathetic ear in the government than public opinion 
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represented by mass media which are still available to ordinary citizen who argue while 
ignorant of their personal interest. 
3. Policy Critique on the Democratic Principle of U.S.-China Relations 
U.S.-China policy in the post-Tiananmen years has been founded on a fragile rationale 
that U.S.-China trade relations would bring democracy to China. The fallacy of the 
rational could be illustrated by analyzing both the transitional Chinese society in 1990s 
and the globalization movement worldwide. 
The fallacy of the premise is that capitalism is not a precondition of democracy and 
political liberty. On the contrary, capitalism has some anti-democratic nature. 
Capitalism, like authoritarianism, has some moral disorientation effects and tends to 
cultivate conspiracies among the rich and the powerful. Keller (1990) notes that, 
although the law of the marketplace is a natural friend of democracy, a structural 
conflict exists between capitalism and democracy. “It is central to the American 
experience that democracy is subordinate to capitalism and dysfunctional in the current 
commercial media structure” (p. 93).  
Similar to the fact that democratic institutions are subordinate to capitalism in the 
U.S., the private sectors of business in China are subordinate to the authoritarian regime 
to the extent that it cannot be a bold friend of democracy. Economic prosperity does not 
necessarily cultivate a democracy-loving middle class in China. On the one hand, 
economic development raises people’s expectations of more affluence, “making ‘how 
to make more money’ a central social concern. As a result, popular enthusiasm for 
political democratization may give way to the sole pursuit of financial gain” (Jian, 
1998). On the other hand, China’s economic reform contains ingredients that hinder – 
and were consciously devised to hinder – political reform. In China, “an emerging 
entrepreneurial class too weak to govern on its own allies – economically and, more 
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importantly, politically – with a reactionary government and against threats to the 
established order” (Kaplan, 2001, p. 517). 
Pei (2006) finds that in the past decade, despite the sustained economic growth, the 
CCP government has made remarkably little progress in political liberalization and 
consolidated significantly its authoritarian rule. “China’s authoritarian ruling elite is not 
only determined to hold on to power, but it also has been smart enough to take adaptive 
measures aimed at countering the liberalizing effects of economic development” (Pei, 
2006). To strengthen the one-party regime, the CCP has been pursuing a two-pronged 
strategy: selective repression of oppositional organization and co-optation of new social 
elites (the intelligentsia, professionals, and private entrepreneurs). On the one hand, 
thousands of People’s Armed Police (PAP), a large anti-riot paramilitary force, are 
quickly maneuvered to nip social discontent in the bud. A special 30,000 Net police 
patrol the Internet traffic day and night to track political dissent and block “hostile or 
harmful” website, both domestic and Western (Pei, 2006). On the other hand, urban 
intelligentsia, civil servants, and professionals are pampered with material perks and 
political recognition to the extent that the once most liberal social groups and the 
backbone of the pro-democracy movement are no longer lethal threats to party rule.  
As to the CCP’s co-optation of Chinese intelligentsia, Barmè (1999) observed that, 
beginning in the 1990s, the CCP’s control of the idea industry enters the phase of soft 
technocratic socialism or “progressive censorship” – “an iron fist in a velvet glove” (p. 
7-20). Leveraging “market force” and changing their managerial manner, Chinese 
communist technocrats reformulated the social contract by which “consensus replaces 
coercion and complicity subverts criticism” (p. 7). Living in this “closed system,” or 
“velvet Bastille,” and under the duress of “invisible violence,” Chinese intelligentsia 
finds that, to prosper, each of them “must learn to be a cultural politician and executive 
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in the streamlined corporate structure” (p. 8). “Artists are jealous of the considerable 
fringe benefits accorded them – better-than-average incomes, fame at home, trips 
overseas, and, best of all, the sense of mission and importance allotted to them by the 
party” (p. 9). By introducing market force (bourgeois liberalism) into progressive 
censorship (communism), the CCP is happy to find that “ideological laxity and moral 
turpitude went hand in hand.” As a result, “state artists become board members in the 
corporation of the state, partaking of the wealth as shareholders in the cultural 
enterprise” (Barmè, 1999, p. 17). Maverick artists are tolerated not only to help the 
state farms of art to have a new hybrid cultural species, but also for propaganda purpose 
– international public relations. “Angry young man of letters who rails against the 
impotence of official culture and the sellout of serious writers is merely a pose that fits 
snugly into a certain market niche”(p. 17). Even many of the dissidents of Tiananmen 
were waiting for pacification from the CCP so that they can go back to China to make a 
fortune in the booming culture industry. Using market forces, the CCP has successfully 
commissioned state artist to produce a “totalitarian nostalgia” – seeking Mao Tsetong 
frenzy – throughout China. 
To enlarge its power base, the CCP allowed new private entrepreneurs to join the 
Party. These communist private entrepreneurs, the bourgeois nouveau riche according 
to CCP’s canonical textbook, enjoy financial privileges and political prestige by 
supporting authoritarian rule. This preemptive political decapitation of the entrepreneur 
class expelled the worry that political rivalry may stem from economic liberalization in 
China. In the meantime, the newly-built rapport between the CCP and business class 
generates brutal corruption in the economic arena. China’s nepotism-ridden capitalism 
still operates within the confines of an arbitrary legal order and a party-controlled court 
system. Capital, licenses and contracts flow to those with connections to the communist 
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officialdom, which, in turn, remains beholden to the communist autocracy. “Whereas in 
the U.S. the private sector wields enormous influence over the political class, in China, 
the reverse is true” (Kaplan, 2001, p. 516). In China, the bourgeoisie, whose economic 
fortune is dependent on the political fortune of the communist state, is unlikely to 
challenge the authority of the official bureaucracy; instead, it is more likely to be agents 
of the state than to be potential antagonist (Kaplan, 2001). 
Thinking globally, Western capitalism and economic globalization do not 
necessarily usher democracy into China. Three reasons challenge the simple equation 
of capitalistic globalization with democratic expansion worldwide. First, Western 
capitalists may enjoy the moral disorientation effect of the authoritarian system in 
China when doing their business. Actually, just as the Clinton administration 
anticipated when sanctifying the delinkage of trade from human rights, the bizarre 
socialist market economy – characterized by brutal abuse of authority, wild bribery, and 
ubiquitous cronyism – did  have some morally disorienting effects on American 
business. In the past decade, sixty-four percent of all the half million business 
corruption cases in China have involved foreign investors and traders.34
Second, multinationals are eager to help the CCP to maintain political stability, 
economic deregulation, and privatization of public property in favor of private sectors 
doing their business in China. Some reports show that while the CCP wants to tighten 
control of all access to the Internet through links to Chinese Internet service providers 
(ISP), Western investors in China’s information networks, such as Microsoft and Cisco, 
have eagerly pitched in. Cisco’s firewall has been a big assistance in the CCP’s effort to 
censor the Internet and to track dissidents (Gutmann, 2002). Overall, as Viacom’s CEO 
admitted, corporate America is very conscious of the tastes of the CCP government, 
                                                 
34 Wei, Changchun, Xiao, Nanfang, and Wu, Yanlin: Foreign corporations bribe Chinese Telecom, Asia-
Pacific Economic Times, July, 23, 2004. Available at:  http://biz.163.com/2004w07/12622/2004w07_ 
1090547360398.html
136
and therefore, “do[ing] the things we think will endear us ultimately to China,” and 
“don’t produce material that invites criticism from China” (Zawadzinski, 2004).  
Another example, when the CCP conducted a foreign propaganda event – “2000 
Experience – Chinese Culture in the United States” – from August 24 to September 18, 
2000, in nine metropolitan American cities to enhance China’s image in the U.S., the 
$7 million cost of the foreign public relations operation was reportedly underwritten by 
U.S. companies active in the China market (Crowell & Hsieh, 2000). Warner Brothers, 
IDG, Citigroup, and New York Life Insurance Company were among the American 
sponsors of the cultural festival.35 Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation hosted the 
Chinese Information Officers’ stop in San Francisco to address the Asia Society. 
Murdoch had been coveting China’s media market for a long time. However, in 1993, 
shortly after he initiated StarTV, he irritated the CCP government with an offensive 
remark that “StarTV will be proved to be a stark threat to all the tyrannies in the 
world.” The CCP government sought revenge quickly by banning all privately owned 
satellite receivers in China. StarTV suffered a huge loss in advertisement revenue. After 
that conflict, Murdoch began to mend the breach by deleting the BBC News program 
from StarTV’s program menu (Gittings & Borger, 2001). He also dropped a publishing 
contract with Chris Patten, Hong Kong’s last British governor who had confronted 
China with his democracy agenda (Gittings & Borger, 2001). Murdoch made a shrewd 
calculation when dumping Chris Patten’s book: “some flak in Britain was worth 
suffering when there are many millions of dollars to be made in China” (MacLeod, 
1998). 
Foreign direct investment in China, while providing a much-needed blood 
transfusion for the CCP rulers, has a built-in interest in maintaining China’s status quo. 
                                                 
35  News reports are available at:  www.filmsea.com/focus/200310080007.htm, and 
www.scoba.org/hunan/famous.htm
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“Western captains of industry routinely parade through Beijing singing the praise of the 
Communist regime (and often inveighing against its detractors), while they admonish 
America’s leaders to take no action that might upset the exquisite sensibilities of 
China’s politburo” (Kaplan, 1999). 
Ironically, whereas the human rights-blind U.S.-China relations make the world 
safer for American business, it is not so promising for the democratic enterprise. 
Business prosperity in China only consolidates the legitimacy of the CCP dictatorship 
and strengthens its repressive party line, i.e., “stability-trumps-all.” Economic 
liberalization does not entail political reform; rather, it empowers the current system of 
brutal inequity and wild corruption. The CCP always uses plausible economic 
accomplishments, at the expense of social equality though, to justify its political high-
handedness. “The Chinese government can expand freedom in economic life without 
losing controls in society and politics” (Bernstein and Munro, 1997, p. 60). The U.S. 
State Department’s annual report on human rights concluded that increased trade made 
little difference to political freedom “in the absence of a willingness by political 
authorities to abide by the fundamental international norms” (Silverstein, 1996). 
Third, globalization, as Karl Marx predicted in The Communist Manifesto, is the 
inevitable outcome of the worldwide expansion of the basic confrontation of capitalist 
society, i.e., the subordinating of democracy to the monopolistic or oligopolistic 
capitalism. Capitalism was born in the process of creating a world market. Its growth in 
the past two centuries in the major capitalistic countries, such as the U.K., the U.S., 
Germany, France, and Japan, has been associated with conquest, primitive 
accumulation characterized by “undisguised looting, enslavement and murder,” 
splitting of the world market among powers, economic penetration, and the spread of 
the self-regulating market to every niche and cranny of the globe in spite of the 
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difference in social institutions (Foster, 2000). Globalization, in essence, is the 
formation of the unified world market and the spread of capitalistic mode of production 
all over the world (Foster, 2002). Globalization is not necessarily democratization of 
the world. It is libertarian fantasy that free trade and economic liberalization create 
political liberty and democratic institutions. On the contrary, as Lionel Jospin, France's 
most recent Socialist prime minister, indicated, globalization is a “modern aristocracy 
placing economic efficiency above all other values.”36 Globalization has been promoted 
in the past decade by “financiers, industrialists, top civil servants and privileged 
journalists” in the name of global competitiveness and at the expense of ordinary 
workers. Indeed, it is a new capitalistic ideology by which economic rationality trumps 
all, by which “one cannot touch profits, increase capital taxes or limit extravagant 
salaries without discouraging initiative and paralyzing creative energies, without 
provoking disinvestment or relocation of enterprises or without driving away brains and 
talents.”37     
As to the globalization in China, the architects of the U.S.-China policy in the 1990s 
have sought mainly to achieve the narrow aims of the corporate sector rather than to 
spread democracy in China. Capitalists usually are more eager to spread the gospel of 
laissez-flair than the gospel of democracy over the whole surface of the globe. Even 
Nixon’s 1972 visit of China was partly motivated by multinationals’ desire to sell 
products to populous China.  
In summary, by putting the policy tradeoff into the perspective of capitalistic 
expansion, it is a false prophecy that economic globalization, with multinational 
corporations at its center, is an enlargement of democracy. Rather, we may see a 
                                                 
36 John Thornhill, France's former Socialist leader hits at backers of globalization. Financial Times, 
October 21 2005   Available at: http://news.ft.com/cms/s/34b0ec78-41cf-11da-a45d-00000e2511c8.html
37 John Thomhill quote Lionel Jospin’s word from his book, The World as I See It. Available at: 
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/34b0ec78-41cf-11da-a45d-00000e2511c8.html   
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globalization of monopolistic capitalism, far-reaching exploitation of the working class 
worldwide, and the ever-increasing rapport between the corporate and the state, both 
democratic and authoritarian. 
4. Empowering Citizens in Opinion-Policy Process: Communitarian 
Recommendations 
Democracy is hard work: “It requires considerable commitment on the part of citizens 
above and beyond that of their daily work and daily lives; it requires healthy mediating 
institutions where people can meet and exchange views and information” (Alterman, 
1998, p. 125). Otherwise, the making of public policy, especially the foreign policies 
dealing with non-democratic countries, could easily be hijacked by special interests 
who are very capable of exploiting American people’s ignorance to bend the nation’s 
policies to their own benefits” (Alterman, 1998, p. 125). Actually, the U.S. public, 
while uneasy with the new rules of the global capitalism which threatened their job 
security, health, and working safety, finds no effective allies within the policy-making 
community in challenging this nation’s “official fealty to the twin values of free trade 
and economic efficiency,” and in fighting “to retain a measure of democratic control 
over their lives and communities” (Alterman, 1998, pp. 101-102).  
 The problem is: Can ordinary citizens make reasonable policy choices? Blais et al 
(2006), based on their research on “British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral 
Reform,” find that “it is possible for ordinary citizens to become involved participants 
making reasoned choices rooted in their underlying value preferences” (p. 1). The 
citizen assembly was composed of ordinary citizens sampled randomly from the voters’ 
list. Before generating verdict with regard to election reform, these ordinary citizens 
have gone through three phases – learning, public hearings, and deliberation. The final 
results indicates that, in spite of difference in assembly members’ initial levels of 
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political awareness, there was no systematic difference in the viewpoints and evaluation 
between the most and least politically sophisticated. Their conclusion is that ordinary 
citizens can make an intelligent, coherent, and reasonable choice in regard to policy 
issue (Blais, et al, 2006, p. 11).     
Therefore, to maintain the accountability and the incorruptibility of the republican 
democracy, it is the most urgent task (1) to rejuvenate the deliberative model of politics 
through which ordinary citizens could be public policy jurors reviewing and discussing 
policy issues on a daily basis; (2) to restore the national “public sphere” in which “all 
citizens may confer in an unrestricted fashion about matters of general interest, with 
specific means for transmitting information” (Habermas, 1989, p. 47);  and (3) to create 
the Deweyite “Great Community” through which the public can perform co-operative 
inquiry and self-education, regain the lost art of public conversation, and finally, 
acknowledge that “self-government is not a drab necessity but a joy to be treasured” 
(Dionne, 1991, p. 354). 
Particularly, this dissertation research recommends a Communitarian transformation 
of American media democracy:  
(1) The mass media system should be structured to be an apparatus of citizens’ co-
operative inquiry of issue and a public forum for their self-enlightenment at both local 
level and national level, in both traditional media and digital media. As a result, the 
mass media system should constitute an enlargement of civil society and public sphere 
and a limitation on elite influence in the democratic decision-making process. 
(2) Communitarian journalism – contextualized in community and standing in 
accord with common good – should be incorporated into the routine operation of 
newsrooms where journalist “address members of the public as fellow citizens capable 
of civic action, rather than as passive spectators” and “view the public as a partner in 
141
setting the agenda” rather than as an unreflective representation of public opinion 
(Borden, 2005, p. 40). 
(3) The integrity and accountability of the public opinion-public policy process 
should be judged only by the extent at which ordinary citizens are empowered to 
exercise their self-government based on republic virtue, such as civic participation, 
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Appendix 1. Coding Protocol 
 
1. Date         
 
_ _  / _ _  / _ _   (mm/dd/yy) 
All the items – NYT news/editorial and CNN transcript – are lined up in 





1 = NYT                        2 = CNN  
NYT Articles are print journalism, CNN transcript are broadcast journalism. 
 
3. Item type 
 
1 = news reporting           2 = opinion pieces 
As to NYT articles, those appeared in “Foreign Desk” are news reporting and 
those in the “Editorial Desk” are opinion pieces. As to CNN transcript, the 
episode proceeding between CNN news anchor and CNN correspondents for 
reporting significant change of China-related affairs are news reporting; the 
episodes proceeding between/among news anchors and CNN correspondents, 
commentators, scholars, experts, government officials, legislators, issue 
advocates, activists, and ordinary U.S. citizens for discussing, commenting 
on, or debating with regard to episodic news events or thematic issues are 
opinion pieces; some special programs are classified as opinion pieces. 
 
4. Author type of News items(according to byline)     
1 = NYT reporters, correspondent, and staff writers, CNN 
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reporters, correspondent 
2 = reporters of AP, Reuters, or other wire service  
3 = other news agencies or personnel 
The news people affiliated with or in-residence at NYT and CNN are coded as 
“1;” those affiliated with or in-residence at Associated Press, Reuters, 
Agence France-Presse, Xinhua News Agency, Interfax News Agency, and other 
major news syndicate are coded as “2;” the rest are coded as “3.”  
 
5. Author type of opinion pieces 
 
1 = transcript of speech or authentic text of document, 
treaties, announcement. 
Verbatim documenting on public speech of national leaders and policy-
makers; transcript of judicial/legislative proceeding; archival text of 
official document and treaty; transcript of news conference, joint press 
conference; authentic or live broadcasting of official announcement; and 
policy papers. 
2 = editorial articles by editorial board of NYT 
The editorials of the NYT usually appear in the far left side of the NYT’s 
opinion page and are authored by the NYT’s editorial board. The newest list of 
the board members includes:  
Gail Collins, Editor;  
Andrew Rosenthal, Deputy Editor;  
Helene, Cooper, Assistant Editor;  
Robert B. Semple Jr. | Associate Editor;  
David C. Unger | Senior Foreign Affairs Writer;  
Philip M. Boffey | Science;  
Francis X. Clines | National Politics, Congress & Campaign Finance;  
Adam Cohen | Law & Technology;  
Carolyn Curiel | Local Government, Social Issues, National Trends & 
Environment; 
Lawrence Downes | Suburban Issues;  
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Verlyn Klinkenborg | Agriculture, Environment & Culture;  
Nicholas Kulish | Business;  
Elenor Randolph | New York City & State, Media, Politics & Russia;  
Tina Rosenberg | Human Rights & Foreign Policy;  
Dorothy Samuels | Law, Civil Rights & National Affairs;  
Brent Staples | Education, Race & Culture;  
Teresa Tritch | Economic Issues & Tax Policy.  
3 = CNN reporters, correspondent, and anchors. 
The affiliation of CNN people is clearly identified by the “Lexis-Nexis” 
transcript as “CNN correspondent,” “CNN anchor,” “CNN reporter,” and so forth.  
4 = NYT columnist. 
The NYT columnists are in-residence columnists whose opinion pieces 
published in the NYT’s OP/Ed pages in a regular basis. Usually, they produce 
column article weekly. Their opinion piece appears on a constant weekday 
edition or weekend edition. The composition of the NYT columnists roughly 
reflects an ideological balance between the conservative and the liberal. 
Usually the column articles appear in weekday editions are deemed as more 
influential than those appears in weekend editions. Currently, Op/Ed 
columnists of The New York Times includes: David Brooks, Nicholas D. Kristof, 
Maureen Dowd, Paul Krugman, Thomas L. Friedman, Frank Rich, Bob Herbert, 
William Safire, and John Tierney.  
5 = commentator, editor, journalist, writer, and political 
analyst/strategist  
Commentators are those “who discusses social, political or cultural issues 
or events, typically in a public context.” They are usually referred to as 
pundit; editor, journalist, and writers are those coming from authoring 
community who have shown expertise in interpreting issues. Political analysts 
and political strategists are political scientists with a strong agendas to 
influence public policy and electorate result. Those people in category “5” 
usually have clear party affiliation or ideological leaning. For example, Rush 
Limbough, Ariana Huffington,      
6 = Administration officials 
Administration officials are those incumbent federal/state government 
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officials such as the President of the U.S., cabinet officials, government 
agency, state government officials, etc.  
7 = Member of Congress 
Incumbent federal legislators: House Representatives and Senators  
8 = retired government officials 
The former President of the U.S., such as President Nixon and President 
Jimmy Carter; the former government officials such as Henry Kissinger, 
secretary of state in the Nixon administration, and ex-ambassador to China. 
9 = university faculty 
Scholars currently affiliated with or associated with a given department or 
research institute within a university. 
10 = public intellectuals (expert, scholar, scientist, 
economist) 
Nationally acknowledged public intellectuals who, though associated with a 
particular discipline within universities or research institutions, write and 
comment on universal public policy issues to a large audience rather than 
their professional colleagues in a regular basis, such as linguist Noam 
Chomsky, economist Milton Friedman, Palestinian American literary theorist 
Edward Said, historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and writer Susan Sontag. 
11 = think tank scholars 
Scholars associated with “idea industry.” Unlike university professors--who 
are often engaged in esoteric research with little relation to public policy--
think tank scholars are in the business of providing policy-relevant expertise 
to elected officials and to the public. Some think tank scholars, especially 
those with ideology-driven policy agendas, can offer intellectual 
reinforcement and indeed promote the political platforms of aspiring office 
holders and elected officials. Several prominent think tanks can be talent 
pool for incoming administrations to draw on, and can also serve as retirement 
homes for high-level policy makers after they leave public office. 
12 = business community 
The business community is composed of people in charge of corporations, 
bankers, lawyers, lobbyist, and other professionals in a for-profit 
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organization, or people representing those institutions.  
13 = issue advocates, interest groups, NGO 
In “Federalist Paper #10,” James Madison identified group pressures as  
“factions” by which it means “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passions, or of interest.” The most common and durable source of 
factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. “A landed 
interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, 
with many lesser interest, grows up of necessity in civilized nations, and 
divided them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and 
views.”   
There is no significant difference among issue advocates, interest groups, 
and NGO. Overall, these groups are mobilized and active citizen groups set up 
for influencing public policy through grass-root campaign. The goals of their 
political campaign or operation usually are not so broad as political 
parties’. 
To be specific: 
(1) Issue advocates are those civic groups specifically set up to engage 
in single-issue politics on one issue only. The typical issue 
advocate is like Anti-War Mom, Tibet Justice Center, Million Man 
March, or Citizen for a Free Kuwait.  
(2) Interest group (also called advocacy group, lobbying group, pressure 
group or special interest) is a group, however loosely or tightly 
organized, doing advocacy. They are determined to encourage or 
prevent changes in public policy without trying to be elected.” James 
Carey defines interest groups as those who work for private sectors, 
usually behind the scenes, and “uses the state political parties, the 
press – indeed, any apparatus available – to control the distribution 
of economic rewards and social privilege.”1 “[T]heir relation to 
public life is essentially propagandistic and manipulative.”2 The 
typical interest groups are like the National Rifle Association and 
Common Cause.  
                                                 
1 James Carey (1995): “The press, public opinion, and public discourse” in James Carey: A critical 
reader. pp. 244. 
2 ibid. 
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(3) NGO is an organization that is not part of a government and was not 
founded by states. Therefore it is typically independent of 
governments. Although the definition can technically include for-
profit corporations, the term is generally restricted to social, 
cultural, legal, and environmental issue advocacy groups having goals 
that are primarily noncommercial. Principles of altruism and 
voluntarism remain key defining characteristics of NGO. While NGOs 
could be operational NGO or advocacy NGO, they are typically value-
based. The typical NGOs are like Green Peace, Amnesty International, 
Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, etc. 
This dissertation research excludes corporate lobbyist from interest groups 
and classifies it as belong to “the business community” category. 
14 = public figures (celebrities) 
Public figures are those who secured their fame by being famous in 
politics, business, and performance. In this research, public figures 
exclusively are celebrity performers.  
15 = ordinary citizen have no apparent affiliation 
Ordinary citizens come from every walk of life and participates in public 
life with their affiliation, wealth, status left behind. They are activated 
into a social relation, an expression of their opinion with regard to public 
life, by the news. In this research, ordinary citizens are those who cannot be 
identified as belonging to the aforementioned 14 categories. 
16 = Chinese dissident 
Chinese dissident are those Chinese citizens or newly naturalized Chinese 
American citizens who held a very different viewpoint from the CPP as to the 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist government. Their basic political stance 
is to overthrow the Chinese Communist government and to build a westernized 
multiparty ruling, representative, and three-branch “checks and balance” 
system in China. They either stay in jail in China or are exiled to the U.S. 
upon the request of the U.S. government.  
17 = Chinese official 
Officials of the Chinese government, or scholars from official 
establishment organizations. For example, a Chinese scholar from the Chinese 
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Academy of Social Sciences or from the Chinese Communist Party Academy are 
anything but ordinary Chinese citizens.  
18 = Hong Kong/ Marco official 
Hong Kong people affiliated with three braches of the Hong Kong government. 
After the handover, the Hong Kong government is called the government of Hong 
Kong Special Administration Region of People’s Republic of China. 
19 = Hong Kong or Marco people 
Ordinary Hong Kong people who are not associated to the Hong Kong 
government apparatus.  
20 = Taiwan officials 
Taiwanese come from the three branches of the government of Republic of 
China.  
21 = Taiwan people. 
Ordinary Taiwan people who are not associated to the Taiwan government 
apparatus. 
22 = international officials 
People work at the U.N. or political leaders/ government officials from 
other countries except for China and the U.S.   
23 = Tibetan 
Tibetan people live in Tibet or in exile in India or the U.S.. Dalai Lama 
is their political leader. They ask for either maximum autonomy or, as its 
radial division insists, total independence from the Chinese government.   
24 = Chinese citizen 
Ordinary Chinese citizens who can not be identified to be belonging to 
establishment or bureaucratic institutions of China  
25 = others. 
Anybody who cannot be identified to belong to the aforementioned 24 
categories.   
 
6. Issues dealt with  
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01 = Overall U.S.-China relations 
Reviewing the overall wellbeing or irregularities of the U.S.-China 
diplomacy. Usually the review is conducted at the end of year or at 
anniversary day of “the U.S.-China marriage,” discussing very broad issues 
between the two countries   
02 = human rights abuses in China 
 It is very easy to confuse “human right abuse” with “oppressive polity.” 
The researcher admits that the two categories indeed are very similar in 
character. To differentiate the two term, the first thing is to know that 
human rights abuses is the noticeable symptoms of oppressive polity in which 
(1) one party hold monopoly on power; (2) the ruling party make it an open 
belief that political power comes from gun barrel. (3) the head of the 
Military Committee of the party is the real puppeteer of the political drama. 
(4) the ruling party is the last arbitrator of moral integrity and political 
correctness; (5) civic initiatives are greatly suppressed in the favor of 
societal stability; (6) the authority or legitimacy of one-party state cannot 
be challenged without being severely persecuted. (7) The central-command 
system of the government has tremendous effect on the economic destiny of both 
natural man and legal man. (8) all the government officials are handpicked by 
party apparatus beyond any public scrutiny. (9) All the printers and airwaves 
belong to state and are strictly licensed or registered to do government’s 
business. (10) party membership can be traded as punishment for breaking law 
while non-party members of the society have no way to attenuate their sin. 
(11) propaganda is an open belief with regard to the function of journalism. 
(12) the propaganda department of the party spares no pain to oversee the flow 
of information. (13) the propaganda department distribute “reporting advice” 
to all the editor-in-chiefs on a regular basis. (14) education is a privilege 
to sons and daughters born in metropolitan cities like Beijing and Shanghai 
due to the significant discount of exam scores conferred to them during 
matriculation procession. (15) all the land belong to state in the extent that 
personal estate right expires 70 years later after purchase of residence, etc… 
All those phenomenon are related to oppressive polity. In contrast, human 
rights abuse referred to actual damage on personal freedom which could be 
enumerated as: (1) unjustified and unwarranted search and arrest due to 
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expressing unofficial political point of view. (2) arbitrary confiscation of 
personal property by the state; (3) unwarranted confinement imposed by police; 
(4) unwarranted trade of bodily organ after execution. (5) state-sponsored 
boycott against a person’s publication or job opportunity due to difference in 
opinion. (6) denial of due process of law to the convicted. (7) infringement 
of right to privacy by aggressive patrolling, etc.  
03 = oppressive polity (authoritarianism, dictatorship, 
tyranny) in China. 
It is a broad and theoretical discussion of the CCP’s totalitarian ruling 
in China. It concerns more about the lack of democracy and political reform in 
China rather the enumerated person rights case by case. The point is that 
human rights abuses occur in every corner of the world in various degree, but 
oppressive polity grow only in those countries who have a strong belief in 
oppression and dictatorship, even in the name of “people’s democratic 
dictatorship.”       
04 = corruption and crime in China 
 The brutal corruption in China in the 1990 are resulted from the unchecked 
power the culture of corruption embedded in feudalism tradition. The staple 
corruption involve the bartering between political power, such as 
administrative regulation, personnel promotion/demotion, bank lending, and 
public project bidding, and cash/prostitute. Other corruption involves 
nepotism, insider trading, embezzlement of public property among small faction, 
etc. 
As to crime, this dissertation designates it as the stories dealing with 
criminal activities harming public safety in terms of life and property.         
05 = incompetence and inefficiency of Chinese bureaucracy 
and Chinese economy 
 These are stories dealing with the setbacks and failures of Chinese economy 
and administrative function resulted either from the ineptitude or ignorance 
of public officials, or from the institutional dysfunction due to incongruence 
between ideas and reality.  
06 = China’s family planning 
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 The arbitrariness of the “one child per household” policy and the 
aggressive execution of the policy at the expense of abusing human rights, 
destroying gender balance, and being insensitive to religious sentiment. 
07 = U.S.- China diplomatic activities  
The mutual visits by supreme leaders, officials, military units of the two 
countries. For example, Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit of the U.S. in 
1997 and President Clinton’s visit of China in 1998, the annual meeting of 
Jiang and Clinton during APEC since 1995, the Chinese military fleet’s visit 
of U.S. ports.   
08 = U.S.-China trade relations 
 The overall trade volume between the two countries, the treaties and 
meetings between the U.S. and China in regard to trade or commerce issue, the 
MFN renewal and PNTR passage in Congress, and the U.S. business activities in 
China. 
09 = Trade imbalance, strife, and irregularities. 
 The bickering and threatening with trade war between the U.S. and China 
result from the trade surplus in one side and trade deficit in another side. 
The fighting between the two countries due to trade protection, subsidized 
export, export of labor product, unjustified tariffs, unfair trade quota, and 
so forth.      
10 = Chinese pirate on U.S. product 
 The infringement of copyright, trademark, and patent of American product by 
Chinese companies. The negotiation between the two countries for strike hard 
on bootleggers; American’s complain about Chinese government’s leniency to the 
perpetrators or Chinese State-Owned-Enterprise’s (SOE) involvement in piracy.  
11 = Chinese WTO (GATT) entry 
 China’s 15 years of effort for restoring its membership in GATT, lately the 
WTO. The trade negotiation between the U.S. and China for facilitating the WTO 
entry. The political ramification of China’s WTO entry.   
12 = China’s Olympic bidding 
 Beginning at early 1990s, China bid for hosting Olympic in Beijing. The 
first bid was defeated in September 1993 by American led demonizing campaign. 
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The grievance of the Chinese toward the harsh boycott of the western world 
which reminded them of the partition of China by western powers in the end of 
the 19th century. Three years later, China decided to bid again. While the 
U.S. government still can’t get over China’ human rights violations, some 
officials argued that hosting of Olympic Games may encourage the Chinese 
government to open its society and conform to the international protocol in 
safeguarding human freedoms.           
13 = Chinese prosperity and economy in general 
 Though dubious and false data-laden, the success of the Chinese economy was 
widely hailed by international community. The huge market attract American 
business to forget about the barbarous nature of the Communist dictatorship in 
China. Articles praising China’s economic success, exciting with China’s huge 
market demand, and show skepticism toward the sustainability of the Chinese 
economy belong to this category.     
14 = Chinese military threat 
 This category designates to the news/opinion dealing China’s military 
clout. Usually it is about American military’s worrying about China’s military 
build-up, weapon upgrading, and China’s spying of U.S. military secret.    
15 = Chinese nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapon 
testing 
 News and Op/Ed items dealing with the China’s export of nuclear technology 
to Iran and China’s military cooperation with Pakistan, China’s unwillingness 
to stop nuclear weapon testing.    
16 = Chinese espionage 
 The news media’s frenzy about Chinese espionage was trigger during 
Clinton’s second term. The most significant events are allegation of Lee Wen 
Hoo’s stealing of nuclear secret from national weaponry lab and Cox’s 
sensation report about China’s perennial stealing of U.S. missile technology. 
Also, the U.S.-China cooperation in launching U.S.-made satellite was 
considered by Cox report to be dangerous to the U.S. national security.     
17 = Chinese donation to Democratic party. 
 News stories and opinion pieces dealing with allegations of China’s 
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campaign donation, by way of a businessman from southeastern Asia, to 
Clinton’s re-election campaign. Also included are discussions about the 
dubious U.S.-China strategic partnership purchased by Chinese military.    
18 = U.S.-China military strife and confrontation 
 Two big events designated to the U.S.-China military confrontation: One is 
the PLA’s war game and missile testing near Taiwan Strait which triggered 
U.S.S. Nimitz’s “patrolling” of the Taiwan Strait; the other is U.S. B52’s 
bombing of China embassy in Yugoslavia in May 8, 1999. All the news stories 
and discussions with regard to the two events are categorized as U.S.-China 
military strife and confrontation.       
19 = Taiwan independence 
 Taiwan president Lee Tenghui’s “two states” theory, Taiwan presidential 
election, Lee Tenghui’s visit of Cornell in 1995, Lee Tenghui’s re-election as 
Taiwan’s President, pro-Independent candidate Chen Shuibian’s being elected as 
the president of Taiwan. Taiwan’s returning back to the U.N.       
20 = U.S. weapon deal with Taiwan 
 News about U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, America’s selling of F-15, 
Patriot Pac-3 antimissile systems, and other sophisticated weaponry system 
which may embolden Taiwan’s independence movement. 
21 = Tibet separation 
 Tibet’s being occupied by CCP government in the 1950s and Dalai Lama’s 
exile government in the U.S. ever since. The integrity of Tibet culture 
jeopardized by arbitrary ruling of the CCP government. The controversial 
selection of new live Buddha, Banchan XI, by the Chinese central government.   
22 = Hong Kong and Marco handover 
 The negotiation between the Chinese government and the British government 
with regard to handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Hong Kong governor 
Chris Patten’s legislative reform which triggered nasty strife between China 
and the U.K. The final handover of Hong Kong to China in July 1, 1997, The 
U.S. government’s skepticism in regard to China’s commitment to keeping Hong 
Kong’s legal system intact and to respecting Hong Kong’s political and 
economic freedom.  
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23 = China’s foreign affairs with other countries 
 China’s geopolitical diplomacy with Russian, Japan, India, Iran, Korea, 
Israel. China-Europe cooperation, the possibility of China-Russia military 
alliance, and China’s vigorous diplomacy in Asia minor, South America, and 
Africa.  
24 = China’s environment and energy problem 
 The deterioration of environment in China due to single-minded economic 
development. The Three Gorge Dam Project and its negative effect on 
environment. The air pollution due to low exhaustion standard; The shortage of 
water, food, fuel due to the sudden economic takeoff.   
25 = AIDS and other disease 
 The scandalous expansion of AIDS in China due to profit-driven blood 
gathering practice of local government which spread unsafe blood with 
astonishing speed.  
26 = Chinese leaders 
 Profiling a Chinese leader upon his death or ascent to power.  
27 = natural disaster, accident, and crash 
 Neutral reporting of earthquake, hurricane, derailing, forest fire, 
airplane crash, and other disasters in China. 
28 = animal rights abuse and animal conservation 
 Chinese cuisine featuring Dog! Cat! and other endangered animals!  
29 = others 
30 = the U.S. government’s propaganda against the Chinese 
government. 
 The failure or success of U.S. government’s effort for peaceful revolution 
in China by way of VOA, Asia Liberty Satellite, etc.     
 
7. 4P Frames on which the news and opinion items are based 
 
01 = ideopolitical conflict – human rights, political 
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freedom (principle) 
02 = geopolitical conflict – military rivalry, 
proliferation, regional influence, etc. (power) 
03 = economy and business – economic cooperation, 
opportunity (prosperity) 
04 = common interest – environment, energy, disease, 
population, reconciliation (peace) 
05 = can not be attributed to the 4Ps frame 
According to Jentleson (2000), the U.S. foreign policy is usually made in 
the name of the national interest, which could be broken down to four goals or 
four frameworks of foreign policy theory: principle, power, prosperity, 
peace.3
Principle: 4
Principle involves values, ideals, and beliefs for which the U.S. has 
claimed to stand in the world. Generally, the principle could be called 
democratic idealism. It has two central tenets: (1) “When tradeoffs have to be 
made, ‘right’ is to be chosen over ‘might,’” i.e., the U.S. should “stand up 
for principles on which it was founded and not be just another player in 
global power politics” and struggle to be “the only monument of human rights… 
the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from 
hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions 
shall ever become susceptible to its benign influence.” (2) “In the long run 
‘right’ makes for ‘might,’” and “in the end interests like peace and power are 
well served by principles.” By promoting democracies, the U.S. actually 
promote peace. Principle is where the “soft power” of the U.S. lies. The 
value, belief, reputation, and cultural attractiveness of the U.S. can have 
quite practical value as source of influence. Overall, democratic idealism has 
an implicit optimism about human nature.  
Based on the “principle” framework, those items which highlight the 
ideopolitical conflict between the U.S. and China are principle-minded.  
                                                 
3 Bruce W. Jentleson: American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century, p. 10-24.  
4 ibid, p. 16-18 
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Power:5  
Power theory is hardheaded and a realistic view of foreign affairs involves 
self-defense and preservation of national independence and territory. It also 
includes the might which would enable a country to prevent, deflect, and 
defeat threats to its security, to assert itself, to advance it own interest 
and to be aggressive. Its basic rationale is that international relations are 
struggles for power. Conflict and competition are the basic reality of 
international politics. International relations are not a constant state of 
war, but a state of relentless security competition, with the possibility of 
war always in the background. Genuine peace, or a world in which states do not 
compete for power, is not likely. States thus ultimately can rely on 
themselves for security. Power is the ability to overcome obstacles and 
prevail in conflicts. It is the general capacity of a state to control the 
behavior of others. Power-based foreign policy pursues a strong defense and a 
credible deterrence (being perceived by others in the international system as 
having the will to use its capacities). Power-based foreign policy strategies 
include coercive intervention and military alliance against a mutual enemy. 
Power-based diplomacy also tolerates covert action, the secret operation. 
Prosperity:6  
Prosperity theory requires that foreign policy be motivated by pursuit of 
prosperity and places the economic national interest above other concerns. 
Most generally, prosperity-driven policy involves efforts to strengthen global 
capitalism as the structure of the international economy. 
There are two versions of prosperity theory. One is international political 
economy, a benign view of prosperity theory as pursuing a favorable balance of 
trade, strong economic growth, a healthy macro-economy. The other is a 
critical view of prosperity as imperialism – foreign policy is dominated by 
and serving the interest of the capitalist class and other elites, such as 
multinational corporations and major banks. The prosperity that is sought is 
more for the private benefit of special interests, and the ways in which it is 
sought are highly exploitative of other countries. 
Peace: 7
                                                 
5 Bruce W. Jentleson: American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century,  pp. 10-13 
6 ibid,  pp. 14-16.  
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Peace theory also is called liberal internationalism. This views world 
politics as a cultivable garden in contrast to the realist view of a global 
jungle. Although they stop well short of world government, these theories 
emphasize the possibility and the value of reducing the chances of war and of 
achieving common interests sufficiently for the international system to be one 
of world order. Conflict and tensions do exist, but cooperation among nations 
is possible and beneficial. Pursuing cooperation this is neither naïve nor 
dangerous, but rather a rational way to reduce risk and make gains that even 
the most powerful state could not achieve solely on its own. International 
institutions can manage problems lest they get out of control. Collective 
action, coordination, and international institution provide the structure and 
the commitment to facilitate, and in some instances require, the fulfillment 
of commitments to collective action and coordination. 
 
8. Major citation in supporting the main point 
 
Name ________________   
The name of the people being cited in support of the main point in the 
article 
Author type of the people being cited  ________ 
Use the same coding protocol as defined in “5 Author type of opinion 
pieces.” 
Affiliation or association ______________ 
Record his/her title, job position, and organizations he/she works for.  
 
9. The importance level of human rights in U.S.-China 
relation argued in this article 
 
    __         __      __      __     
                                                                                                                                              
7 Bruce W. Jentleson: American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century, p. 14-16. 
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    0           1       2       3      
0 ===== N/A 
1 ===== Marginal  
2 ===== Important 
3 ===== Crucial  
Level 0 designates no mention of the issue. 
Level 1 designates the lowest level of importance by which it means that 
the U.S. should accommodate China’s definition of human rights as “right to 
live,” allow economic survival rights to take precedence over the political 
liberty, and thus, drop human rights issue from U.S.-China relationships. 
Level 2 designates the moderate level of importance by which it means that 
the U.S. could implement human rights agenda via economic transaction, 
dialogue, and engagemental diplomacy. 
Level 3 designates the highest level of importance by which it means that 
the U.S. should enforce human rights standards strictly and straightforwardly 
link human rights issues with other issues of U.S.-China relation. 
 
10. The article argue for the importance level of U.S.-
China trade as 
 
__      __      __      __       
0       1       2       3     
0 ===== N/A 
1 ===== Marginal 
2 ===== Important 
3 ===== Crucial 
Level 0 designates no mention of the issue 
Level 1 designates the lowest level of importance by which it means that 
the U.S. should enforce economic sanction against China if China fails to meet 
                                                                                                                                                     168
human right standards. 
Level 2 designates the moderate level of importance by which it means that 
the U.S. should do business with China in the hope that business relation and 
economic liberty could bring about political liberty in China. Also the U.S. 
business should enforce ethical code when do business in China. For example, 
U.S. business should stay aside from China’s controversial Three Gorge Dam 
project which is believed to endanger ecological balance.  
Level 3 designates the highest level of importance by which it means that 
the U.S. should not stay aside China’s huge market, and should develop normal 
trade with China regardless of China’s human rights record. 
 
11. The article argues that the United States should 
pursue a U.S.-China policy as  
 
__      __      __      __   
0       1       2       3          
0 ===== N/A 
1 ===== Containment 
2 ===== Congagement 
3 ===== Engagement 
 “0” designates no mention of the issue. 
“1” designates containment policy stance by which it means that the U.S. 
should contain communist China by isolating China, sanctioning China, stopping 
U.S.-China economic relation, enforcing human rights standard ruthlessly, and 
supporting Taiwan’s independence, etc.  
“2” designate congagement policy stance by which it means that the U.S. 
should preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy while deterring China 
from becoming hostile and hedging against the possibility that a strong China 
might challenge U.S. interests. According to Khalilzad (1999), one of the 
three most important neoconservative thinkers, “congagement” is a combination 
of containment and engagement by which the U.S. can “continue to try to bring 
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China into the current international system while giving equal attention to 
deterrence and preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to this system while 
seeking to convince the Chinese leadership that a challenge would be difficult 
to prepare and extremely risky to pursue.” (Rand Paper) 
“3” represents engagement, i.e., keeping dialogue with China with regard to 
human rights and trade issue, expanding economic relations with China in the 
hope that liberalization of economy could bring about liberalization of 
Chinese society, acknowledging China’s strategic role to reduce global 
warming, nuclear proliferation, and regional conflicts in the post-Cold War 
era, etc.) 
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1 01/01/93 2 2 5 3 1 Jack Germond 5 Baltimore Sun 3 0 0
2 01/06/93 1 1 1 2 1 Robin Munro 13 Asia Watch 3 0 0
3 01/11/93 1 2 11 3 1 11 3 2 0
4 01/15/93 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 2
5 01/19/93 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
6 02/14/93 1 1 1 13 3 Lawrence H. Summers, 10 the former World Bank chief economist 3 3 3
7 02/15/93 1 1 1 9 3 Ronnie Y. Cheong 12 0 2 0
8 02/21/93 2 1 1 3 1 Wong Dong 16 Chinese dissident 3 0 0
9 02/27/93 1 1 1 1 1 Bill Clinton 6 President of the United States 3 2 2
10 03/10/93 1 2 9 9 3 9 0 3 3
11 03/11/93 1 1 1 12 1 3 2 0
12 03/16/93 2 1 1 3 1 Lee Peng 17 China's Prime Minister 1 3 0
13 03/16/93 1 1 1 22 2 Li Peng 17 China's Prime Minister 0 0 0
14 03/26/93 1 1 1 5 3 2 0 0
15 03/29/93 2 2 3 14 2 KIM KYUNG WON 22 Korean Institute of Defense Analysis 0 0 1
16 03/31/93 2 2 10 13 3 Mr. C. H. Kwan 10 Nomura Research Inst 0 3 3
17 04/01/93 1 1 1 26 1 Li Peng 17 China's Prime Minister 1 3 0
18 04/02/93 2 2 3 22 1 MARIA TAM 17 Advisor to Chinese government 3 0 3
19 04/09/93 1 2 4 1 1 3 1 1
20 04/13/93 2 1 1 8 3 LEONARD WOODCOSK 8 Fmr. U.S. Ambassador to China 0 3 3
21 04/13/93 1 1 1 22 1 3 3 0
22 04/19/93 1 1 1 21 1 13 International Campaign for Tibet 2 0 0
23 04/20/93 2 2 12 1 1 Sidney Rittenberg 12 consultant to Americans doing business in China 1 3 3
24 04/26/93 1 1 1 3 1 3 2 0
25 04/27/93 1 2 4 21 1 3 1 1
26 04/30/93 1 1 1 19 4 0 3 0
27 05/09/93 1 1 1 23 1 3 0 0
28 05/13/93 1 1 1 1 1 6 3 2 2
29 05/16/93 2 2 7 8 3 Sen. GEORGE MITCHELL 7 2 2 3
30 05/16/93 1 1 1 4 1 2 0 0
31 05/19/93 1 2 15 8 3 2 3 3
32 05/22/93 2 1 1 8 3 Jiang Zemin 17 Chinese President 2 3 3
33 05/23/93 1 1 1 23 1 2 0 0
34 05/26/93 1 2 2 2 1 3 0 0
35 05/26/93 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
36 05/28/93 2 2 7 8 1 RICHARD BRECHER 12 U.S. China Business Council 3 3 3
37 05/30/93 1 1 1 8 1 3 3 0
38 06/06/93 1 1 1 28 4 Amy S. M. Lau, 18 2 0 3
39 06/11/93 2 1 1 6 1 JOHN WU 26 Immigration Attorney 2 0 0
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40 06/11/93 1 2 25 6 4 2 0 3
41 06/20/93 2 1 1 23 3 0 3 0
42 06/20/93 1 1 1 29 4 1 0 0
43 06/25/93 1 2 12 7 4 0 0 3
44 06/29/93 2 1 1 28 1 RICHARD MOORE 13 International Fund for Animal Welfare 3 0 0
45 07/04/93 1 1 1 3 1 24 a young entrepreneur 3 2 0
46 07/06/93 2 1 1 8 3 Bill Clinton 6 President of the United States 0 3 0
47 07/17/93 1 1 1 23 4 17 0 2 0
48 07/19/93 1 1 2 22 3 18 0 2 0
49 07/22/93 1 2 16 2 1 3 2 1
50 07/24/93 1 1 1 14 2 22 a senior Asian diplomat 0 0 1
51 07/26/93 2 1 1 12 1 Sen. BILL BRADLEY 7 3 0 0
52 07/30/93 1 1 1 3 1 Robin Munro 13 Asia Watch 3 0 0
53 08/06/93 1 1 2 27 4 0 0 0
54 08/09/93 1 2 15 12 4 0 0 3
55 08/11/93 1 1 2 29 4 24 The hijacker, identified as Shi Yuebo 3 0 0
56 08/20/93 1 1 1 2 1 Han Dongfang 16 3 0 1
57 08/25/93 2 1 1 15 2 0 2 2
58 08/31/93 1 2 9 26 4 0 0 0
59 09/03/93 1 1 1 18 2 0 0 1
60 09/08/93 2 1 3 28 4 JOHNNY ROBERTS 13 Save the Rhino Intl 0 0 0
61 09/09/93 1 1 2 22 1 3 0 0
62 09/17/93 2 1 1 15 2 BRENT SCOWCROFT 8 Fmr. Natl. Security Adviser 0 0 3
63 09/17/93 1 1 2 15 2 11 Natural Resources Defense Council 0 0 2
64 09/23/93 2 1 1 12 1 HE SHENLIANG 17 1 0 0
65 09/24/93 2 2 3 12 1 CHINOY 1 CNN correspondent 3 0 0
66 09/24/93 1 2 2 12 1 3 2 2
67 09/26/93 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
68 09/28/93 1 2 9 3 1 3 2 0
69 10/05/93 2 1 1 15 2 0 0 1
70 10/06/93 1 1 1 15 2 Bill Clinton 6 President of the United States 2 2 2
71 10/13/93 1 1 1 14 2 6 CIA 0 0 1
72 10/14/93 2 2 26 3 1 2 0 0
73 10/21/93 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
74 10/23/93 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 2
75 10/28/93 1 1 1 1 3 Alexander M. Haig Jr. 8 former Secretary of State 1 3 3
76 11/04/93 2 1 3 27 4 0 0 0
77 11/05/93 1 1 1 27 5 0 0 0
78 11/10/93 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 2
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79 11/14/93 1 1 1 22 5 2 0 0
80 11/17/93 1 2 9 26 4 0 0 0
81 11/18/93 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3
82 11/19/93 1 2 8 19 2 0 0 1
83 11/19/93 1 1 1 8 2 2 2 2
84 11/22/93 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
85 11/25/93 1 1 2 27 5 0 0 0
86 11/28/93 2 2 3 13 3 1 3 0
87 12/05/93 1 1 2 15 2 0 0 0
88 12/08/93 1 2 4 24 4 0 0 3
89 12/17/93 2 1 1 3 1 LODI GYARI 13 Intl. Campaign for Tibet 3 0 0
90 12/22/93 1 1 1 13 3 12 Shanghai Volkswagen 2 3 3
91 12/27/93 1 1 2 3 1 0 0 0
92 12/28/93 2 1 1 22 3 HOWARD GORGES 12 South China Securities 0 3 0
93 01/05/94 2 1 1 30 5 0 0 0
94 01/13/94 1 1 1 23 3 22 France Foreign Minister 0 3 3
95 01/17/94 2 1 1 8 1 Stapleton Roy 6 U.S. Ambassador 2 3 3
96 01/21/94 1 1 1 7 1 6 anonymous 3 2 3
97 01/24/94 2 2 16 3 1 Wei Jingsheng 16 Chinese Democracy Advocate 3 3 2
98 01/27/94 1 1 1 8 3 Senator Max Baucus 7 2 3 3
99 01/28/94 1 1 1 27 5 0 0 0
100 02/04/94 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 0
101 02/05/94 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
102 02/15/94 1 2 11 21 1 3 0 0
103 02/24/94 2 1 1 22 1 18 3 0 0
104 02/25/94 1 1 1 22 1 3 0 0
105 03/03/94 1 1 1 3 1  John Shattuck 6 the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights 2 2 3
106 03/07/94 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
107 03/10/94 2 1 1 3 1 3 2 0
108 03/11/94 1 1 1 3 1 Xu Liangying 24 historian of the Academy of Sciences 3 0 0
109 03/12/94 2 1 1 7 1 3 2 0
110 03/13/94 1 1 1 7 1 3 1 2
111 03/14/94 2 1 1 7 3 PHILLIP CARMICHAEL 12 American Chamber of Commerce 3 3 3
112 03/14/94 1 1 1 26 5 0 0 0
113 03/16/94 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 2
114 03/20/94 2 2 12 8 3 WILLARD WORKMAN 12 International, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2 3 3
115 03/21/94 2 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
116 03/21/94 1 1 1 23 3 2 3 3
117 03/23/94 2 1 1 23 2 WARREN CHRISTOPHER 6 Secretary of State 0 0 3
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118 03/24/94 1 2 4 2 1 3 1 1
119 03/25/94 1 1 1 1 1 Bill Clinton 6 President of the United States 3 2 2
120 03/29/94 2 1 1 8 3 WINSTON LORD 6 Asst. Secretary of State for East Asia 2 3 2
121 03/30/94 1 1 1 8 3 3 2 2
122 04/02/94 1 1 1 2 1 Wei Jingsheng 16 3 2 2
123 04/04/94 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
124 04/05/94 2 1 1 9 3 ANN BROWN 13 Consumer Product Safety Commission 0 2 2
125 04/07/94 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 2
126 04/10/94 1 1 1 4 1 19 3 0 0
127 04/19/94 1 1 1 4 5 Lee Teng-hui 20 Taiwan's President 3 0 0
128 04/23/94 2 1 1 1 4 24 anonymous 1 0 3
129 04/23/94 2 2 3 1 4 DAVID GERGEN 8 Counselor to Clinton & Fmr Nixon Speechwriter 2 0 3
130 04/29/94 1 2 9 29 1 Xu Liangying 9 3 0 3
131 04/30/94 1 1 1 21 1 3 2 0
132 05/05/94 2 1 2 3 1 ANCHI LUE 21 CTS, Taiwan 3 0 1
133 05/05/94 1 1 1 5 3 17 0 0 0
134 05/10/94 2 1 1 8 3 Rep. LEE HAMILTON 7 2 3 3
135 05/11/94 1 1 1 8 3 Lee Hamilton 7 representative 2 3 3
136 05/13/94 2 1 1 22 3 Mr. TANG 19 1 3 3
137 05/15/94 1 1 1 2 1 24 3 0 0
138 05/17/94 2 1 1 11 1 RON BROWN 6 Commerce Secretary 3 3 2
139 05/20/94 1 2 4 3 1 Nancy Pelosi 7 3 1 1
140 05/21/94 2 2 3 8 1 RON BROWN 6 Commerce Secretary 3 3 3
141 05/24/94 1 1 1 5 2 22 0 0 3
142 05/25/94 2 1 1 8 1 SIDNEY JONES 13 Asia Watch 3 1 1
143 05/25/94 2 1 1 8 3 3 3 0
144 05/26/94 2 2 3 8 3 3 3 3
145 05/26/94 2 2 3 8 3 2 3 3
146 05/26/94 2 1 1 8 3 MICHAEL OKSENBERG 11 East-West Center 3 3 3
147 05/26/94 2 1 1 8 1 3 2 2
148 05/27/94 2 2 6 8 3 PAUL BEGALA 6 Clinton Political Adviser 2 3 3
149 05/27/94 1 1 1 8 3 Bill Clinton 6 President of the United States 2 3 3
150 05/27/94 1 2 4 3 1 3 1 1
151 05/28/94 2 1 1 8 1 Senator MAX BAUCUS 7 3 3 3
152 05/28/94 1 1 1 8 3 22 anonymous 2 3 3
153 06/02/94 2 1 1 5 1 ROBIN MUNRO 13 Asia Watch 3 0 0
154 06/03/94 2 1 1 23 4 JAMES LILLEY 11 American Enterprise Institute 0 0 3
155 06/05/94 1 1 1 2 1 24 2 0 0
156 06/09/94 2 1 1 23 4 0 0 3
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157 06/11/94 2 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
158 06/11/94 1 1 1 15 2 0 0 0
159 06/27/94 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 3
160 07/07/94 1 2 11 19 2 0 0 0
161 07/19/94 1 1 1 24 4 0 0 0
162 07/24/94 1 1 1 2 1 22 anonymous 3 0 0
163 07/25/94 2 1 1 8 3 RICHARD BRECHER 12 U.S.-China Business Council 1 3 3
164 08/07/94 1 1 1 15 5 0 0 0
165 08/16/94 1 1 2 29 5 0 0 0
166 08/22/94 1 2 2 6 1 3 0 0
167 08/26/94 1 2 10 6 3 2 0 3
168 08/29/94 2 2 3 8 3 2 3 3
169 08/29/94 1 1 1 2 1 22 anonymous 3 0 2
170 09/02/94 1 2 15 28 4 2 0 3
171 09/04/94 1 1 1 23 2 Yeltsin 22 Russian President 0 3 0
172 09/10/94 1 1 1 24 5 2 2 0
173 09/20/94 2 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
174 09/20/94 1 1 2 22 1 3 0 0
175 09/21/94 1 2 15 28 1 3 0 2
176 09/27/94 1 1 1 15 2 22 anonymous 2 3 3
177 10/03/94 1 1 1 26 1 3 0 0
178 10/12/94 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 0
179 10/20/94 2 1 1 22 5 0 0 0
180 11/05/94 1 1 2 22 1 2 0 0
181 11/07/94 1 2 2 8 3 2 3 0
182 11/13/94 2 1 1 1 1 Bill Clinton 6 President of the United States 3 0 0
183 11/14/94 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 0
184 11/14/94 1 1 1 15 2 2 3 3
185 11/22/94 1 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
186 12/09/94 2 1 1 27 5 0 0 0
187 12/09/94 1 1 2 27 5 0 0 0
188 12/16/94 1 1 1 5 1 Xiao 17 Governor of Sichuan Province 2 3 0
189 12/20/94 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 2
190 12/27/94 1 1 1 24 1 Guo 17 0 2 0
191 12/28/94 2 1 1 21 1 3 0 0
192 12/31/94 2 2 7 3 1 Richard Nixon Former President of The United States 3 3 3
193 01/01/95 1 1 2 9 3 0 2 1
194 01/09/95 1 1 1 3 1 24 2 0 0
195 01/14/95 1 1 2 14 2 Perry, Secretary of Defense 6 0 0 3
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196 01/17/95 1 2 5 3 4 24 1 0 3
197 01/28/95 1 2 15 23 5 0 0 0
198 02/04/95 2 1 1 10 3 MICKEY KANTOR 6 U.S. Trade Representative 0 3 2
199 02/05/95 1 1 1 9 3 Representative Philip M. Crane 7 0 2 2
200 02/07/95 1 2 4 2 1 Harry Wu 16 3 1 1
201 02/10/95 2 2 3 1 2 JAMES LILLEY 11 American Enterprise Institute 3 2 1
202 02/19/95 1 2 13 3 1 3 0 0
203 02/19/95 1 1 1 14 2 22 0 0 2
204 02/25/95 2 1 1 10 3 0 3 2
205 02/26/95 1 1 1 9 3 0 3 2
206 03/02/95 1 1 1 2 1 State Dept. Winston Lord 6 3 0 1
207 03/10/95 1 1 2 21 1 Dalai Lama 23 2 0 0
208 03/18/95 2 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
209 03/24/95 1 2 2 23 1 0 0 0
210 03/29/95 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
211 04/11/95 1 1 1 26 1 2 0 0
212 04/16/95 1 2 9 3 1 2 3 0 0
213 04/18/95 1 1 1 1 1 Mr. Christopher 6 Secretary of State 3 0 2
214 04/18/95 2 1 1 15 2 0 0 0
215 04/24/95 1 1 1 4 1 2 0 0
216 05/06/95 1 2 13 2 1 3 0 0
217 05/08/95 1 1 1 4 1 24 2 0 0
218 05/15/95 1 1 2 21 5 Dalai Lama 23 2 0 0
219 05/18/95 1 1 2 21 5 0 0 0
220 05/20/95 1 2 2 3 1 16 3 0 0
221 05/22/95 1 1 2 2 5 2 0 0
222 05/22/95 2 1 1 23 2 0 0 2
223 05/25/95 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
224 05/26/95 1 2 4 21 4 Secretary of State Christopher 6 0 0 3
225 05/31/95 1 1 2 15 2  Kozo Igarashi 22 Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan 0 0 2
226 06/05/95 1 1 2 3 1 3 0 0
227 06/12/95 1 2 4 3 1 24 3 0 2
228 06/13/95 1 1 2 19 2 Lee Teng-hui 20 Taiwan's President 0 0 2
229 06/19/95 1 1 2 2 5 2 0 0
230 06/29/95 1 1 1 2 1 WINSTON LORD 6 3 0 3
231 07/02/95 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
232 07/03/95 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 2
233 07/06/95 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
234 07/09/95 2 1 1 1 2 Prof. JOHN FRANKENSTEIN 19 Hong Kong University 0 0 1
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235 07/10/95 1 1 1 2 1 16 3 1 1
236 07/11/95 1 2 2 2 1 3 0 1
237 07/11/95 1 1 1 19 3 0 3 2
238 07/12/95 2 2 7 1 1 Rep. NANCY PELOSI 7 3 2 2
239 07/13/95 1 1 1 23 1 the Green Party 22 3 3 0
240 07/17/95 1 1 1 2 1 ROBIN MUNRO 13 Asia Watch 3 0 2
241 07/20/95 2 1 1 8 3 Rep. RICHARD GEPHARDT 7 3 3 2
242 07/23/95 1 1 2 19 2 20 0 0 0
243 07/27/95 1 1 1 19 5 0 0 0
244 07/27/95 2 1 1 3 1 Harry Wu 16 2 0 2
245 07/30/95 1 2 2 2 1 3 1 1
246 07/31/95 1 1 1 2 1 Mr. Christopher 6 Secretary of State 3 1 1
247 08/03/95 1 1 1 18 2 Mr. Baum 9 0 0 1
248 08/10/95 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 0
249 08/10/95 2 2 7 1 1 3 0 1
250 08/11/95 1 2 2 3 1 3 0 1
251 08/16/95 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 0
252 08/19/95 2 2 12 13 3 1 3 3
253 08/20/95 1 2 4 1 2 Henry Kissinger 8 3 1 1
254 08/21/95 1 1 1 2 1 Bob Dole 7 3 2 1
255 08/23/95 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
256 08/24/95 1 1 1 7 1 3 0 1
257 08/24/95 2 2 9 2 2 3 0 3
258 08/24/95 2 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
259 08/24/95 2 1 1 2 2 3 0 2
260 08/25/95 2 1 1 2 1 Harry Wu 16 3 0 2
261 08/26/95 1 2 20 19 5 0 0 1
262 08/26/95 1 1 1 7 1 6 anonymous 3 0 3
263 08/26/95 2 2 15 2 1 1 3 3
264 08/27/95 2 2 5 2 1 ARIANNA HUFFINGTON 5 3 0 1
265 08/29/95 1 1 1 19 1 Jimmy Lin 21 3 0 1
266 08/29/95 2 2 12 1 3 ROBERT KAPP 12 President, U.S.-China Business Council 2 3 3
267 09/02/95 1 1 1 3 1 22 3 0 2
268 09/03/95 2 1 1 23 1 3 0 2
269 09/04/95 2 1 1 23 1 2 0 0
270 09/05/95 1 2 22 3 1 2 0 0
271 09/05/95 2 2 3 3 1 2 0 3
272 09/06/95 1 1 1 7 1 6 anonymous 3 0 2
273 09/06/95 2 2 6 23 1 3 0 1
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274 09/08/95 2 2 5 23 1 3 0 1
275 09/10/95 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0
276 09/10/95 2 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
277 09/13/95 1 2 5 3 1 2 0 0
278 09/13/95 2 1 1 6 1 XIE XIDE 17 2 0 3
279 09/14/95 2 1 1 23 3 CHEN SHU YUN 17 1 0 0
280 09/17/95 1 2 9 29 5 2 0 3
281 09/18/95 1 1 1 22 1 Gov. Christopher Patten 22 3 0 2
282 09/18/95 2 1 1 22 1 EMILY LAU 19 3 0 1
283 09/23/95 1 1 2 7 4 0 0 2
284 09/27/95 1 2 13 19 1 22 0 0 0
285 09/27/95 2 1 1 3 1 24 2 0 0
286 09/30/95 1 1 1 15 2 0 0 2
287 10/03/95 1 1 1 7 2 6 0 0 2
288 10/14/95 1 1 1 15 1 0 0 2
289 10/14/95 2 1 1 21 1 3 0 0
290 10/23/95 2 1 1 2 1 16 3 2 1
291 10/24/95 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 2
292 10/24/95 1 1 1 7 1 15 3 0 2
293 10/25/95 2 2 3 7 1 NICHOLAS LARDY 11 Brookings Institute 2 2 2
294 11/08/95 1 1 2 21 1 23 3 0 0
295 11/13/95 1 1 1 21 1 6 3 0 2
296 11/17/95 1 1 1 18 2 0 0 2
297 11/19/95 1 2 4 3 1 3 1 2
298 11/22/95 1 1 1 2 1 6 3 0 2
299 11/28/95 1 2 4 19 1 3 1 1
300 12/01/95 1 1 1 23 1 2 0 2
301 12/05/95 1 2 15 19 1 A. M. Rosenthal 4 3 1 1
302 12/10/95 1 1 1 23 1 0 0 0
303 12/12/95 1 2 4 3 1 3 1 1
304 12/12/95 2 1 1 2 1 Wei Jingsheng 16 3 0 2
305 12/14/95 1 1 1 2 1 Wei Jingsheng 16 3 0 1
306 12/18/95 1 1 1 2 1 Madeleine K. Albright 6 Chief American Representative in the U.N. 3 0 1
307 12/22/95 1 2 10 19 2 HK's South China Morning Post 19 0 0 1
308 12/26/95 2 1 1 5 3 0 0 0
309 12/29/95 1 1 1 23 2 2 2 2
310 01/04/96 2 1 1 19 2 ANDREW YANG 11 Council for Advanced Policy Studies 0 0 2
311 01/06/96 1 1 1 2 1 Robin Munro 13 Human Rights Watch 3 0 1
312 01/09/96 1 2 4 2 1 Human Rights Watch 13 3 1 1
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313 01/14/96 2 2 15 2 1 ROBIN MUNRO 13 Human Rights Watch 3 0 2
314 01/15/96 1 1 1 24 1 24 2 0 0
315 01/15/96 1 2 9 29 1 0 0 3
316 01/19/96 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
317 01/21/96 1 2 10 24 3 0 3 3
318 01/31/96 2 2 7 14 1 Nancy Pelosi 7 Representative of The United States 3 1 1
319 02/01/96 1 1 1 1 2 24 0 0 2
320 02/02/96 1 2 4 19 2 2 1 1
321 02/04/96 1 1 1 10 2 MICKEY KANTOR 6 Trade Representative of The United States 2 2 2
322 02/05/96 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 0
323 02/05/96 2 1 1 27 4 0 0 0
324 02/06/96 1 2 15 8 1 3 1 1
325 02/09/96 1 2 6 8 3 0 2 3
326 02/10/96 2 1 1 9 2 12 0 2 2
327 02/11/96 1 1 2 19 4 Lee Teng-hui 20 Taiwan's President 0 0 2
328 02/15/96 1 2 11 19 4 2 3 3
329 02/20/96 1 1 1 10 3 Wang Binyan 24 Cai Ling Audio and Video Company 0 2 2
330 02/20/96 2 1 1 19 2 DAVID LAMPTON 13 President, U.S. Committee on China Relations 0 0 2
331 02/25/96 1 2 9 3 4 2 0 3
332 03/01/96 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 3
333 03/05/96 2 2 12 19 3 BRAD WHITWORTH 12 Hewlett Packard 0 3 3
334 03/06/96 1 1 1 21 1 13 Amnesty International 3 0 2
335 03/07/96 1 2 9 19 4 0 0 3
336 03/07/96 2 1 1 19 2 0 0 2
337 03/09/96 1 1 1 19 2 20 0 0 2
338 03/09/96 2 1 1 18 2 Mr. Christopher 6 Secretary of State 0 0 1
339 03/10/96 2 1 1 18 2 0 0 2
340 03/11/96 2 1 1 18 2 WILLIAM PERRY 6 Defense Secretary 0 0 2
341 03/11/96 2 2 3 18 2 WILLIAM PERRY 6 Defense Secretary 0 0 2
342 03/11/96 2 1 1 18 2 PATRICK BUCHANAN 8 Presidential Candidate 0 0 1
343 03/12/96 1 2 4 14 2 0 0 1
344 03/12/96 2 2 12 18 3 ROBERT HORMATS 12 Goldman Sachs International 0 3 2
345 03/12/96 2 1 1 19 3 0 2 0
346 03/15/96 1 2 9 1 4 1 3 3
347 03/15/96 2 1 1 18 2 0 0 2
348 03/16/96 2 2 7 18 1 Sen. JESSE HELMS 7 Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 3 0 2
349 03/18/96 1 1 2 18 2 Lee Teng-hui 20 Taiwan's President 0 0 1
350 03/18/96 2 2 11 19 4 STANLEY ROTH 11 U.S. Institute of Peace 0 0 3
351 03/18/96 2 1 1 19 2 0 0 0
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352 03/19/96 1 1 1 19 2 Adm. James O. Ellis 6 the commander of the naval group 0 0 2
353 03/20/96 1 1 2 18 2 0 0 2
354 03/21/96 2 1 1 19 1 24 0 0 3
355 03/21/96 2 1 1 18 3 SIMON LIN 21  President, Acer, Inc. 0 3 3
356 03/22/96 1 1 1 18 2 Defense Secretary William Perry 6 0 0 1
357 03/22/96 2 1 1 18 3 DAVID HANDRIX 12 Global Consumer Banking, Citibank 0 3 3
358 03/23/96 2 2 5 18 2 Dr. MARY BROWN BULLOCK China Analyst 0 0 2
359 03/23/96 2 1 1 19 1 0 0 2
360 03/24/96 1 1 1 19 1 20 3 0 1
361 03/24/96 1 2 4 19 4 22 2 0 3
362 03/25/96 2 1 1 19 2 DAVID LAMPTON 13 Pres. Natl. Cmte. on U.S. China Relations 0 0 2
363 03/26/96 1 1 1 21 1 13  Tibet Info Network & Human Rights Watch 3 0 1
364 03/27/96 1 2 9 19 4 0 0 3
365 03/28/96 2 2 12 8 3 1 3 2
366 04/01/96 1 1 1 22 1 19 3 0 1
367 04/01/96 1 2 4 29 5 0 0 3
368 04/10/96 1 1 1 3 1 Geremie R. Barme 10 a China scholar 3 0 0
369 04/14/96 2 1 1 13 3 0 0 0
370 04/15/96 1 1 1 20 2 0 0 2
371 04/17/96 1 2 4 1 4 Secretary Shultz 8 2 0 3
372 04/23/96 1 1 1 1 2 Zhu Chengshan 24 1 3 2
373 04/27/96 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 2
374 05/02/96 1 2 4 3 1 3 2 1
375 05/04/96 1 1 1 2 1 6 2 0 3
376 05/08/96 2 2 18 22 3 CHRIS PATTEN 18 Gov. of Hong Kong 3 3 2
377 05/10/96 1 1 1 1 3 Bob Dole 7 2 3 1
378 05/10/96 2 1 1 8 2 0 3 3
379 05/15/96 1 2 9 8 1 2 3 3
380 05/15/96 2 2 6 10 3 Ms. Barshefsky 6 Trade Representative of The United States 0 3 2
381 05/15/96 2 1 1 10 1 Ms. Barshefsky 6 Trade Representative of The United States 0 3 2
382 05/16/96 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
383 05/18/96 1 1 1 1 2 Secretary of State Christopher 6 2 3 2
384 05/18/96 2 1 1 10 3 0 3 1
385 05/20/96 2 1 1 1 3 6 0 3 3
386 05/20/96 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 1
387 05/22/96 1 1 1 13 3 24 0 0 0
388 05/23/96 2 1 1 9 5 0 0 0
389 05/28/96 1 1 1 3 1 24 3 0 0
390 06/03/96 1 1 2 23 3 0 0 0
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391 06/04/96 2 1 1 3 1 16 3 0 0
392 06/07/96 1 1 1 15 4 0 0 2
393 06/10/96 1 1 2 2 1 3 0 0
394 06/12/96 1 2 13 3 1 18 3 0 2
395 06/17/96 2 1 1 10 3 12 0 3 3
396 06/17/96 2 1 1 10 3 0 3 0
397 06/18/96 1 1 1 10 3 Ms. Barshefsky 6 Trade Representative of The United States 0 3 3
398 06/28/96 1 1 1 8 3 Representative Sam M. Gibbons 7 3 3 2
399 06/29/96 2 1 1 13 3 24 1 3 0
400 07/04/96 1 1 2 2 1 Amnesty International 13 3 0 0
401 07/11/96 1 1 1 2 1 24 3 0 0
402 07/23/96 1 2 9 1 2 0 0 3
403 07/25/96 1 1 1 1 4 6 anonymous 2 2 3
404 07/29/96 1 1 2 15 2 0 0 2
405 08/05/96 2 1 1 27 5 0 0 0
406 08/13/96 1 1 2 19 5 0 0 0
407 08/26/96 1 1 1 15 2 0 3 3
408 08/30/96 1 2 4 15 2 0 0 1
409 09/01/96 2 1 1 22 1 19 2 0 0
410 09/10/96 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
411 09/15/96 2 2 7 9 3 7 2 2 2
412 09/19/96 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
413 10/06/96 1 1 1 24 1 24 0 0 0
414 10/10/96 1 1 1 2 1 Human Rights Watch 13 3 0 0
415 10/11/96 1 2 2 2 1 0 2 2
416 10/15/96 2 2 9 3 1 9 2 0 0
417 10/16/96 1 1 1 23 2 22 0 0 3
418 10/21/96 1 2 4 3 1 3 1 2
419 10/25/96 1 1 1 25 1 2 0 0
420 10/29/96 1 2 4 17 1 3 1 1
421 10/31/96 1 1 1 2 1 6 3 0 2
422 11/05/96 1 2 17 13 3 0 3 3
423 11/07/96 2 1 1 24 4 0 2 3
424 11/08/96 1 1 2 2 1 3 0 0
425 11/15/96 1 2 13 25 4 0 0 3
426 11/17/96 2 1 1 13 3 1 3 0
427 11/19/96 1 1 2 23 4 0 0 0
428 11/19/96 2 1 1 25 4 17 0 0 0
429 11/20/96 2 1 1 9 3 LAWRENCE SUMMERS 6 DEPUTY TREASURY SECRETARY 0 3 3
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430 11/20/96 2 1 1 7 3 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 0 3 3
431 11/24/96 2 2 11 7 4 JAMES LILLEY 11 Fmr U.S. AMBASSADOR TO China 1 3 3
432 11/24/96 2 1 1 7 3 1 0 3
433 11/25/96 1 1 1 7 1 Human Rights Watch 13 3 3 2
434 11/26/96 2 1 1 13 3 24 0 3 0
435 11/27/96 1 2 2 3 1 3 1 1
436 11/30/96 1 1 1 23 2 22 0 0 2
437 11/30/96 2 1 1 9 1 JAMES MCGREGOR 12 AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 2 3 3
438 12/03/96 1 2 18 22 1 0 0 2
439 12/05/96 1 1 1 23 1 Human Rights Watch 13 2 0 0
440 12/05/96 2 1 1 13 3 24 2 3 0
441 12/07/96 2 2 7 7 1 LIEBERMAN 7 2 3 3
442 12/08/96 1 1 1 24 4 0 0 0
443 12/10/96 2 1 1 22 1 18 0 3 2
444 12/12/96 1 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
445 12/13/96 1 2 4 3 1 3 1 1
446 12/14/96 2 1 1 28 4 0 0 0
447 12/18/96 1 1 1 22 3 Lee Kuan-yew 22 Singapore's leader 2 3 0
448 12/23/96 1 2 9 2 1 3 0 0
449 12/27/96 1 1 1 3 1 6 2 0 3
450 12/27/96 2 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
451 12/28/96 1 2 2 22 1 3 3 2
452 12/30/96 1 1 2 21 1 2 0 0
453 01/01/97 1 2 8 30 3 0 0 0
454 01/02/97 2 1 1 13 3 17 0 0 0
455 01/06/97 1 1 2 25 4 0 0 0
456 01/08/97 1 2 15 21 1 3 0 1
457 01/11/97 2 1 3 13 3 24 0 0 0
458 01/14/97 1 1 1 9 1 2 0 0
459 01/17/97 1 2 11 29 5 0 0 3
460 01/20/97 2 2 8 1 4 DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 8 FMR. NATL. SECURITY ADVISER 0 0 3
461 01/20/97 1 1 1 3 1 Anthony Lake 6 National Security Adviser 2 0 2
462 01/23/97 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 1
463 01/26/97 2 2 1 23 2 0 0 0
464 01/26/97 1 1 1 3 1 24 3 0 0
465 01/30/97 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 3
466 01/30/97 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 2
467 02/02/97 2 1 1 8 3 0 0 0
468 02/06/97 1 1 1 3 1 Tong Yi 16 3 0 0
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469 02/11/97 2 1 1 22 1 EMILY LAU, HK LEGISLATOR 18 3 0 1
470 02/13/97 2 2 5 17 2 0 0 0
471 02/14/97 1 1 1 23 1 0 0 0
472 02/15/97 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
473 02/16/97 1 2 13 3 1 2 0 3
474 02/18/97 2 1 1 17 5 0 0 0
475 02/19/97 2 2 3 26 3 3 3 0
476 02/19/97 2 2 2 26 2 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 0 0 3
477 02/19/97 2 2 8 26 3 RICHARD HOLBROOKE Fmr. ASST. SECRETARY OF STATE 2 3 3
478 02/19/97 2 2 3 26 3 0 0 0
479 02/19/97 2 1 1 26 3 0 0 0
480 02/19/97 2 1 1 26 3 0 0 0
481 02/20/97 2 1 1 26 1 0 0 0
482 02/20/97 2 2 3 26 1 3 0 0
483 02/20/97 2 1 1 26 1 0 0 0
484 02/20/97 1 1 1 22 1 Andrew Nathan prof. of Chinese politics at Columbia University 3 0 0
485 02/20/97 1 1 2 26 5 0 0 0
486 02/21/97 1 2 13 3 1 3 0 1
487 02/21/97 1 1 1 26 1 24 2 0 0
488 02/22/97 2 2 10 26 3 MARY BROWN BULLOCK 10 PRESIDENT, AGNES SCOTT COLLEGE 2 0 0
489 02/23/97 2 2 6 26 1 Nat'l Security Adviser Berger 6 2 3 3
490 02/23/97 2 1 3 26 1 3 0 0
491 02/23/97 1 1 1 3 1 Michael D. Swaine 13 Rand 3 0 2
492 02/24/97 1 2 15 21 1 3 0 0
493 02/25/97 2 1 1 26 1 0 0 0
494 02/25/97 1 1 1 7 1 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 6 Secretary of State 3 0 3
495 02/26/97 1 2 10 3 1 3 0 2
496 02/26/97 1 1 1 4 5 0 0 0
497 02/28/97 2 1 1 17 1 Ross Munro 13 Human Rights Watch 0 0 2
498 02/28/97 1 2 4 22 1 3 0 1
499 03/01/97 1 1 1 1 1 Gary Bauer president of the Family Research Council 3 1 1
500 03/03/97 2 2 5 17 2 Ross Munro 5 Human Rights Watch 0 0 2
501 03/03/97 1 2 4 1 3 Jonathan Hecht 11 consultant to Lawyers Cmt For Human Rights 2 2 3
502 03/05/97 1 1 1 1 1 Nicholas Burns 6 State Dept.' Spokesman 3 0 2
503 03/08/97 2 1 1 27 5 0 0 0
504 03/09/97 2 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
505 03/10/97 2 2 5 17 1 2 0 2
506 03/10/97 1 2 4 1 1 18 3 2 2
507 03/11/97 2 2 5 17 2 Ross Munro 5 0 0 2
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508 03/11/97 2 1 1 17 5 0 0 2
509 03/12/97 2 1 1 17 5 0 0 0
510 03/13/97 1 2 2 17 2 0 0 2
511 03/16/97 2 1 1 1 4 24 0 0 0
512 03/16/97 1 1 2 23 0 0 0 0
513 03/17/97 2 2 8 17 1 JAMES LILLEY 8 0 0 2
514 03/21/97 1 2 2 3 1 3 0 2
515 03/21/97 1 1 1 23 3 0 0 0
516 03/22/97 2 1 1 7 4 0 0 0
517 03/24/97 2 1 1 7 1 Al Gore 6 vice President of The United States 2 0 0
518 03/28/97 2 1 1 3 1 JAMES LILLEY 8 0 0 2
519 03/28/97 1 2 9 3 1 2 0 2
520 03/28/97 1 1 2 23 2 0 0 0
521 03/30/97 2 2 3 1 1 2 0 2
522 03/30/97 1 2 15 3 1 2 1 2
523 03/31/97 1 1 1 19 2 NEWT GINGRICH 6 Speaker of House 3 0 2
524 04/02/97 2 1 1 7 3 NEWT GINGRICH 8 HOUSE SPEAKER 0 2 2
525 04/02/97 1 2 4 1 1 3 1 1
526 04/03/97 2 1 1 9 3 BOB ODUM 12 LOUISIANA AGRICULTURE COMMISSION 0 2 2
527 04/03/97 1 1 2 3 1 3 0 0
528 04/08/97 2 2 18 22 1 CHRIS PATTEN 18 Gov. of Hong Kong 3 0 0
529 04/09/97 1 1 2 23 2 3 0 2
530 04/10/97 2 1 1 22 1 MARTIN LEE 19 HONG KONG LEGISLATOR 3 0 2
531 04/11/97 1 2 15 3 1 2 0 0
532 04/13/97 1 1 1 22 4 0 0 0
533 04/16/97 1 1 1 23 1 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 6 Secretary of State 3 0 2
534 04/18/97 1 2 2 22 1 3 1 1
535 04/18/97 1 1 2 4 1 0 0 0
536 04/22/97 2 2 23 21 1 Richard Gere 14 the actor and Buddhist 3 0 2
537 04/22/97 1 1 1 22 1 MARTIN LEE 19 2 0 0
538 04/23/97 1 2 13 22 1 3 0 1
539 04/24/97 1 1 1 21 1 Bill Clinton 6 President of the United States 3 0 2
540 04/27/97 1 1 2 4 5 0 0 0
541 04/29/97 2 1 1 17 1 17 0 0 3
542 04/29/97 1 2 4 3 1 3 1 1
543 04/30/97 1 1 2 27 5 0 0 0
544 05/06/97 1 1 1 22 1 2 0 0
545 05/09/97 2 2 3 22 1 PATRICK LEE 19 BUSINESSMAN 3 0 2
546 05/13/97 2 1 1 8 3 JOHN CHAFEE 7 (R) SENATOR, RHODE ISLAND 0 3 3
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547 05/16/97 1 1 1 22 1 Yueng Sum 19  a leader of the Democratic Party 2 0 0
548 05/18/97 2 1 3 23 4 0 3 0
549 05/19/97 2 1 1 8 3 Bill Clinton 6 President of the United States 2 3 3
550 05/20/97 2 1 1 22 4 0 0 0
551 05/21/97 2 2 6 9 3 ROBERT RUBIN 6 TREASURY SECRETARY 0 3 3
552 05/22/97 1 2 15 3 1 3 0 1
553 05/23/97 1 1 1 22 4 0 0 0
554 05/25/97 2 1 1 13 3 WEI JUN, CORRESPONDENT 17 SHANGHAI TV CHINA 0 0 0
555 05/28/97 1 2 4 1 1 3 1 1
556 05/30/97 1 1 2 3 1 0 0 0
557 06/03/97 2 2 16 3 1 Dai Qing 16 2 0 0
558 06/03/97 1 2 4 1 1 3 1 1
559 06/05/97 2 1 1 22 1 19 3 0 0
560 06/12/97 2 1 1 22 1 CHRIS PATTEN 18 3 0 2
561 06/12/97 1 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
562 06/17/97 1 2 15 3 1 3 0 0
563 06/19/97 2 1 1 22 1 3 3 2
564 06/19/97 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2
565 06/20/97 1 1 1 1 1  Representative Dick Armey 6 majority leader in the House 3 2 2
566 06/22/97 2 1 1 22 1 2 0 0
567 06/23/97 2 1 1 22 1 CHRIS PATTEN 18 3 0 0
568 06/24/97 2 2 22 22 4 MAJ. GEN. BYRAN DUTTON 22 COMMANDER, BRITISH FORCES 2 0 3
569 06/24/97 2 1 1 22 4 0 0 0
570 06/25/97 1 1 1 22 1 Sister Betty Ann Maheu 19 editor 3 3 2
571 06/26/97 2 1 1 22 1 19 3 0 2
572 06/26/97 2 1 1 22 3 0 2 0
573 06/26/97 1 1 1 22 1 CHRIS PATTEN 18 Gov. of Hong Kong 3 0 2
574 06/27/97 2 2 19 22 3 JOSEPH CHENG, 19 CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG 0 3 3
575 06/27/97 2 2 18 22 1 2 0 0
576 06/27/97 2 1 1 22 1 CHIK KI-WAI 19 POLICE INSPECTOR 3 0 0
577 06/28/97 2 1 1 22 1 2 0 0
578 06/28/97 1 2 4 8 1 2 2 2
579 06/29/97 2 2 22 22 1 Margaret Thatcher 22 Fmr. British prime minister 3 0 2
580 06/29/97 2 1 1 19 1 TRONG CHAI 21 DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY 3 0 0
581 06/29/97 2 1 3 22 1 3 0 2
582 06/29/97 2 1 1 22 1 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 6 U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 3 0 2
583 06/29/97 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 2
584 06/30/97 2 2 3 22 1 19 3 3 3
585 06/30/97 2 1 1 22 4 Jiang Zemin 17 China President 0 0 3
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586 06/30/97 2 2 3 22 1 2 0 2
587 06/30/97 2 2 3 22 3 2 3 3
588 06/30/97 2 1 1 22 4 CHRIS PATTEN 18 Gov. of Hong Kong 0 3 0
589 06/30/97 2 1 1 22 4 19 0 0 0
590 06/30/97 1 1 1 22 5 0 0 0
591 07/01/97 2 2 12 22 3 Mark Mobius 12 director of Templeton Asset Management 0 3 3
592 07/01/97 2 1 1 22 3 0 3 3
593 07/01/97 1 2 15 8 1 2 3 3
594 07/01/97 1 1 1 22 4 Chinese Americans 15 0 0 3
595 07/01/97 1 1 1 8 2 0 1 2
596 07/02/97 1 1 1 9 2 Senator Thad Cochran 7 0 1 2
597 07/03/97 1 1 1 15 2 0 0 2
598 07/05/97 2 2 3 22 1 3 0 0
599 07/05/97 1 2 9 22 4 0 0 3
600 07/07/97 1 2 4 21 5 0 0 3
601 07/08/97 2 1 1 17 2 0 0 2
602 07/08/97 2 1 1 17 2 SEN. JOHN GLENN 7 0 0 0
603 07/09/97 1 2 2 17 1 0 0 2
604 07/13/97 2 1 3 25 5 0 0 0
605 07/15/97 2 1 1 17 2 JOSEPH LIEBERMAN 7 0 0 0
606 07/16/97 2 1 1 17 5 0 0 0
607 07/16/97 1 1 1 26 3 2 3 0
608 07/20/97 1 1 2 19 2 0 0 0
609 07/21/97 1 2 4 1 2 Juwono Sudarsono 22 Indonesia's leading strategic analyst 0 2 1
610 07/22/97 2 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
611 07/26/97 1 2 15 3 1 2 0 2
612 07/28/97 2 1 1 22 1 Rubin Monro 13 Asia Watch 3 0 0
613 07/30/97 1 1 1 21 2 Lodi Gyari president of the Int'l Campaign for Tibet 3 0 2
614 08/02/97 2 1 1 29 4 24 0 0 0
615 08/07/97 2 2 10 13 3 2 3 2
616 08/10/97 1 2 8 1 4 Jimmy Carter 8 2 0 3
617 08/13/97 1 1 1 7 1 2 3 3
618 08/14/97 1 2 15 3 1 3 0 0
619 08/17/97 2 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
620 08/21/97 1 1 2 22 1 3 0 0
621 08/25/97 1 2 4 8 3 2 2 2
622 08/25/97 1 1 1 21 1 2 0 0
623 09/02/97 1 1 1 29 1 2 3 3
624 09/08/97 2 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
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625 09/10/97 1 1 1 22 1 2 3 0
626 09/12/97 1 2 15 17 1 0 0 2
627 09/13/97 1 1 1 26 1 2 0 0
628 09/15/97 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
629 09/17/97 1 1 2 2 1 3 0 0
630 09/19/97 2 2 11 3 3 Jonathan Pollack 11 senior adviser for int'l policy at Rand Corp. 0 2 0
631 09/21/97 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2
632 09/28/97 2 1 3 23 5 24 0 0 0
633 09/30/97 1 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
634 10/01/97 1 2 15 22 5 2 0 3
635 10/06/97 1 1 1 23 1 Mary Robinson 22 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2 3 3
636 10/10/97 2 1 1 21 1 2 0 0
637 10/18/97 2 1 1 7 3 BOB BROADFOOT 12 Political & Economic RISK CONSULTANCY 0 3 0
638 10/18/97 1 1 1 15 2 Robert Kagan 11 The Carnegie Endowment 2 2 2
639 10/20/97 1 2 4 13 1 Jeffrey E. Garten 9 dean of the Yale School of Management. 2 3 2
640 10/21/97 2 1 1 13 3 24 0 0 0
641 10/24/97 2 1 1 7 1 MIKE JENDRZEJCZYK 13 Human Rights Watch Asia 3 3 2
642 10/24/97 2 1 1 7 3 IAN BUTTERFIELD 12 Director, Int'l Affairs, Westinghouse Electric 0 3 2
643 10/25/97 2 1 1 7 1 Jiang Zemin 17 China President 3 0 2
644 10/25/97 1 2 11 2 1 PEDRO C. MORENO 11 Rutherford Institute 3 0 1
645 10/25/97 1 1 1 7 5 2 0 2
646 10/26/97 2 2 7 7 1 3 2 2
647 10/26/97 2 1 1 7 1 3 0 2
648 10/26/97 1 1 1 7 1 3 0 2
649 10/27/97 2 1 1 7 1 REP. NANCY PELOSI 7 3 2 1
650 10/27/97 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
651 10/28/97 2 1 1 7 1 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 6 Secretary of State 3 2 2
652 10/28/97 2 1 1 7 1 3 0 0
653 10/28/97 1 1 1 7 1 2 0 2
654 10/29/97 2 2 7 7 1 REP. NANCY PELOSI 7 3 2 2
655 10/29/97 2 1 1 19 1 2 0 0
656 10/29/97 2 1 1 8 2 DAN HORNER 11 NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE 0 3 2
657 10/29/97 2 1 1 8 3 0 3 0
658 10/29/97 1 1 1 7 5 2 0 2
659 10/30/97 2 1 1 8 3 GREG MASTEL 11  ECONOMIC STRATEGY INST. 0 2 2
660 10/30/97 2 1 1 29 4 2 0 3
661 10/30/97 2 1 1 7 3 0 3 3
662 10/30/97 2 2 6 8 1 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 6 Secretary of State 3 3 2
663 10/30/97 1 2 2 7 1 3 1 1
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664 10/30/97 1 1 1 7 1 3 2 2
665 10/31/97 1 1 1 7 2 Leslie H. Gelb 11 President of the Council on Foreign Relations 3 0 1
666 11/01/97 2 2 3 7 1 3 0 0
667 11/01/97 2 1 1 7 3 STEVE DORTMAN 12 VICE CHAIRMAN HUGHES 2 3 3
668 11/01/97 1 1 1 21 1 2 0 2
669 11/02/97 2 2 3 7 1 3 1 1
670 11/02/97 1 2 4 1 1 3 1 1
671 11/02/97 1 2 15 7 1 3 0 1
672 11/02/97 1 1 2 7 1 3 0 0
673 11/03/97 2 1 1 8 3 2 2 2
674 11/03/97 1 2 4 7 1 3 0 1
675 11/03/97 1 1 1 7 1 3 0 0
676 11/05/97 1 2 15 1 1 3 2 1
677 11/09/97 2 1 3 29 4 0 0 0
678 11/09/97 1 1 2 27 5 0 0 0
679 11/16/97 2 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
680 11/17/97 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 2
681 11/18/97 1 2 2 2 1 3 0 1
682 11/18/97 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0
683 11/21/97 2 1 1 2 1 Wei Jingsheng 16 3 0 1
684 11/22/97 1 1 1 2 1 Wei Jingsheng 16 3 1 1
685 11/23/97 2 2 16 2 1 Wei Jingsheng 16 3 0 0
686 11/27/97 2 1 1 5 3 0 2 0
687 11/28/97 1 2 15 3 1 3 0 1
688 11/28/97 1 1 1 24 4 0 0 0
689 12/06/97 1 1 1 22 2 19 0 0 2
690 12/09/97 2 1 1 29 1 2 0 0
691 12/17/97 1 1 1 25 5 0 0 0
692 12/21/97 2 1 1 23 4 CHEN JUNSHI 19 HONG KONG ENTREPRENEUR 0 0 0
693 12/24/97 1 2 2 9 3 0 3 0
694 12/26/97 1 1 2 23 2 0 0 0
695 12/30/97 2 1 1 25 2 3 0 0
696 01/01/98 1 1 2 29 4 0 0 0
697 01/05/98 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
698 01/11/98 2 1 1 27 1 2 0 0
699 01/12/98 2 1 1 27 4 0 0 0
700 01/15/98 2 1 1 27 4 0 0 0
701 01/15/98 1 1 1 2 1 Qin Yongmin 16 3 0 3
702 01/22/98 1 1 2 23 1 2 0 0
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703 02/02/98 1 2 13 19 4 Formosan Association for Public Affairs 0 0 2
704 02/04/98 2 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
705 02/04/98 1 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
706 02/09/98 1 1 2 2 1 3 0 0
707 02/15/98 1 1 1 24 4 18 0 0 3
708 02/16/98 1 2 4 16 2 0 0 2
709 02/17/98 2 2 3 13 3 0 3 3
710 02/17/98 1 1 2 3 1 3 0 0
711 03/01/98 1 1 1 24 4 0 1 0
712 03/02/98 1 2 2 3 1 3 0 2
713 03/04/98 2 1 1 17 5 0 0 0
714 03/06/98 2 1 1 17 5 0 0 0
715 03/07/98 1 1 1 2 1 25 3 1 2
716 03/13/98 1 1 2 2 1 Amnesty International 13 3 0 2
717 03/13/98 1 2 4 2 1 3 0 1
718 03/16/98 1 1 1 26 3 0 3 3
719 03/19/98 1 1 1 26 5 0 0 0
720 03/22/98 1 2 13 19 1 13 Director, International Campaign for Tibet 3 0 2
721 03/24/98 2 2 12 7 3 GEORGE FISHER CHAIRMAN & CEO, EASTMAN KODAK 0 3 0
722 03/28/98 1 1 2 29 5 0 0 0
723 04/02/98 1 1 1 2 1 Mike Jendrzejczyk 13 Director for Human Rights Watch Asia 3 0 2
724 04/08/98 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 0
725 04/09/98 1 2 13 3 1 13 human rights watch 3 0 2
726 04/15/98 1 2 15 8 2 0 1 1
727 04/16/98 2 1 1 3 1 Xu Wenli 16 3 0 2
728 04/16/98 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
729 04/19/98 2 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
730 04/20/98 1 1 1 2 1 Wang Dan 16 2 0 0
731 04/21/98 2 1 1 2 1 16 3 0 0
732 04/24/98 1 1 1 2 1 Andrew Nathan 9 Prof. of Chinese politics at Columbia Univ. 2 0 3
733 04/24/98 1 2 4 1 1 3 1 1
734 04/28/98 2 1 1 7 4 SHEN JIRU CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 3 3
735 04/28/98 1 1 1 2 1 Wang Dan 2 0 0
736 05/03/98 1 1 2 3 1 Mathias Duan Yinming 24 A Chinese bishop 3 0 0
737 05/07/98 2 1 1 24 4 PROF. LIANG CONGJIE 16 FRIENDS OF NATURE 0 0 0
738 05/10/98 1 1 1 3 1 Ambassador Sasser 6 3 0 2
739 05/12/98 2 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
740 05/17/98 1 2 2 17 2 0 0 2
741 05/18/98 2 2 7 17 2 0 0 2
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742 05/19/98 2 1 1 17 2 0 0 2
743 05/20/98 2 1 1 17 1 Rep. Dan Burton (R), INDIANA 7 0 1 1
744 05/20/98 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 3
745 05/21/98 2 1 1 17 5 0 0 0
746 05/21/98 1 1 1 15 2 17 0 0 3
747 05/22/98 1 2 15 17 1 0 0 2
748 05/23/98 2 2 3 17 2 0 1 1
749 05/24/98 1 2 15 17 4 0 3 3
750 05/26/98 2 2 7 17 2 NEWT GINGRICH 7 Speaker of House 0 1 1
751 05/26/98 1 2 15 7 1 3 0 2
752 05/27/98 2 2 2 14 2 3 0 2
753 05/27/98 1 1 1 22 1 Martin Lee 19 the chairman of the Democratic Party 3 0 2
754 05/30/98 2 2 3 7 2 0 0 3
755 06/01/98 1 1 1 15 2 0 0 0
756 06/03/98 2 2 3 7 4 0 0 3
757 06/03/98 1 2 15 14 2 0 0 2
758 06/04/98 2 2 12 8 3 GREG MASTEL 12 ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE 2 3 3
759 06/06/98 2 2 12 8 3 LARRY LAU 9  STANFORD UNIVERSITY 0 3 3
760 06/07/98 1 1 2 3 1 2 0 0
761 06/07/98 1 2 2 7 1 3 1 2
762 06/09/98 2 2 3 7 4 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 2 3
763 06/10/98 2 1 1 7 1 SEN. TIM HUTCHINSON 7 3 1 1
764 06/11/98 2 1 1 7 1 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 3 2
765 06/11/98 2 1 1 7 1 Harry Wu 16 Chinese Dissident 3 1 1
766 06/11/98 1 1 1 7 1 2 0 0
767 06/13/98 2 1 1 21 5 2 0 0
768 06/14/98 1 1 1 18 2 0 0 2
769 06/15/98 2 1 1 21 1 2 0 0
770 06/17/98 1 2 8 14 2 0 0 1
771 06/18/98 1 1 1 23 2 Mr. Fernandes 22 India's Defense Minister 0 0 2
772 06/19/98 2 2 7 14 2 REP. CHRISTOPHER COX 0 0 2
773 06/20/98 2 1 1 15 2 0 0 2
774 06/20/98 1 1 1 7 4 Robert A. Kapp 24 president of the U.S.-China Business Council 2 0 3
775 06/21/98 2 1 1 7 1 SEN. TIM HUTCHINSON 7 3 0 2
776 06/22/98 2 2 5 7 1 Jay Carney, correspondent 5 Time magazine 3 3 3
777 06/22/98 1 1 1 13 3 0 3 3
778 06/22/98 1 2 15 19 2 0 0 1
779 06/23/98 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
780 06/24/98 2 2 8 7 1 Winston Lord 8 former U.S. ambassador to China, 3 0 2
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781 06/24/98 2 1 1 7 4 ROBERT RADTKE 13 ASIA SOCIETY 2 0 3
782 06/24/98 1 1 1 10 3 0 2 2
783 06/25/98 2 2 3 7 4 3 0 3
784 06/25/98 2 2 7 7 1 SEN. PAUL WELLSTONE 7  (D), MINNESOTA 3 1 2
785 06/25/98 2 1 1 7 1 24 anonymous 2 0 3
786 06/25/98 1 1 1 7 4 2 3 3
787 06/25/98 1 1 1 7 1 24 2 0 0
788 06/25/98 1 2 2 7 1 3 0 2
789 06/26/98 2 1 1 9 3 0 2 0
790 06/26/98 2 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
791 06/26/98 2 1 1 7 1 2 0 0
792 06/26/98 1 1 1 7 1 Michael D. McCurry 6 White House spokesman 3 0 2
793 06/26/98 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
794 06/27/98 2 2 1 7 1 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 3 2
795 06/27/98 2 1 1 7 1 3 0 3
796 06/27/98 2 1 1 7 1 3 0 2
797 06/27/98 2 2 7 7 2 U.S. Senator Edward Kenndy 7 3 3 2
798 06/27/98 1 1 1 21 1 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 0 2
799 06/27/98 1 2 2 7 1 3 0 2
800 06/28/98 2 1 1 7 1 3 0 0
801 06/28/98 2 2 16 7 1 CHAI LING 2 0 3
802 06/28/98 1 1 1 7 4 2 0 3
803 06/29/98 2 2 16 7 1 Wang Dan 2 0 3
804 06/29/98 2 1 1 7 3 2 2 3
805 06/29/98 2 2 24 7 1 Liu Yanxi 2 0 3
806 06/29/98 2 2 5 7 1 Karen Grigsby Bates, journalist 5 LA Times 3 0 2
807 06/29/98 1 1 1 7 1 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 0 3
808 06/29/98 1 1 1 7 1 24 2 0 3
809 06/29/98 1 2 2 7 1 3 1 2
810 06/30/98 2 1 1 7 3 0 3 3
811 06/30/98 2 1 1 13 3 0 3 3
812 06/30/98 1 1 1 8 3 Marta Newhart a spokeswoman for Boeing in Beijing 0 3 3
813 07/01/98 2 1 1 7 1 MARTIN LEE 19 HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY 3 0 0
814 07/01/98 1 1 1 8 1 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 2 3
815 07/01/98 1 1 1 21 1 3 0 0
816 07/02/98 2 1 1 7 4 2 0 3
817 07/02/98 1 1 1 2 1 Bao Tong 16 3 0 0
818 07/02/98 1 2 15 7 1 3 1 1
819 07/03/98 2 2 1 7 1 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 3 3
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820 07/03/98 2 1 1 1 4 0 2 3
821 07/03/98 1 1 1 7 4 0 0 3
822 07/03/98 1 2 15 7 4 0 0 3
823 07/04/98 2 2 7 7 1 SEN. PAUL WELLSTONE (D), MINNESOTA 3 1 2
824 07/04/98 1 1 2 23 4 0 0 0
825 07/05/98 2 1 3 29 1 1 0 0
826 07/05/98 1 2 15 19 1 3 0 2
827 07/06/98 2 2 6 7 1 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 6 Secretary of State 2 0 3
828 07/07/98 1 1 1 14 2 0 0 0
829 07/09/98 1 2 9 1 1 2 0 3
830 07/11/98 1 1 1 22 3 0 0 0
831 07/13/98 2 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
832 07/14/98 2 1 3 14 2 0 0 3
833 07/14/98 1 2 15 2 1 3 1 0
834 07/19/98 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
835 07/20/98 1 2 10 7 1 1 0 3
836 07/21/98 2 1 1 2 1 3 0 2
837 07/26/98 2 1 3 13 4 0 0 0
838 07/28/98 1 1 1 14 3 0 0 0
839 07/31/98 1 1 1 1 3 Representative Lee H. Hamilton 7 0 3 3
840 08/05/98 1 1 1 27 5 0 0 0
841 08/09/98 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 3
842 08/13/98 2 1 1 27 4 0 0 0
843 08/14/98 1 1 2 27 1 0 0 0
844 08/19/98 2 1 1 27 4 0 0 0
845 08/22/98 1 1 1 22 1 19 2 0 0
846 08/24/98 2 1 1 27 4 0 0 0
847 08/26/98 1 2 11 24 1 LESTER R. BROWN 11 Worldwatch Institute 0 1 2
848 08/31/98 1 1 1 27 4 0 0 0
849 09/04/98 1 1 1 2 1 John Kamm 13 a SF businessman and human rights activist 2 0 3
850 09/14/98 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
851 09/15/98 2 1 1 23 1 Mary Robinson 22 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 3 0 3
852 09/18/98 1 1 1 2 1 16 3 0 0
853 09/27/98 1 1 1 22 1 22 2 0 0
854 10/04/98 1 1 1 5 3 0 0 0
855 10/11/98 2 1 3 27 4 0 0 0
856 10/12/98 1 1 1 22 4 Tung Chee-hwa Hong Kong's chief executive 2 2 3
857 10/14/98 1 2 15 29 1 2 0 3
858 10/19/98 1 1 1 19 1  Koo Chen-fu Straits Exchange Foundation in Taiwan 3 0 0
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859 10/25/98 2 1 1 1 4 0 0 3
860 10/29/98 1 1 1 3 1 0 0 0
861 11/03/98 1 1 1 24 4 0 0 0
862 11/04/98 2 1 1 21 1 2 0 0
863 11/06/98 1 2 15 8 1 0 1 0
864 11/11/98 1 1 1 21 1 3 0 0
865 11/15/98 1 1 1 13 3 Yukon Huang 12 Beijing representative of the World Bank 0 2 3
866 11/16/98 1 2 15 3 1 2 0 0
867 11/19/98 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
868 11/26/98 1 1 1 12 1 2 0 3
869 11/28/98 2 1 1 23 1 Jiang Zemin 17 China President 0 0 0
870 12/01/98 1 1 2 2 1 3 0 0
871 12/05/98 1 1 1 19 2 0 0 0
872 12/07/98 1 1 2 4 5 0 0 0
873 12/10/98 1 1 1 2 1 Beatrice Laroche 13 liaison at the UN for Human Rights in China 3 0 0
874 12/15/98 1 1 1 2 1 Lu Siqing Info Ctr of Human Rights Mvmt in China 3 0 2
875 12/20/98 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 0
876 12/21/98 2 1 1 3 1 PENG MING, ACTIVIST 16 3 0 0
877 12/22/98 2 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
878 12/22/98 1 1 1 2 1 Liu Nianchun 3 0 2
879 12/24/98 1 1 2 21 1 0 0 0
880 12/24/98 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 2
881 12/30/98 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 0
882 01/01/99 1 1 1 28 4 2 0 0
883 01/01/99 1 2 2 16 2 0 0 1
884 01/03/99 2 2 8 1 2 0 0 3
885 01/09/99 1 1 1 28 4 2 0 0
886 01/19/99 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
887 01/21/99 1 2 15 14 2 0 2 2
888 01/24/99 1 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
889 01/27/99 2 1 1 13 3 0 2 0
890 01/30/99 1 1 2 27 5 0 0 0
891 02/04/99 1 1 1 21 1 Kate Saunders 13 the Tibet Information Network 3 0 0
892 02/10/99 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 2
893 02/12/99 1 1 1 24 1 Prof. William Barron, 19 University of Hong Kong 2 2 0
894 02/16/99 1 1 1 6 4 0 0 0
895 02/21/99 1 1 1 22 4 2 0 3
896 02/22/99 1 2 4 3 1 3 2 1
897 02/25/99 1 1 1 27 3 0 0 0
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898 02/26/99 2 1 1 2 1 SEN. PAUL WELLSTONE 7 (D), MINNESOTA 3 0 2
899 02/27/99 1 1 1 2 1 Senator Paul Wellstone 7 Democrat of Minnesota 3 1 1
900 03/01/99 1 1 1 16 2 0 0 2
901 03/02/99 2 1 1 7 1 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 6 Secretary of State 3 2 3
902 03/05/99 1 1 1 8 3 Charlene Barshefsky 6 U.S. Trade Representative 2 3 3
903 03/07/99 1 1 1 16 2 6 0 0 2
904 03/08/99 1 2 4 16 2 0 0 1
905 03/09/99 2 1 1 16 2 BILL RICHARDSON 6 SECRETARY OF ENERGY 0 3 3
906 03/09/99 2 2 8 16 3 Henry Kissinger 8 fmr Secretary of State 0 2 2
907 03/09/99 2 1 1 16 2 0 0 0
908 03/10/99 1 1 1 25 3 24 0 0 0
909 03/10/99 2 2 7 16 2 Sen. Fred Thompson (R-TN) 8 chairman of the Senate Govt Affairs Cmt 0 2 2
910 03/10/99 2 1 1 16 2 0 0 1
911 03/11/99 1 1 1 4 1 3 0 0
912 03/13/99 2 2 6 16 2 KEN DEGRAFFENREID 8 FORMER REAGAN NSC STAFF 0 0 1
913 03/14/99 2 2 10 29 5 0 0 0
914 03/14/99 1 2 8 16 2 Robert M. Gates 8 Director of CIA under President George Bush 2 2 2
915 03/15/99 1 1 1 14 2 William J. Perry 8 the former Defense Secretary 0 0 2
916 03/16/99 1 1 1 1 2 Senator Hollings 7 the ranking Democrat on the Commerce Cmt 3 0 1
917 03/16/99 2 2 7 16 2 REP. PORTER GOSS (R-FL) Chairman, PMT selecte Cmt on Intelligence 0 2 2
918 03/17/99 2 2 7 14 2 0 0 0
919 03/17/99 1 2 15 16 4 0 0 3
920 03/18/99 2 1 1 18 2 XUE MOUHONG 17  QINGHUA UNIVERSITY 0 0 2
921 03/18/99 2 1 1 16 2 China/"USA Today" poll 15 0 0 2
922 03/19/99 1 1 1 29 4 Arthur Doak Barnett a leading scholar & gov't adviser on China 2 3 2
923 03/19/99 2 2 3 16 5 0 0 0
924 03/20/99 1 1 2 23 1 2 0 0
925 03/22/99 1 2 4 16 2 0 0 1
926 03/23/99 1 1 2 23 3 0 0 0
927 03/26/99 1 1 1 5 3 Zhu Rongji 17 Chinese Prime Minister 0 0 0
928 03/29/99 1 2 15 3 1 2 3 3
929 03/30/99 1 1 1 4 1 2 0 0
930 04/04/99 2 1 3 23 2 24 0 0 2
931 04/05/99 1 1 1 14 2 Kanatjan Alibekov 22 defector from Soviet germ warfare program 0 0 0
932 04/05/99 1 2 2 7 1 3 2 2
933 04/07/99 2 1 1 1 3 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 0 3 3
934 04/08/99 1 1 1 11 3 0 3 2
935 04/08/99 2 1 1 7 3 0 2 0
936 04/08/99 2 1 1 7 2 2 3 3
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937 04/09/99 1 1 1 7 4 0 3 2
938 04/09/99 2 1 1 7 1 3 3 2
939 04/09/99 1 2 2 16 2 3 2 2
940 04/10/99 1 1 1 16 2 Zhu Rongji 17 Chinese Prime Minister 0 0 2
941 04/13/99 1 1 1 16 5 0 0 2
942 04/13/99 2 1 1 16 2 Zhu Rongji 17 Chinese Prime Minister 0 0 3
943 04/15/99 1 1 1 11 3 ROBERT KAPP the president of the U.S.-China Business Council 0 3 3
944 04/15/99 2 2 6 8 3 Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin 6 0 3 3
945 04/15/99 1 2 4 1 2 Governor George W. Bush 6 Presidental Candidate 2 3 2
946 04/19/99 1 1 1 16 5 0 0 0
947 04/23/99 1 1 1 16 5 0 0 0
948 04/27/99 1 1 1 11 3 0 2 0
949 04/28/99 2 1 1 16 5 0 0 2
950 04/29/99 1 2 4 16 2 Representative Chris Cox 7 chairman of the select committee 0 0 1
951 04/30/99 1 1 1 20 2 Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman 7 House International Affairs Committee 0 0 2
952 04/30/99 2 1 1 16 2 10 0 0 1
953 05/03/99 1 1 1 3 5 2 0 0
954 05/06/99 2 1 1 24 4 0 0 0
955 05/07/99 2 1 1 18 5 0 0 0
956 05/08/99 1 1 1 18 4 24 0 0 2
957 05/08/99 1 1 1 18 4 0 0 0
958 05/08/99 2 2 6 18 2 Jim Sasser 6 the United States ambassador to China 0 0 3
959 05/08/99 2 1 1 18 2 0 0 0
960 05/08/99 2 2 11 18 2  Dimitri Simes 11 The president of The Nixon Center 0 0 3
961 05/08/99 2 1 1 18 4 JAVIER SOLANA 22 NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL 0 0 3
962 05/09/99 1 1 1 18 5 0 0 0
963 05/09/99 2 1 1 18 4 2 0 0
964 05/09/99 2 1 1 18 2 0 0 0
965 05/10/99 1 1 1 16 2 0 0 0
966 05/10/99 1 1 1 18 2 0 0 0
967 05/10/99 2 2 6 18 1 Jim Sasser 6 the United States ambassador to China 2 0 3
968 05/10/99 2 2 13 18 1 JAN BERRIS 13 NAT'L CMT ON U.S. CHINA RELATIONS 0 0 3
969 05/10/99 2 1 1 18 2 0 0 0
970 05/10/99 2 2 3 18 1 2 0 0
971 05/10/99 2 1 1 18 1 2 0 0
972 05/10/99 2 2 11 16 2 Greg Valliere 11 Charles Schwab Washington Research Group 0 0 2
973 05/10/99 2 2 1 18 2 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 0 3
974 05/10/99 1 2 2 18 2 0 0 3
975 05/11/99 1 1 1 14 2 0 0 2
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976 05/11/99 1 1 1 18 4 0 0 0
977 05/11/99 2 2 3 17 2 2 0 2
978 05/11/99 2 1 1 18 2 0 0 2
979 05/11/99 2 1 1 17 1 0 0 0
980 05/11/99 2 1 1 18 2 2 0 3
981 05/12/99 1 1 1 16 5 0 0 0
982 05/12/99 2 2 8 18 2 JAMES LILLEY 8 FMR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO CHINA 2 0 3
983 05/12/99 1 2 8 18 4 Robert M. Gates 8 Director of CIA under President George Bush 0 0 3
984 05/13/99 2 2 1 1 2 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 0 0 3
985 05/14/99 1 1 1 16 2 0 0 1
986 05/14/99 2 2 4 8 3 Thomas Friedman 4 The New York Times 0 3 0
987 05/14/99 1 2 5 18 1 3 0 0
988 05/15/99 2 2 3 18 1 2 0 3
989 05/16/99 1 1 1 18 5 0 0 3
990 05/16/99 2 1 1 16 2 0 0 1
991 05/18/99 1 1 1 24 4 0 0 0
992 05/18/99 1 2 4 18 1 Larry Diamond 11 democracy specialist at the Hoover Institution 2 3 3
993 05/21/99 1 1 1 18 2 0 0 0
994 05/23/99 2 1 1 18 2 0 0 2
995 05/24/99 2 1 1 16 2 REP. Christopher Cox (R-CA) SELECT CHINA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN 0 0 2
996 05/24/99 2 2 8 1 4 JAMES LILLEY 8 fmr ambassador to China 2 3 3
997 05/24/99 2 1 1 16 2 REP. Christopher Cox (R-CA) 7  SELECT CHINA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN 0 0 2
998 05/24/99 2 1 1 16 2 0 0 2
999 05/24/99 2 1 1 16 2 0 0 2
1000 05/25/99 1 1 1 16 2 0 0 1
1001 05/25/99 2 1 1 16 2 REP. Christopher Cox (R-CA) SELECT CHINA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN 0 1 1
1002 05/25/99 2 2 3 16 2 0 3 2
1003 05/25/99 2 1 1 16 2 JAMES MULVENON RAND CORPORATION 0 0 3
1004 05/25/99 2 1 1 16 2 0 0 2
1005 05/25/99 2 1 1 16 2 ZHU BANGZAO 17 CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN 0 0 2
1006 05/25/99 2 2 6 16 2 BILL RICHARDSON U.S. SECRETARY OF ENERGY 0 0 2
1007 05/25/99 2 1 1 11 3 0 2 3
1008 05/26/99 1 1 2 23 2 0 0 0
1009 05/26/99 1 1 1 16 2 0 0 2
1010 05/26/99 2 2 7 16 2 0 2 2
1011 05/26/99 2 2 5 11 3  Adam Zagorin "Time" Washington correspondent 0 3 3
1012 05/26/99 2 1 1 16 2 REP. Christopher Cox (R-CA) 7 SELECT CHINA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN 0 0 1
1013 05/29/99 2 2 11 1 2 David Shambaugh 11 Brookings Institution 0 1 1
1014 05/30/99 2 2 8 16 2 Henry Kissinger 8 fmr Secretary of State 0 0 3
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1015 05/30/99 1 2 2 16 2 2 3 2
1016 06/01/99 1 1 1 2 1 Ding Zilin, a retired professor 24 3 0 0
1017 06/01/99 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 0
1018 06/02/99 2 1 1 8 1 Charlene Barshefsky 6 Trade Representative of The United States 3 3 3
1019 06/03/99 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
1020 06/03/99 2 1 1 8 3 ROBERT KAPP 12 U.S.-China Business Council 2 3 3
1021 06/03/99 1 2 9 16 1 2 3 3
1022 06/04/99 1 1 1 2 1 Sophia Woodman 13 Human Rights in China 3 0 0
1023 06/04/99 2 2 11 3 1 JAMES LILLEY 11 Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute 3 3 2
1024 06/04/99 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
1025 06/06/99 1 1 1 2 1 Bao Tong 13 3 0 0
1026 06/08/99 2 1 1 18 2 0 0 2
1027 06/10/99 1 1 1 14 2 Dan Hoydysh 12 the director of trade policy for Unisys Corp. 0 2 2
1028 06/10/99 2 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
1029 06/15/99 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1030 06/17/99 2 2 3 18 2 0 0 3
1031 06/19/99 1 1 1 21 5 0 0 0
1032 06/21/99 1 2 15 18 2 0 0 1
1033 06/24/99 1 1 2 16 2 0 0 2
1034 06/25/99 1 1 1 22 3 0 2 2
1035 06/28/99 2 1 1 3 3 2 3 3
1036 06/29/99 1 1 1 3 1 24 3 0 0
1037 06/29/99 1 2 4 1 3 2 3 3
1038 07/09/99 1 1 1 21 1 23 3 0 0
1039 07/10/99 2 1 1 29 4 0 0 3
1040 07/11/99 2 1 1 29 4 0 0 3
1041 07/13/99 2 1 1 8 5 0 0 0
1042 07/14/99 1 1 2 22 1 2 0 0
1043 07/15/99 1 2 2 19 2 0 0 2
1044 07/17/99 1 1 1 29 3 0 0 0
1045 07/19/99 1 2 15 19 1 2 0 1
1046 07/20/99 1 1 2 7 3 0 0 3
1047 07/20/99 1 2 9 19 1 3 0 1
1048 07/22/99 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1049 07/22/99 2 1 1 3 1 17 2 0 0
1050 07/23/99 1 1 1 18 5 0 0 0
1051 07/25/99 1 1 2 19 2 22 0 0 3
1052 07/26/99 2 1 1 8 1 REP. DAVID DREIER (R), CALIFORNIA 3 3 3
1053 07/27/99 1 1 1 3 1 Amnesty International 13 3 0 0
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1054 07/27/99 1 2 4 19 1 3 2 2
1055 07/29/99 2 2 16 2 1 Erping Zhang 16 spokesman for Falun Gong in The United States 3 0 0
1056 07/30/99 1 1 1 3 1 24 3 0 2
1057 07/30/99 1 2 15 3 3 1 3 3
1058 08/01/99 1 1 1 16 2 George A. Keyworth 10 a senior scientist from Los Alamos Nat'l Lab 0 0 2
1059 08/02/99 2 1 1 2 1 XU LIANGYING, SCIENTIST 24 3 0 0
1060 08/02/99 1 2 11 19 4 Chas. W. Freeman Jr. co-chairman of the U.S.-China Policy Foundation 2 0 3
1061 08/03/99 1 1 1 15 2 0 0 2
1062 08/06/99 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1063 08/08/99 1 2 15 20 5 0 0 0
1064 08/10/99 1 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
1065 08/14/99 1 1 2 5 4 0 0 0
1066 08/15/99 2 1 3 21 1 2 0 0
1067 08/20/99 1 2 20 19 5 3 0 1
1068 08/24/99 1 1 1 21 5 0 0 0
1069 08/26/99 2 2 16 2 1 Han Dongfang 16 Fmr. Tiananmen Square Labor Activist 3 0 0
1070 08/31/99 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
1071 09/04/99 1 1 2 29 5 0 0 0
1072 09/07/99 2 1 1 19 3 0 3 3
1073 09/08/99 1 2 4 23 4 0 0 0
1074 09/10/99 1 1 1 14 2 CIA 6 0 0 2
1075 09/11/99 2 1 1 11 3 0 3 0
1076 09/15/99 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1077 09/20/99 1 2 15 13 4 1 1 3
1078 09/22/99 2 1 1 16 5 0 0 0
1079 09/23/99 1 1 1 5 3 0 0 0
1080 09/26/99 2 1 1 24 4 0 0 0
1081 09/28/99 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1082 09/28/99 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
1083 09/28/99 2 1 1 8 3 2 2 3
1084 09/29/99 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1085 10/01/99 1 1 1 3 1 Wang Ruoshui 16 3 0 0
1086 10/01/99 2 2 5 29 4 2 2 0
1087 10/01/99 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
1088 10/01/99 1 2 15 13 4 1 1 3
1089 10/03/99 2 2 3 3 1 3 2 0
1090 10/14/99 1 1 2 4 5 0 0 0
1091 10/17/99 2 1 3 13 1 2 0 0
1092 10/19/99 2 1 1 14 2 0 0 2
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1093 10/22/99 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
1094 10/23/99 1 2 9 14 2 0 0 2
1095 10/28/99 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1096 10/29/99 2 1 1 3 1 THOMAS PICKERING U.S. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 3 0 2
1097 10/30/99 1 1 1 22 4 0 0 0
1098 11/01/99 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
1099 11/04/99 1 1 1 3 1 NYT Editorial board 2 3 0 0
1100 11/09/99 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
1101 11/11/99 1 1 1 11 3 0 3 3
1102 11/11/99 2 1 1 14 2 0 0 2
1103 11/14/99 1 1 1 11 3 0 2 3
1104 11/15/99 2 2 12 11 3 Robert Hormats vice chairman of Goldman Sachs International 2 3 3
1105 11/15/99 2 2 3 11 3 0 3 3
1106 11/15/99 2 1 1 11 3 0 3 0
1107 11/15/99 1 2 12 5 3 Gordon G. Chang a lawyer based in Beijing for an American firm 2 2 2
1108 11/16/99 1 1 1 11 1 0 3 3
1109 11/16/99 1 1 1 11 1 Charlene Barshefsky 6 Trade Representative of The United States 0 3 3
1110 11/17/99 1 1 1 3 1 He Qinglian 16 a Shenzhen author and economist 3 3 2
1111 11/18/99 1 1 1 29 1 0 3 2
1112 11/18/99 2 1 1 8 3 0 2 0
1113 11/21/99 2 1 1 13 2 0 0 0
1114 11/22/99 1 2 4 1 1 Governor George W. Bush 6 Presidental Candidate 3 3 2
1115 11/24/99 1 1 1 29 1 Gladys Yang 24 3 0 0
1116 11/25/99 2 1 1 27 5 0 0 0
1117 11/26/99 1 1 2 22 5 0 0 0
1118 11/27/99 2 1 1 27 3 0 0 0
1119 11/29/99 2 2 6 1 3 GENE SPERLING 6 DIR., NATL. ECONOMIC COUNCIL 2 3 3
1120 11/30/99 2 2 3 11 1 3 3 3
1121 12/02/99 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1122 12/05/99 2 2 25 11 2 0 0 0
1123 12/07/99 1 1 2 3 1 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 0 2
1124 12/10/99 1 1 1 23 2 2 0 0
1125 12/11/99 2 1 1 24 4 0 0 0
1126 12/11/99 1 2 15 23 1 3 0 1
1127 12/13/99 2 1 1 22 5 0 0 0
1128 12/16/99 1 1 1 7 2 0 0 3
1129 12/16/99 2 1 1 18 4 0 0 3
1130 12/19/99 2 1 3 22 4 0 0 0
1131 12/20/99 1 1 1 22 4 President Jorge Sampaio 22 President of Portugal 2 0 0
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1132 12/20/99 2 1 1 16 5 0 0 0
1133 12/24/99 1 2 15 21 1 0 0 1
1134 12/25/99 1 1 2 3 1 13 Info Ctr of Human Rights Mvnt in China 3 0 0
1135 12/31/99 1 1 1 3 1 Neil Weissman 9 academic dean at Dickinson College 3 0 0
1136 12/31/99 2 2 3 13 1 0 0 3
1137 01/01/00 1 1 1 13 5 0 0 0
1138 01/01/00 1 2 15 8 1 3 1 2
1139 01/02/00 2 2 11 19 LARRY WORTZEL 11 HERITAGE FOUNDATION 0 0 2
1140 01/06/00 1 1 1 3 1 Liu Jian 24 a lawyer 3 0 0
1141 01/09/00 2 1 1 21 1 2 0 0
1142 01/11/00 1 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
1143 01/12/00 2 1 1 5 3 0 0 0
1144 01/18/00 1 1 1 21 1 2 0 0
1145 01/19/00 2 1 1 23 2 0 0 2
1146 01/21/00 1 1 1 4 1 Dai Xianglong 17 Head of the People's Bank of China 2 0 0
1147 01/26/00 1 1 1 2 1 Jerome Cohen 10 an expert on Chinese law 3 0 0
1148 01/27/00 2 1 1 1 4 0 0 3
1149 01/30/00 1 1 1 2 1 Song Yongyi 16 An American-based Chinese scholar 3 0 0
1150 01/31/00 1 2 15 3 1 3 1 2
1151 02/03/00 1 1 1 20 2 Steven M. Goldstein 10 a China specialist at Smith College 0 0 2
1152 02/05/00 2 1 1 13 4 0 0 0
1153 02/10/00 1 1 1 2 1 Senator William V. Roth Jr. 7 the Delaware Republican 3 2 2
1154 02/15/00 2 2 16 2 1 HARRY WU 16 FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER 3 2 3
1155 02/16/00 1 2 16 2 1 3 0 2
1156 02/18/00 1 1 1 23 5 0 0 0
1157 02/20/00 1 1 1 22 1 19 2 0 0
1158 02/22/00 2 1 1 19 2 0 2 3
1159 02/24/00 1 1 1 11 3 Senator William V. Roth Jr. 7 the Delaware Republican 0 3 3
1160 02/26/00 1 1 1 7 2 0 0 3
1161 02/27/00 1 2 15 19 4 0 0 3
1162 02/28/00 2 2 6 19 4 James Prueher 6 The U.S. ambassador to China 0 2 3
1163 03/02/00 1 1 2 21 1 2 0 0
1164 03/05/00 2 2 9 26 1 RICHARD DROBNICK 9  UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 0 3 3
1165 03/06/00 1 1 1 4 3 2 2 0
1166 03/08/00 2 1 1 19 2 0 0 2
1167 03/09/00 1 1 1 8 1 Nicholas Lardy 11 a China expert at the Brookings Institution 3 2 2
1168 03/10/00 1 1 1 3 1 Mr. Mao 13 chairman of the Unirule Institute for Economics 3 0 0
1169 03/10/00 1 2 2 8 2 2 3 3
1170 03/12/00 1 2 15 19 2 0 0 2
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1171 03/14/00 2 2 13 20 2 ANDREW YANG 13 TAIPEI INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 0 0 2
1172 03/14/00 1 1 1 19 3 0 2 0
1173 03/16/00 1 1 1 19 2 Zhu Rongji 17 Chinese Prime Minister 0 2 0
1174 03/17/00 2 2 3 19 1 0 2 2
1175 03/18/00 2 1 1 19 4 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 0 3
1176 03/19/00 2 1 1 19 1 24 anonymous 3 0 0
1177 03/19/00 1 1 1 19 4 Chu Yun-han 21 a political scientist at National Taiwan University 2 0 3
1178 03/20/00 2 1 1 19 2 2 0 3
1179 03/20/00 1 1 1 19 4 a senior administration official 6 2 0 3
1180 03/21/00 1 1 1 19 1 3 0 2
1181 03/21/00 1 2 15 19 2 3 0 2
1182 03/22/00 1 1 1 19 1 21 3 0 3
1183 03/26/00 1 1 1 29 5 0 0 0
1184 03/31/00 2 1 1 29 3 Feng Xiaogang 24 0 2 0
1185 03/31/00 1 1 1 7 4 0 0 2
1186 04/04/00 1 1 1 14 2 William S. Cohen 6 Defense Secretary 0 0 2
1187 04/05/00 2 1 1 2 1 LOIS WHEELER SNOW 5 WIDOW OF EDGAR SNOW 3 0 0
1188 04/06/00 1 1 1 8 3 0 3 3
1189 04/06/00 1 2 4 14 2 Cohen 6 Secretary of Defense 0 0 2
1190 04/11/00 1 2 2 18 4 0 0 0
1191 04/12/00 2 1 1 8 3 BRET CALDWELL 13 TEAMSTERS' SPOKESMAN 3 1 2
1192 04/12/00 2 1 1 8 3 0 1 0
1193 04/12/00 1 1 1 8 3 George Becker 13 president of the United Steelworkers of America 0 1 2
1194 04/14/00 1 1 1 7 3 0 3 3
1195 04/16/00 1 1 1 5 3 0 3 0
1196 04/19/00 1 1 1 2 1 Ken Roth 13 executive director of Human Rights Watch 3 0 2
1197 04/20/00 1 1 1 29 5 2 0 0
1198 04/20/00 1 2 2 20 2 0 0 1
1199 04/26/00 1 1 1 2 1 Fa Lun Gong Sect 16 3 0 0
1200 04/28/00 2 1 1 8 3 2 3 3
1201 04/29/00 1 1 2 23 4 0 0 0
1202 05/03/00 1 1 1 3 1 Committee to Protect Journalists 13 2 0 0
1203 05/06/00 2 2 11 8 1 NICHOLAS LARDY 11 BROOKINGS INSTITUTIONS 2 3 3
1204 05/08/00 2 1 1 18 2 24 anonymous 2 0 3
1205 05/08/00 1 1 1 3 1 24 3 0 0
1206 05/09/00 2 2 8 8 1 Jimmy Carter 8 Fmr President of the United States 2 3 3
1207 05/09/00 1 2 4 8 3 Prof. Robert Reich 8 former Labor Secretary 0 3 3
1208 05/11/00 1 1 1 3 1 0 0 0
1209 05/12/00 2 1 1 8 5 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 0 3 0
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1210 05/13/00 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
1211 05/13/00 1 1 1 8 3 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 0 3 3
1212 05/14/00 1 2 15 3 1 3 1 1
1213 05/17/00 2 2 6 8 2 Governor George W. Bush 6 Presidental Candidate 2 3 2
1214 05/17/00 1 1 1 8 3 15 2 2 2
1215 05/18/00 2 2 1 8 1  Alan Greenspan 6 Federal Reserve Chairman 2 3 3
1216 05/18/00 2 2 6 2 1 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 6 Secretary of State 3 0 2
1217 05/18/00 2 1 1 8 2 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 3 3
1218 05/18/00 1 1 1 8 3 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 0 3 3
1219 05/18/00 1 2 4 1 1 Richard Nixon 8 Former President of The United States 3 1 1
1220 05/19/00 2 1 1 8 5 0 3 0
1221 05/19/00 1 1 1 19 1 Annette Lu 20 Vice President-elect of Taiwan 2 0 1
1222 05/20/00 2 1 1 8 1 REP. ASA HUTCHINSON 7  (R), ARKANSAS 3 3 0
1223 05/20/00 1 2 15 1 1 3 1 2
1224 05/21/00 2 2 12 8 3 MICHAEL MAILBACH 12 INTEL CORPORATION 2 3 3
1225 05/21/00 1 1 1 8 1 Zhou Daichun 24 a commercial lawyer in Beijing 2 3 3
1226 05/21/00 1 2 2 8 3 2 3 3
1227 05/22/00 2 2 7 8 1 REP. NANCY PELOSI 7 (D), CALIFORNIA 3 1 1
1228 05/22/00 2 1 1 8 1 JAMES HOFFA 13 Int'l BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS 2 1 0
1229 05/23/00 2 2 7 8 3 Gallup poll 15 3 3 2
1230 05/23/00 2 1 1 8 3 2 3 3
1231 05/23/00 2 1 1 8 3 3 3 0
1232 05/23/00 1 1 1 11 3 24 0 2 0
1233 05/24/00 2 1 1 8 3 REP. DAVID BONIOR 7  (D-MI), MINORITY WHIP 3 3 2
1234 05/24/00 2 1 1 8 3 0 3 0
1235 05/24/00 2 2 7 8 5 REP. CHAKA FATTAH (D), PENNSYLVANIA 0 0 0
1236 05/24/00 1 1 1 8 3 Representatives Barney Frank 7 a liberal Democrat from the Boston 3 1 2
1237 05/24/00 1 2 12 8 3 MICHAEL N. BAZIGOS 12 globalization strategic consulting 0 3 3
1238 05/25/00 2 1 1 8 3 TERRY MCGRAW 12 MCGRAW-HILL COMPANIES 3 3 3
1239 05/25/00 2 1 1 8 3 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 3 2
1240 05/25/00 1 1 1 8 1 Rep. Richard Gephart, (D) MI 7 THE MINORITY LEADER, 3 2 2
1241 05/25/00 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1242 05/26/00 1 2 7 8 3 George R. Nethercutt Jr. 7 a Republican Congressman from WA 2 3 3
1243 05/27/00 2 2 3 13 3 3 3 0
1244 05/29/00 1 1 1 19 1 3 0 0
1245 05/30/00 1 2 15 8 3 0 1 2
1246 06/01/00 2 2 12 8 3 BARRY HYMAN 12 EHRENKRANZ KING NUSSBAUM 0 2 0
1247 06/01/00 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
1248 06/04/00 2 1 1 2 1 JOHN KAMM 13 HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATE 3 0 0
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1249 06/08/00 2 1 1 23 1 0 0 0
1250 06/09/00 1 1 1 7 2 0 0 0
1251 06/12/00 1 2 15 11 1 3 1 2
1252 06/13/00 1 1 1 29 0 0 0 0
1253 06/19/00 1 1 1 27 1 2 0 0
1254 06/24/00 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 2
1255 06/24/00 1 1 1 14 2 Representative Christopher Cox 7 a California Republican 0 0 2
1256 06/28/00 1 2 15 8 1 0 2 3
1257 06/29/00 1 1 2 16 2 0 0 2
1258 06/30/00 2 1 1 3 3 KRISTEN GUIDA 13 FREEDOM HOUSE 3 0 0
1259 07/02/00 1 1 1 3 1 Zhang Jingcai 24 retired Communist party cadre 3 0 0
1260 07/05/00 2 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
1261 07/08/00 1 1 1 23 1 2 0 0
1262 07/12/00 2 1 1 14 2 0 0 2
1263 07/13/00 1 1 1 14 2 0 0 2
1264 07/15/00 1 2 15 1 4 0 0 3
1265 07/18/00 1 1 1 23 2 David Shambaugh 11 China specialist at Brookings Institution 0 0 2
1266 07/27/00 1 1 2 8 3 0 3 3
1267 08/01/00 1 1 1 19 4 Chen Shui bian 20 Taiwan President 0 0 0
1268 08/03/00 1 1 1 19 1 2 0 0
1269 08/06/00 2 1 3 24 4 LI RUOFAN VICE DIR., QINGHAI LAKE STATE 0 0 0
1270 08/07/00 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
1271 08/14/00 1 1 1 13 5 0 0 0
1272 08/15/00 1 2 15 1 4 0 0 3
1273 08/19/00 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 0
1274 08/24/00 2 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
1275 08/25/00 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0
1276 08/28/00 2 1 1 23 1 Bishop Desmond Tutu 22 3 0 0
1277 08/30/00 1 2 15 21 4 3 1 2
1278 09/01/00 1 1 1 7 1 Bob Berring 9 law prof. at UC Berkeley 3 0 2
1279 09/05/00 2 1 1 7 2 EDWARD FRIEDMAN 9 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 3 0 2
1280 09/06/00 1 1 1 8 1 Senator William V. Roth Jr. 7 a Delaware Republican 2 3 2
1281 09/07/00 1 1 1 22 1 Michael DeGolyer 18 head of the Hong Kong Transition Project 3 0 0
1282 09/08/00 2 1 1 7 4 2 2 2
1283 09/09/00 1 1 1 22 1 0 0 0
1284 09/12/00 1 2 2 16 4 0 0 0
1285 09/13/00 1 1 1 8 3 Thomas J. Donohue 12 president of the US Chamber of Commerce 0 3 3
1286 09/17/00 1 1 1 3 1 24 2 0 0
1287 09/19/00 2 2 1 8 4 Bill Clinton 6 The President of the United States 3 3 3
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1288 09/19/00 2 1 1 8 4 3 3 3
1289 09/20/00 1 1 2 8 5 0 3 0
1290 09/23/00 1 2 15 1 4 0 0 3
1291 09/27/00 1 2 20 19 4 0 2 3
1292 09/29/00 1 1 2 27 5 0 0 0
1293 10/01/00 2 1 1 3 1 Fa Lun Gong Sect 16 3 0 0
1294 10/02/00 1 1 1 23 4 0 0 0
1295 10/08/00 2 2 11 1 4 WINSTON LORD 11 CHINA SPECIALIST 3 3 3
1296 10/09/00 1 1 1 3 3 0 0 0
1297 10/14/00 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0
1298 10/17/00 1 1 1 19 2 0 0 0
1299 10/23/00 1 1 1 23 2 0 0 0
1300 10/24/00 1 2 4 11 4 Qian Qichen 17 China's deputy prime minister 0 2 3
1301 11/05/00 1 1 1 13 5 0 0 0
1302 11/10/00 1 1 1 3 1 Edward L. Shaughnessy 10 a historian at the University of Chicago 2 0 0
1303 11/17/00 1 1 1 22 1 Willy Wo-Lap Lam 19 columnist & editor of South China Morning Post 2 0 0
1304 11/22/00 1 1 1 15 2 0 0 3
1305 11/26/00 1 1 3 23 3 0 0 0
1306 12/06/00 1 1 1 19 2 Parris H. Chang a legislator of Democratic Progressive Party 0 0 2
1307 12/12/00 1 2 9 19 4 VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG 9 assistant prof. of POLI, University of Richmond 2 0 3
1308 12/13/00 1 1 1 3 1 3 0 0
1309 12/17/00 1 1 1 25 1 2 0 0
1310 12/23/00 1 1 1 4 1 0 0 0
1311 12/26/00 2 1 1 27 5 0 0 0
1312 12/27/00 1 1 1 4 5 0 0 0
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